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Ehab Galal
Where has the authority gone?  
New imperatives and audience research 
Shared, mediated experiences come to define the terms and outlines of social and po-
litical discourse. Through such trends, culture increasingly functions with a kind of au-
tonomy that is in many ways unprecedented. At the same time, practices of religion are 
changing, with individuals assuming more responsibility for the direction of their own 
spiritual quests. Through their “seeking”, the influence and legitimacy of formal religions 
of all kinds has increasingly come into question. The power of legitimation is more and 
more in the hands of the seeker as she looks to a wider and wider range of sources and 
contexts – beyond the traditional ones – for religious or spiritual insight. This has all 
served to center the media in these trends and in our understanding of them. (Hoover 
2006: 2)
This quote from the introduction to Stewart Hoover’s book Religion in the Media 
Age (2006) points to a number of aspects that characterises media’s role in the 
individual believer’s pursuit of religious meaning today. First, traditional and for-
mal religious institutions are increasingly challenged by the media as an alterna-
tive place that can provide believers with resources for making meaning of faith. 
Second, it is up to the believer and media user more than ever to navigate and 
negotiate the many offers currently available. Third, accessible mediated sym-
bolic resources are no longer restricted to one religious context or authority, but 
are embedded in not only different religions and different transnational, national 
and local contexts, but also in different media genres. All of these changes are 
important in understanding the relationship between audiences and mediated 
religion. 
This volume explores part of this relationship by examining how Arab au-
diences respond to religion in Arab media. The focus is on mediated religion 
as it is transnationally and globally practiced and consumed by Arabic-speaking 
audiences. The chapters of this book explore how Arab Muslims and Christians 
in different contexts make use of religious, cultural, and political narratives of-
fered by Arab media to construct ideas about believing and belonging within 
and across national borders. The volume presents six case studies examining 
audiences from various perspectives offered by scholars with different research 
interests and theoretical approaches to the Arab audiences. In terms of both 
theory and analysis, the approaches employed in these contributions are cross 
disciplinary and qualitative. In order to introduce the theoretical and analytical 
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approaches that frame these contributions, I discuss the role and position of re-
ligion in the media along with the dynamics of the media-audience relationship 
in this chapter. 
Mediated religion in Arab media
Religion has always an omnipresent topic in the media. However, the ways in 
which the media addresses religion differs widely across nations and across pub-
lic and private media. In general, though, media researchers tend to agree that 
over the last twenty to thirty years, religion has become an increasingly popu-
lar subject (Clark 2007; Hoover 1997, 2006). Terms like re-sacralization or re- 
enchantment of public spheres have been suggested and refer to the current pres-
ence of religion in primarily western media as reflecting a return of religion into 
the public sphere. The use of the term ‘re-enchanting’ of the public challenges We-
ber’s idea of a disenchanted public as result of modernisation (Martín-Barbero 
1997; Murdock 1997). The term re-sacralization likewise refers to the return of 
the sacred or holy to the public – contrary to modernisation’s assignation of the 
sacred to traditional religious institutions and private spheres. The introduction 
of concepts such as re-sacralization or re-enchantment reflects an interest in the 
position of religion in public spheres and hence in the media.
One may, however, question the emphasis on the ‘return’-perspective, claim-
ing that religion has always been present in the media, but in different ways. It is 
precisely these ‘different ways’ that are the focus of my attention. Although analy-
ses and discussions of re-sacralization or re-enchantment have mainly derived 
from the specific processes of secularism and post-secularism in western coun-
tries (cf. Clark 2002; Mitchell & Marriage 2003), in Arab countries similar – but 
different – changes have also been prevalent. Since the 1950s, a number of Arab 
states have restricted religious programming to Koran recitations and Friday 
prayers as a way of legitimising their own authoritarian power. By clearly demar-
cating the Koran recitations and Friday prayers from other media programmes 
and by observing prescribed ritual times, these broadcasts mirror traditional 
institutionalised religious practices. Thus, it was not the kind of dramatic shift 
in public religion that Hoover suggests in the quote given at the introduction 
of this chapter. Over time, however, religion has been succeeded in obtaining 
new spaces in Arab media due to a number of political, technological and social 
factors. Koran recitations and Friday prayers have been met with competition 
from a wide variety of different religious programming from religious teaching 
to reality shows. Some of these are broadcasted by ‘ordinary’ channels that em-
brace both religious and non-religious programming. Others are broadcasted by 
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the numerous religious channels that have been introduced since the late 1990s. 
It is also important to note that religious issues and language have also gained 
ground in non-religious programming. The factors behind this development are 
manifold. The islamisation of society and public institutions has frequently been 
cited to explain this trend. While this is surely an important factor, it cannot 
be separated from the general social development of better educated and more 
individualised audiences and the advent of and access to new technologies that 
free the individual from traditional dominant discourse communities (Eickel-
man and Anderson 1999). Furthermore, the gradually loss of state monopolies 
over television has resulted in increased liberalisation of Arab media. In addition 
the growing economic and cultural influence of Saudi Arabia and of Gulf State 
media tycoons has helped make them important players in the Arab media mar-
ket (Sakr 2001). 
In order to understand the position of religion in Arab media, I focus on three 
developments. First, I point to the influence of satellite TV on the emergence of 
new religious channels and programming. The audiences’ relation to such chan-
nels and programmes are a point of reference in the first four chapters of this vol-
ume. As such, the following section provides important contextual background 
information. The second development of note is that religion has also gained 
new attention in more popular media genres such as drama series and cinema, 
a trend which is examined in the last two chapters. Finally, as a result of these 
two developments, the media has become a battlefield for political and religious 
positioning vis-à-vis different antagonists, which is a subject in all the chapters 
to varying degrees.
Arab religious satellite media
An irrefutable aspect of the recent development of satellite media is the in-
tensified transnational character of media production and media circulation; 
transnational refers here to extending or operating across national boundaries. 
Compared to previous national monopolies of radio and television production, 
almost all kinds of media are today influenced by transnationality, whether in 
terms of ownership, production, transmission, circulation, or as sources for local 
media. Arab media have also become transnational, not only in their reach but 
also in their ownership and language. According to the Arab League report from 
2013, today there are more than 1,320 television satellite channels broadcasted 
by Arab satellites and among these, 168 are state owned and 1,152 are private. 16 
television satellite channels are owned by non-Arab states broadcasting in Arabic 
(Itihad iza‘at al-Dewwal al-‘Arabiya 2013: 20–22). Arab channels transmit via 
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twelve satellites covering most of the planet (ibid.: 27). Among the Arab satellite 
channels, there are also about 135 Islamic channels including Sunni as well as 
Shia Islam (ibid.: 24). However, the majority of the Islamic channels are Sunni. 
There are also Christian channels offering full-time religious TV.
This development reflects a shift from national monopolies of TV and radio 
that promoted secular nationalism in which the key role of religion was to sup-
port the cultural and moral order of the national imagined community (Abu-
Lughod 2005; Rugh 2004). The growing liberalisation of Arab media – to the 
extent it exists – has supported the emergence of new private media and among 
these, satellite channels (Sakr 2001). Thus, in the 1990s, a number of Arab satel-
lite channels were launched. Not only were satellite channels introduced by many 
Arab states, but private initiatives were also commenced – primarily by Saudi 
princes and businessmen with close connections to the Saudi regime. These 
included MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Center, 1991), ART (Arabic Radio 
and Television, 1993), Orbit (1994) and Rotana (1995). Since the 1990s new 
channels have mostly been launched under the umbrella of the large pan-Arab 
broadcasting groups previously mentioned, thus further consolidating their 
position. With the establishment of al-Jazeera in Qatar in 1996, the Arab me-
dia field became even more diverse due to the channel’s critical news coverage, 
which has made it popular all over the world (Mellor et al. 2011). From the 
very beginning, one of al-Jazeera’s most popular programmes was the religious 
programme al-Sharia wa al-Hayat [Sharia and the life] with the religious scholar 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi giving answers on basis of Islam to all kinds of questions from 
the audiences. Without doubt, the success of this programme has inspired oth-
ers, and the fatwa programme did also get a central place in the Islamic channels 
that soon became part of the satellite development. 
New channels that define themselves as Islamic offer what they themselves 
define in general terms as ‘universal values’ based on Islam (Galal 2012). These 
Islamic channels are characterised by being almost exclusively financed and pro-
duced by Arab businessmen, business consortia or financial companies. The first 
Islamic Arab satellite channel, Iqraa (Read)1, was launched in 1998 by ART. The 
media group ART consists of several thematic channels, (with Iqraa as the only Is-
lamic one) and is owned by Saudi businessman and multi-millionaire Saleh Kamel. 
Hence, most Islamic satellite channels do not stem from religious institutions or 
organisations, but from multiple business interests with a sharp eye for market 
1 Iqraa is the imperative of the word ‘to read’ which was the first word revealed to the 
prophet Muhammad according to the Islamic tradition. 
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share, and thus for audience behaviour and interests. While Islamic satellite televi-
sion appears to be considered a good business investment by many, most low-cost 
Islamic websites and pamphlet literature are published by religious institutions 
or associations. Additionally, most Arab-Christian satellite channels have been 
launched by churches or religious associations, not media corporations. 
As a reaction to the events of September 11, the Islamic channel al-Majd was 
launched in 2003 and later expanded with a number of channels under the com-
mon name al-Majd. The owner is a Saudi investment company owned by Abd 
al-Rahman Ashmemri together with other partners. In 2006, al-Resalah [The 
message] was launched by Saudi prince al-Walid bin Talal, who is managing 
director of ‘Kingdom Holding Company.’ Another Saudi businessman, Osama 
Kadasa, was behind several channels (e.g. Khalijia TV and al-Baraka). In these 
cases, the owners are Saudi, but businessmen from other Arab countries have 
also founded Islamic satellite channels. Al-‘Afasi was launched in 2005 by Kuwaiti 
businessman and religious scholar Mishari bin Rashed al-‘Afasi. Likewise, Tiba 
TV was launched by a Kuwaiti investor in 2007. Al-Najah was started in 2006 by 
Jordanian businessman, Salah Salih al-Rashed. In Egypt al-Nas and al-Rahma 
are officially headed by Egyptian religious scholars promoting an Islamic way of 
life, but are funded by businessmen. For instance, al-Nas is funded by Saudi busi-
nessman Mansour bin Kidsa. Due to the more restrictive media laws in countries 
such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, some businessmen establish religious satellite 
channels with the Egyptian satellite provider Nilesat. The motive of obtaining 
higher revenue makes Nilesat agree to a more liberal channel policy and thus 
offers competition to other Arab satellite providers. 
Most of the Islamic channels claim that they are apolitical in relation to inter-
nal political affairs (Galal 2011b). However, together with the Muslim Brother-
hood channel, Misr25, al-Nas, al-Rahma and al-Hafez TV were closed down by 
the Egyptian military power after the removal of president Morsi on 3 July 2013. 
Their channelling of emotions and mobilization supporting the Muslim Brother-
hood president Morsi and political Islam was obviously a thorn in the side of the 
military. While al-Rahma was only closed down for a short period, the Muslim 
Brotherhood tried to launch a new channel, Ahrar25 [Liberators25], for a short 
time in Egypt. But this was not allowed, and now they broadcast Rab‘a TV and 
Mekamillin TV [We continue] from Turkey.2 
2 Other channels established by brotherhood sympathisers through non-Arab satellites 
are al-Shar‘ ia [Legitimate], al-Sharq [The East], al-Midan [The square], and Misr al-
An [Egypt now]. They can all be seen in the Middle East by satellite dish and internet. 
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Launching and shutting down channels not only reflects the continuous at-
tempts by Arab regimes to control media and audiences’ access to media, but also 
how different groups or individuals try to influence public debates of political 
changes. Thus, Misr25, whose name refers to Egypt [Misr] and the date of the 
Egyptian revolution (25 January 2011), was launched shortly after the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011. When compared with other Arab countries such as Iraq or 
Tunisia, the situation is no better. In both countries, many television channels 
were closed down by the state. In Iraq, ten television channels were shut down in 
2013, followed by a few more in 2014. In Tunisia, the state closed down different 
television and radio channels to a lesser degree since the Arab Spring of 2011. 
Most recently in Tunisia, nine mosques, an Islamic radio and a television channel 
were shut down in July 2014. According to the government, they were shut down 
due to the killing of fourteen soldiers by some terrorists. 
Iqraa, al-Resalah, al-Majd group, al-Nas and al-Rahma have often been men-
tioned as the most popular among Islamic satellite channels (Galal 2012). In 
this volume, the first four chapters also refer to audiences’ use of Sunni religious 
channels and programmes. The most popular – of those mentioned – can be 
characterised as having Salafi aspirations dominated by a Gulf state and Saudi 
conservative Salafi tradition. However, Salafi is a broad term denoting the idea 
of going back to the early tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his follow-
ers and to the Koran and Hadith3 as a basis for interpretation. Thus, in reality 
the Salafi trend may actually have many variations. What they have in common, 
though, is what Oliver Roy has defined as a privatisation of religion through 
economic liberalism that emphasises individual re-islamisation (Roy 2004: 53). 
Like Hoover in the beginning of this chapter, Roy too argues that with islami-
sation, religiousity has become the responsibility of the individual, partly de-
pending on the premises of the religious market (ibid.). Seen in this perspective, 
Islamic channels offer symbolic resources to the individual Muslim in order to 
help him or her become a true believer instead of offering political solutions to 
societal problems. The question is then: What kind of programmes and symbolic 
resources do Islamic channels offer their audiences?
The programming on the most popular channels is characterised by a vari-
ety of different programmes that reflect how the Islamic perspective is trans-
lated into media practices. One group of programmes is based on traditional 
religious practices that have been moved from an institutional platform into the 
3 Hadith refers to the record of the traditions or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica).
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media. These kinds of programmes focus on interpretations and recitations of 
Islamic traditions (Koran, Hadith and Sunna4) and are thus a substitute for what 
could otherwise be found in a mosque or by approaching a Muslim scholar. On 
al-Rahma TV, a well-known programme is the Usul al-Sunna [Principles of al-
Sunna] with Sheikh Muhammad Hassan, and another is Usul al-Fiqh [Principles 
of jurisprudence] with Muhammad abd al-Wahid. Most channels also broadcast 
so-called fatwa programmes. On Iqraa, one of these is Fatawi Ramadan with Abd 
Allah al-Muslih. The biggest difference of these programmes when compared to 
traditional religious institutions is that they provide access to many more dif-
ferent interpretations and interpreters. Another popular group of programmes 
includes talk shows, contests, health programmes and many others, which I char-
acterise as lifestyle programmes because they address daily life and its challenges. 
One example from al-Resalah TV is ‘Ish bibasata [Live simple]. The programme 
focuses on young people and philosophical thinking. Through discussions of dif-
ferent topics related to younger generations, the programme tries to bridge the 
gap between the classical philosophical way of thinking and its complicated lan-
guage with the modern mentality and the kind of language used by the young-
er generations. On Iqraa, the programme ‘Ish illahza [Live your minute] with 
Mustafa Husny focuses on how young people in particular should live happily 
by being close to God’s call to human beings and understanding him. This group 
of programmes shares an emphasis on how to live a good and righteous life in 
accordance with Islam and how Islam helps the individual face life’s obstacles. A 
third, minor group of programmes are those without a specifically Islamic frame 
of reference. Such programmes may include news, sports, documentaries or 
shows on social, economic or labour market issues. For instance, al-Rahma TV 
broadcasts educational programmes to secondary school students on subjects 
ranging from English and Arabic languages, physics and mathematics to geology. 
Iqraa broadcasts general interests shows such as Matbakhik [Your kitchen]. Al-
though not explicitly Islamic, these programmes are carefully chosen to promote 
either ethical or traditional Arab values. 
Religion in Arab mainstream media
Despite the tendency to make specific religious channels or programmes, reli-
gion also appears to have become a greater part of a general entertainment and 
consumer culture. Not only does religious programming make use of popular 
4 Sunna refers to the body of traditional social and legal custom and practice of the 
Islamic community (Encyclopaedia Britannica).
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media genres such as lifestyle programmes, but also popular media genres in-
cluding movies, TV drama series, cartoons, reality TV, and television contests, all 
of which increasingly include religious themes or figures (Clark 2007; Ginsberg, 
Abu-Lughod & Larkin 2002a; Meyer & Moors 2006). In Arab cinema, religion 
has always been present, but as argued by Abu-Lughod (2005) and Shafik (2007), 
the place of religion has been to support the national secular imagination. With 
processes of islamisation and new religious programming, religion has become 
an increasingly more popular topic in mainstream media, resulting in a popular 
culture that mixes religious symbols, rituals and semantics with media genres 
developed outside religion. Thus, audiences are introduced to new platforms for 
practicing religion by consuming programmes that are framed as popular media 
genres (e.g. contests), but the content confirming participants’ religious identity. 
In the Islamic context, contests on Koran recitation or spiritual beauty of Mus-
lim women are examples of these genres (cf. Galal 2010). Religion thus becomes 
a consumer good alongside other consumer goods that construct alternative 
spaces to traditional religious institutions for religious practices. Many of these 
programmes propagate a modern and individualised approach to being Muslim 
as something one needs to ‘achieve’ through practice (Galal 2009).
Publics and counter publics
Not surprisingly, these mixtures of semantics and diversity in religious prac-
tices have led to an ever more vocal struggle over religious positions, places 
and representations. In his study of cassette-recorded Islamic sermons, Charles 
Hirschkind (2006) argues that they are used to create an Islamic counter public 
that is ethical rather than political defined. The preachers assert that the West-
ern popular culture is contrary to Islamic values; their cassette sermons offer 
another kind of public (Hirschkind 2006). Islamic channels also present them-
selves as offering an alternative to Western and secularised culture. Additionally, 
they emphasise that the global, Western dominated picture of Islam is distorted 
and they work to present a true picture of Islam (Galal 2012). With the excep-
tion of Iqraa, no other Islamic channel was launched before the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, and the number of new channels grew significantly after the 
Danish Muhammad cartoon crisis of 2006. Without being able to prove a direct 
casual relation between these events and the increase in number of channels, it 
appears clear that these channels see themselves as working to correct the dis-
torted picture of the prophet Muhammad and Islam. This positioning between 
an Islamic and a Western-influenced culture is just one aspect of the field of 
mediated Islam. Different self-appointed or institutionally associated religious 
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authorities also struggle over legitimacy and may question each other’s authority 
in public. The media owner may have a position to defend, as may the regime 
who accepts the broadcast. The media owner might have considerations to make 
alongside his business interests, and as mentioned, the regime might close down 
channels for political reasons. Furthermore, most Arab regimes actively censor 
media products such as film and TV to a much greater degree than print media. 
When it comes to religious content, regimes censor programmes with the help of 
traditional religious institutions. Thus, the continuous struggle and fragmenta-
tion among traditional institutional authorities, characterises mediated religion 
in the Arab media. Audiences are invited to participate in the negotiations of true 
religion and what it means to be Muslim (or Christian) by choosing from among 
the many programmes, religious authorities and interpretations. This audience 
participation is the main focus of this volume. The guiding questions are as fol-
lows: Who are the Arab audiences? How do they navigate and make sense of 
the abundance of symbolic resources offered by the diverse range of competing 
programmes and genres?
Watching religious channels and programmes:  
fragmented audiences
The development, history, circulation and content of religious channels and 
religious programming have been gradually gaining more research attention. 
However, very little has been published on Arab audiences and the relationship 
between mediated religion in Arab media and its viewers worldwide. In spite of 
the widely held acknowledgment that the effect of media has to be understood in 
the encounter between media discourse and audience responses (Hoover 2006; 
Morley 1980; Hall 1992), Arab television audiences frequently appear to be per-
ceived as a passive, impressionable and homogenous mass. Since the majority of 
publications on Arab transnational media – particularly satellite television – fo-
cuses on programme content, the economic and political gains of television pro-
duction, or the democratic potential of a civic Arab public, very little is known 
about the relationships among different channels, their programming, and their 
audiences. Rikke Haugbølle criticises these studies for having a media-centric 
focus (Haugbølle 2013). This is even truer for the religious programming, which 
has remained underexamined until now. 
In general, existent knowledge about Arab audiences suffers from a lack of 
accurate audience measurement systems for TV and audited circulation (Project 
Team 2010: 21). Speaking of a typical or characteristic Arab audience is extreme-
ly difficult, given the fact that the Arab audiences are fragmented ‘across a region 
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of approximately 7.5 million square kilometres, a population of over 250 million 
people and an extensive number of spoken dialects’ (ibid.: 43), as well as major 
differences, when it comes to literacy, living conditions and generational divides. 
Market-based studies do, however, give us some general information. In the Arab 
world, television is still the most popular media outlet despite the global trend 
towards other platforms. This is supported by a study of audience habits in Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia, which shows that the average number of hours spent watch-
ing television did not change between 2009 and 2012 (Project Team 2012: 41). 
Furthermore, satellite is a much more popular television platform in these coun-
tries than in the international television market (ibid.: 43). As for viewership, the 
larger satellite channels like Rotana, al-Jazeera and MBC are the most popular 
across the region, with the exception of MBC, which is not particularly popular 
in Egypt (ibid.: 45). None of these are religious channels, and nor do these kinds 
of generalisations tell us much about the ways in which audiences navigate these 
programmes or derive meaning from them. 
The concept of an audience is a very abstract and broad concept. As applied in 
this volume, it refers to ‘both a product of social context (which leads to shared 
cultural interests, understanding, and information needs) and a response to a 
particular pattern of media provision’ (McQuail 1997: 2). As for the audiences 
in the case studies presented, they are more specifically defined by – at least to 
some degree – being able to speak or understand Arabic and identifying with an 
Arab ethnic background. They are also defined by their exposure to Arab media, 
particularly to media with religious content or themes.
The analytical approach of the volume deploys what Stig Hjarvard has called a 
culturalist approach, considering ‘media as religion,’ rather than ‘religion in me-
dia’ (Hjarvard 2008a: 4). According to Hjarvard, the approach of ‘media as reli-
gion’ places focus on cultural meaning making in practice and ‘a cultural studies 
approach to media and communication’ (ibid.: 4). The effect of television is there-
fore to be understood as an encounter between media discourse and audience re-
sponses. In other words, the mediated messages do not have any influence without 
audiences’ interpretation or decoding efforts. The culturalist approach is based 
on the understanding that audiences’ responses necessarily include performing 
acts. Audiences are thus seen as agents. One kind of act performed by audiences 
is interpretive: audiences construct meanings of media messages. Since the act 
of interpretation is deeply socially embedded, a second kind of audience activ-
ity emphasises the audiences’ engagement with media in social settings during 
their consumption, or by sharing interpretations and experiences with media as 
a continuation of actual use (Croteau & Hoynes 1997). By constructing meaning 
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and through socially embedded cultural and religious identifications, both kinds 
of activities can contribute to the audience’s formation of identity. There is thus 
no automatic relationship between a programme being watched by an audience 
member and the member’s identifications. Watching a religious programme, for 
instance, may result in fortifying an anti-religious attitude. Similarly, one audi-
ence may derive more religious meaning from mainstream television than from 
specific religious programming (Hoover 2006). 
As an alternative to the culturalist approach, Hjarvard suggests the ‘mediati-
zation of religion’ as a concept. This approach ‘focuses on the ways that media 
and popular culture in general both transform existing religious phenomena and 
come to serve collective functions in society that hitherto have been performed 
by religious institutions’ (Hjarvard 2008a: 4). By introducing the concept of the 
mediatization of religion (Hjarvard 2008a & b; Clark 2011), I want to emphasise 
the role of media in religion and religious practices. The mediatization perspec-
tive examines media as a new place for religion and as a force that increasingly 
replaces traditional religious institutions. Thus, not only overtly religious pro-
grammes construct media as a religious place, but also use media ritualistically 
as well as for commemoration and spirituality. I have previously argued that it 
is possible to see religious programming as ‘a lived space’ where it is the social 
practices around the programming and the ascription of meaning to these prac-
tices that makes the media a new place for religion – rather than the content per 
se (Galal 2011a).
The chapters of the present volume are all informed to some extent by both 
a culturalist and mediatization approach. While several of the chapters take 
particular and situated human interactions and religious meaning-making that 
characterise the culturalist approach as a point of departure (ibid.: 5), some chap-
ters also raise questions about the role of media as an instrument in practicing 
and articulating religious identity today in Arab countries or in Arab diasporas. 
Hence, the main objective of this book is to contribute new epistemic analyses 
of Arab audiences and to highlight the ways these groups make use of media in 
their construction, negotiation, and rejection of religious identities and practices. 
In the following section, I will draw attention to additional qualitative perspec-
tives on how audiences make meaning of what they see by referring to audience 
studies in general and to the findings presented in this book in particular. One 
fundamental aspect of this approach is taking the heterogeneity and transna-
tionality of the Arab Muslim audiences seriously. As such, case studies stemming 
from diverse national contexts are included: Algeria, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, 
Great Britain, Morocco, Tunisia and the United States. 
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Audiences: why and how? 
A general interest of this book is understanding why or why not Arab audiences 
watch religious channels and programmes. What do the audiences do with the 
religion that they watch, and how are various media used in various ways? Con-
sequently, the question of ‘why’ is closely connected to general media use – the 
‘how’ – and the meaning audiences ascribe to what they watch. By combining the 
why with the how, it is possible to explore the social aspects of media use as well 
as the influence of time and space on how audiences choose between different 
media outlets. 
As presented in the prelude of this chapter, one of the general ideas that re-
searchers in the field seem to agree about is that media offers an alternative space 
to traditional institutions, as well as alternative authority figures to the authori-
ties of traditional institutions. In terms of Islamic programming, the question is 
to which degree the media substitutes or supplements the mosque, knowing that 
not only the mosque but also interpersonal communication have played a role 
in forming religious convictions and interpretations. Looking into the findings 
of Ehab Galal in his chapter on ‘Audience responses to Islamic TV: Between re-
sistance and piety’, it appears that Islamic TV, at times, takes over the role of the 
traditional institution. TV becomes a place for religious learning and for meet-
ing religious scholars whom individual believers can follow. It is also a place for 
contemplation. Furthermore, this alternative space is characterised by a trans-
national frame of reference. Although the relevance of the findings are disputed, 
audiences interviewed in national contexts as varied as Algeria, Egypt, Great 
Britain and Germany (to mention some of the contexts appearing in the contri-
butions) seem to share a common language and at least a partial knowledge of 
the religious authorities and practices in Arab media. 
Although the number of religious authorities has become manifold, authori-
ties seem to play an immense role in the audiences’ use of religious TV. Reli-
gious authorities are watched, listened to, challenged and rejected – and as such 
have not lost their meaning for believers. But authority has become multifari-
ous. Placed within a field of competition in the open media, audiences challenge 
authorities, and authorities challenge each other. The right interpretation is no 
longer only guaranteed by institutional belonging, but also by belonging to a 
specific media or programme. Whereas institutions previously ensured or guar-
anteed the authority of a specific scholar, it now seems increasingly to be the 
channel or programme that takes on this role. In the chapter ‘Religious media 
as a cultural discourse – The views of Arab Diaspora in London’, Noha Mellor 
analyses identity negotiations among university students with an Arab-Muslim 
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background in London. She demonstrates how they renounce the religious tel-
evision preachers supported by their parents. They reject the programmes as ir-
relevant because they find that they stem from a context other than the British. 
In addition, the religious authorities on such programmes generally lack knowl-
edge about the university students’ local context and way of life in London. This 
analysis shows how common references to religious authorities are shared across 
generations and countries, but the evaluation of these authorities is ultimately 
dependent on the individual. 
In addition to serving as an alternative to traditional religious institutions, re-
ligious programming also appears to perform specific social functions related to 
the quest for religious insight. Particularly in diasporan communities, it appears 
that first generation immigrants try to make their families watch religious TV 
together in order to introduce the younger generations to their cultural and reli-
gious heritage. As noted by Khalil Rinnawi in his chapter titled ‘Cyber religious-
national community? The case of Arab community in Germany,’ younger genera-
tions only reluctantly watch religious programmes together with their families 
during Ramadan or at the parents’ request. Thus, watching Islamic programming 
is more about fulfilling familial obligations than about personal preferences 
or motivations. In both cases, some interviewees also point at the problems of 
understanding the advanced Arabic spoken on some of the programmes. Fur-
thermore, the sharing of programmes within the family seems to create a joint 
feeling of cultural belonging rather than common belief. This is also the case in 
Ratiba Hadj-Moussa’s contribution titled ‘Maghrebi Audiences: Mapping the di-
vide between Arab sentiment, Islamic belonging and political praxis.’ She argues 
that when watching religious programming together, Maghrebi families adhere 
to shared cultural values and morals. She refers to normative issues regarding 
the body and sexuality that define what audiences watch when they are put to-
gether in the same room. She observes that when families watch TV together, 
they primarily tend to watch national or Arab TV that lives up to these shared 
norms. On the other hand, single men or young couples might have their own 
TV sets in their private rooms where they tend to watch western channels to a 
higher degree. Overall, the religious discussions that arise from watching reli-
gious programming appear primarily to occur between peers and colleagues of 
similar generational backgrounds. Several of the interviewees that appear in the 
contributions, especially the younger ones, claim that they often – after having 
watched a programme on their own – discuss specific issues among friends in 
order to reach their own opinion. 
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The question of how to watch religious programming is no longer simply an 
issue of having a TV set. It is also a matter of having access to several media plat-
forms. The concept of transmediality is useful here in understanding the com-
plexity of media’s function today. Elizabeth Evans defines transmediality as ‘the 
increasingly popular industrial practice of using multiple media technologies to 
present information concerning a single fictional world through a range of tex-
tual forms’ (Evans 2011: 1). Several media users – as portrayed in the present 
volume – are very aware of content ‘made available simultaneously or near-si-
multaneously on multiple platforms’ as phrased by Evans (2011: 2). When reject-
ing watching a particular programme with their parents, for example, a young 
person might claim that will later watch it on YouTube, as exemplified in Mellor’s 
chapter. Or, as is the case in the chapter by E. Galal, they may selectively choose 
what they want to see using the Internet and YouTube as their main source, par-
tially because they prefer to watch programmes outside of normally scheduled 
broadcasts use to of work or school. At the same time, this generation also ap-
pears to prefer having the option of being able to pick and choose what they like, 
when they like. The transmediality does make it possible to watch a programme 
at any time and at any place – whether in their private home, on a public bus 
(as is the case for one of the Egyptian interviewees in E. Galal’s contribution), 
at work, or together with their family. These choices may create new rituals of 
media practices, in which watching religious programming is defined by the in-
dividual’s rhythm of life. 
Since the media text or content is not isolated from consumption practices 
(Ang 1996), the practices described in the case studies of this volume hint at 
changes in pursuing religious knowledge and insight due to mediatization. As 
for the relationship between media and religion, it becomes important to explore 
how media provides the Muslim believer with an alternative space for religious 
practices and a shared frame of religious references across countries and social 
divides, along with religious practices and convictions. Likewise, it appears that 
authority has become a contested category, and that transmediality and media 
convergence change the social practices of media use. This volume raises the 
question of how these changes influence religious identity formation.
Identity formation and intersections 
As argued by Steward Hoover (2006), religious media and programming may 
be used by audiences for diverse purposes. One purpose might be to negotiate 
and identify a personal position towards one’s (or others’) beliefs; another might 
be entertainment, and a third purpose could include finding ways to construct 
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meanings of identity and belonging. The culturalist approach emphasises how 
the individual actively uses media as an integrated part of his or her social 
and cultural life. Media participates in the structuring of social consciousness 
through style, genre, schedule, images and language. When people interact with 
media, they become involved in a process that simultaneously connects then 
with different cultures, with remembered and imagined pasts, and with sources 
of insight and meaning (Hoover 2006: 72). Thus, media offers different sources 
for audiences’ identity formation processes. In this perspective, identity must be 
understood as changeable, situational and relational. It is the result of continuous 
and sometimes ambiguous processes of identification (Hall and du Guy 1996; 
Jenkins 2003). In religious studies, a similar understanding of identity refers to 
beliefs as achieved rather than ascribed. As argued by Hoover, it is no longer pos-
sible to define religion only based on its historical, structural or doctrinal charac-
teristics. Instead, religion should be explored as something that is created on the 
basis of experiences, practices and the efforts of lived life (Hoover 2006: 39). This 
is not only a question of personal identity but also of belonging to a collective. As 
an unavoidable aspect of media’s participation in the mediatization of religious 
identities, it does take part in collective processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
Media thus becomes a tool for performing religiously motivated cultural and 
social ways of life, which become symbolic of belonging to a religious group. The 
performative and participative become central in order to belong, as also argued 
by Eickelman and Anderson (1999: 2). 
The simultaneity and intersection of identity formation processes, as analysed 
in the chapters of this volume, emphasise how religious identity in a global con-
text intersects with ethnic and national belonging, and more importantly how 
these intersections are inscribed within negotiations of power relations. Al-
though religious programming may help the believer to practice or learn about 
his or her religion, it may also help Arabic speaking audiences reject a marginal-
ised, minoritised or colonised position vis-à-vis specific ‘Others.’ 
Viewed from this perspective, audiences use media to negotiate religious, na-
tional, regional and many other forms of identity. The negotiations of subject 
positions are a general aspect of the contributions in the volume. In the chapter 
by E. Galal, belonging or not belonging to the Salafi tradition appears during 
several of the interviews. In the chapter by Hadj-Moussa, it is more a question of 
belonging to an Arab or a French cultural tradition. And in Mellor’s contribution, 
it is a matter of belonging to either a Muslim or Arab tradition. These examples 
demonstrate the influence of context on how (the same) media are used in creat-
ing different strategies for identity formation. 
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Parallel to increasing access to Arab satellite TV in Maghreb, Hadj-Moussa 
argues that Maghrebi audiences have gradually come to identify more with a 
Muslim-Arab identity than a French one. According to Hadj-Moussa, Arab TV 
has helped Maghrebi audiences to ‘recover a positive self-image’ by offering a 
counter colonial power. She demonstrates how Arab coverage of the Gulf-war in 
2003, particularly by al-Jazeera, has strengthened the emotional ties and degree 
of identification with Arabness and the Islamic world among Maghrebi audi-
ences. She argues that political identifications intersect with more individual 
senses of belonging and points to Muslim TV preachers, such as the Egyptian 
Amr Khaled, as having had a profound influence, especially on younger Maghre-
bi audiences. 
Like Hadj-Moussa analysis of Arab TV as a counter public in the Maghreb, 
Rinnawi suggests a similar perspective, though with generational differences. 
Rinnawi argues that Arab TV is a place for leaving the position of a marginal-
ised minority in German society to become part of a transnational Arab-Muslim 
imagined community. Not only does Arab TV offer practical guidance on how 
to live as a righteous Muslim, but it also becomes the place where viewers can 
connect to their religious leaders and celebrate religious festivals. Thus, media 
offers a function similar to a mosque. For the younger generation, Arab media is 
more of a supplement to German TV. Arab TV serves as a space in which audi-
ences can experience and construct an emotional and patriotic sense of belong-
ing and solidarity with the religious and cultural heritage of their parents. For the 
younger generation, these feelings are closely connected to an experience of not 
feeling fully accepted in German society. 
In Great Britain, Mellor shows how young Muslims struggle with the overly 
inclusive category of British Muslims. Young Arab students do not like to identify 
with this category because they do not feel an affinity towards Asian Muslims 
who constitute the majority of Muslims in Britain. They thus use Arab program-
ming to help negotiate a specifically Arab Muslim identity as along with mo-
rality and values. However, interviewees reported finding most of the Islamic 
programming out of context or political biased – and therefore irrelevant to their 
purposes. In this case, the interplay between religious (Muslim), ethnic (Arab) 
and diasporan identity in Britain comprise young Arab students’ negotiations 
and use of Arab media.
Vivian Ibrahim also writes about the intersections of national and religious 
identity in her chapter titled ‘Watching the history of the ‘present’: Religion and 
national identity in the Egyptian diaspora.’ This chapter analyses diasporan re-
sponses to an Egyptian musalsalat [drama series] on the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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The diaspora groups interviewed by Ibrahim consist of Copts (Egyptian Chris-
tians) living in United States, along with both Copts and Muslims living in Great 
Britain. She particularly notices that the types of interpretations given on the 
religious and national identities represented in the series depend on the length 
of time the interviewee has lived outside of Egypt. Thus, while the U.S. group 
rejects the representation of a united and national brotherhood between Copts 
and Muslims in Egypt (as propagated by the series), British interviewees tended 
to support the show’s narrative by contributing own experiences of brotherhood 
across religious divides. 
Resisting representation 
As media can be used by its audiences to negotiate or resist unwanted subject 
positions by choosing particular programmes or channels, access to diverse me-
dia also activates a growing resistance to and critique of media representations. 
Resistance refers to the possible rejection, mediation, and negotiation of hegem-
onic discourses and power inequalities, which is to some degree a central part of 
current discourses on Islam. In other words, using media is not only a matter of 
audiences’ personal or private meaning making; it has also become part of global 
as well as local struggles over representation. Thus, private meaning making con-
verges with public meaning making. Often public meaning making is influenced 
by responses from political or faith communities contesting media’s positioning 
of these groups. As argued by Lise Paulsen Galal in her chapter on ‘Minority re-
ligion mediated: Contesting representation,’ with a reference to Eugenia Siapera 
(2010), ‘it is differentiations that make the struggle about representation a crucial 
aspect of globalization.’ 
When looking at representations of religious differences (across and within 
different religions), the increasing number of religious programmes and the in-
clusion of religion in popular culture media such as film and television dramas 
have contributed to an increased responsibility for the individual to make up his 
or her own mind about their religious identity. However, the diverse positioning 
of believers within religious programmes has also lead to increasing numbers of 
accusations of blasphemy or disrespect of religion. This trend compromises the 
ability of the individual to decide what is religiously legitimate. While the new 
diverse trend of religion as a topic and frame of reference in the private realm en-
courages individualised meaning making and negotiation, in the public space it 
appears to invite to struggle, rejection and contestation. The Danish Muhammad 
cartoon crisis has already been mentioned as an example that transformed a local 
Danish news story into a global struggle over representation. Mediatized religion 
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is not just approached as a cultural or religious message by audiences, but also 
at times as politically motivated (mis)representation. The interpretation(s) of a 
programme by audiences may be unforeseen or unintended by the programme’s 
producers; as Ibrahim’s analysis in this volume demonstrates, the context of mi-
gration may play a crucial role in determining an audience’s interpretation. And 
given the global scope of most media today, contexts may be manifold compared 
to the past. In the chapter by E. Galal, one of the interviewees reports believing 
that the Islamic channels owned by Saudis are untrustworthy since they, accord-
ing to him, have a political agenda influenced by the United States. Furthermore, 
what may by some be evaluated primarily for its entertaining quality (such as 
the drama series broadcasted during Ramadan, as described by Ibrahim), may 
be interpreted by others as a political discourse of national identity promoted by 
the Egyptian State and rejected for its silencing of inequality and discrimination. 
The chapter by L.P. Galal focuses on public contestations of representation of 
religion that draw on global discourses of rights and equality. Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, it is not only Muslims who challenge representations of their religion 
or religious authorities. The chapter analyses public – mainly Christian Coptic 
– responses to cinematic representations of Copts and Muslim-Coptic relations. 
L.P. Galal demonstrates how the responses are inscribed within different con-
verging discursive orders. The argument is that public (audience) responses are 
never isolated from existing struggles over difference and sameness. Thus, it does 
not make sense to see the return of religion into the public sphere via the media 
as merely a decline of traditional religious institutions’ power. Instead, it can be 
viewed as a new revival of religious practices through media. By changing or ex-
tending its platform by the help of the media, religion has also altered discursive 
orders due to new potential convergences with other discourses, such as religious 
freedom, human rights or national unity. 
As previously mentioned, several Islamic satellite channels and program-
ming have been launched in order to oppose existent representations of Islam 
in a global context. Looking across the different contributions to this volume, 
it is obvious, however, that the struggle springs from different contexts at dif-
ferent times and places. As for the Egyptian audiences interviewed by E. Galal, 
the key struggle has to do with what form of Islam is going to dominate the 
Egyptian public. Thus, when Muslim audiences watch religious TV, for exam-
ple, it is not only in order to confirm their personal beliefs, but also to challenge 
on-going discursive imaginaries and to position themselves within a socio-
religious context.
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With its cross-disciplinary contributions, this volume offers an explora-
tive and qualitative approach to the relationship between media, religion and 
audiences. The essays draw on analytical perspectives from media, religious, cul-
tural, Middle Eastern, global and diasporan studies. Each case study contributes 
to knowledge of religious TV and religion in media, the understanding of audi-
ences, identity formation and the influence of regional verses global contexts. 
The contributions demonstrate how media has taken over some of the functions 
of traditional religious institutions, but they also show that religious institutions 
are still influential – not only in the individual believer’s life, but also in the strug-
gle over the true religion. The role of religious authorities is a key aspect of this 
struggle. The essays point to a development that places more religious respon-
sibility in the hands of the individual believer. However, they also show how 
identifying and evaluating different religious authorities appears to be important 
for audiences. The explosion in the number of religious programmes seems to 
help explain the sudden increase in the number of authorities. Thus, traditional 
structures of authority are to some degree reproduced, although the large num-
ber of available authorities is challenging for audiences to navigate and evaluate. 
Another finding of this volume that deserves more attention in future research 
is the influence of context on audience responses. Each case study is situated in a 
particular time and place. This specific context is potentially always in a state of 
flux, since audiences may identify simultaneously with different contexts. Some-
times the interpretations are located within a global context; others are figured 
within a local or regional context. As the context is interchangeable, the need 
for exploring the situated practices of media use becomes even more important. 
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Ehab Galal
Audience responses to Islamic TV:  
Between resistance and piety
Introduction
Most individuals of a Muslim cultural background today have probably expe-
rienced being confronted with questions of his or her beliefs, or how he or she 
perceives the role of Islam. For some, these may be more indirect questions em-
bedded in global media discourses; the reality is, however, that for more than 
twenty years Islam as religion and being Muslim as a way of life have not primar-
ily been solely private matter of belief. Instead, Islam and being Muslim have 
been globally contested, imagined and negotiated by both Muslims as well as 
non-Muslims. At the same time, this global struggle is paralleled in regional, na-
tional and local religious and political discussions over the role of Islam. The in-
creasing number of Islamic television channels does not only participate in this 
ongoing struggle over how to interpret and understand Islam, but may also be 
seen as a consequence of the global and local attention placed on Islam. Regard-
less of whether Islamic channels are seen as voices of resistance, voices of piety, 
or both, they are – together with their audiences – contributing to and indeed 
shaping global and local discourses of Islam. 
Over the past 25 years, the domination of national broadcasting outlets has 
been weakened due to commercialisation, internationalisation, and liberaliza-
tion. The result has been a destabilization and decentralization of the institu-
tional and technological arrangements of television (Ang 1996: 9). These changes 
have altered both the way scholars and the media industry approach audiences. 
A deeper awareness of audiences as being fragmented and often unpredictable 
has become the basis of strategies used in the media industry, as well as a point 
of departure for audience researchers (ibid.). 
Despite increasing competition and fragmentation within the media, televi-
sion has not lost its role as a key disseminator of knowledge. Much to the con-
trary, television and other media do offer a variety of authoritative forms. When 
it comes to Islamic TV in particular, religious knowledge has become frag-
mented and compartmentalised, and thus contested due to the many different 
programmes and different scholars who convey religious knowledge (Eickelman 
and Anderson 1999; Zubaida 2005). On the other hand, Islamic television also 
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offers audiences a space for (ostensibly) authoritative interpretations of religious 
knowledge and belief. Thus, the question is: what do audiences make of these 
many different programmes, scholars and interpretations? It is widely accept-
ed that audiences actively participate in the interpretation of media messages 
and are not just passive subjects. This assumption, however, has limited what 
we know regarding audiences’ use of television. For instance, what do audiences 
do with religious truths given in Islamic programming? And how do audiences 
ascribe authority to the different religious scholars? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, I will present an analysis based on 
fieldwork conducted on Arabic-speaking audiences in Copenhagen, London and 
Cairo, which focused on their responses to religious programming. The aim is to 
shed light on the ways in which Arab audiences make use of Islamic program-
ming in the construction, negotiation and rejection of religious identities and 
practices. In turn, this information will help us better understand the influence 
of Islamic programming on current conversations about Islam. By choosing au-
diences from widely different national and urban contexts, my research strongly 
acknowledges the reality of transnational media. Whereas many Islamic chan-
nels and scholars did emerge from national settings, they have in the meantime 
become transnational commodities, as will be demonstrated in the following 
analysis. On basis of a comparative approach to in-depth interviews with indi-
vidual audience members, I discuss and critically reflect on how constructions 
of religious truth, knowledge and belief in Islamic programming are becoming 
more influential in audiences’ own interpretations, uses and practices of watch-
ing Islamic TV. My analytical approach is inspired by media ethnography and 
an interest in how people relate to media in their everyday lives, along with how 
media provides symbolic resources for meaning making (Ang 1996; Croteau & 
Hoynes 1997; Gillespie 1995; Hoover 2006; Morley 1980). 
The chapter is structured as follows: first, I will introduce the methodological 
and theoretical approaches that are central in my analytical argument. Second, 
I present the analytical findings focusing on the following three issues: how to 
characterise Islamic media, how to watch Islamic television, and how to make use 
of the discursive resources offered by Islamic television. In the end, I discuss the 
relevance of my findings and offer some concluding remarks. 
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Audiences, meaning making and everyday life
My analytical argument is based on data collected as part of a research project on 
‘Muslim and Arab audiences responses to new programming at Arab Television.’1 
The project was a qualitative study of how audiences relate to and make use of 
Islamic TV and how this relation becomes formative in the construction of iden-
tity. In this chapter, I draw on findings from fieldwork and interviews with audi-
ences in Copenhagen, London and Cairo. The aim of the interviews was to gain 
qualitative insight into how interviewees produce meaning on basis of what they 
watch on TV. While several of Muslim television preachers and programmes 
may be thought of as either liberal or conservative, radical or moderate, salafi 
or Islamist, I wanted to better understand how ‘ordinary’ Muslims interpret and 
use what they see when watching such preachers and programmes. ‘Ordinary,’ 
however, is an imprecise and empty term. It is therefore not useful in identi-
fying interviewees. Instead, I sought the ‘widest possible differentiation’ among 
my interviewees, drawing upon a wide spectrum of middleclass individuals who 
identified Arabic as their mother tongue. Additional inclusion criteria stipulated 
that interviewees saw themselves as belonging to an Arab and Islamic culture, 
identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim Umma2, and desired to learn 
and practice Islam in the right way. 
The aim of using the widest possible differentiation, as argued by Neergaard 
in her book on qualitative method, is first to gain access to ‘the typical’ by cutting 
across all differences. Second, it helps identify difference and nuances through 
comparison. Third, it provides access to ‘the variations’ within ‘the typical’ in or-
der to get knowledge about the influence of a context (Neergaard 2007). Included 
within the group of interviewees were therefore both women and men, socially 
positioned between middle and lower middle classes who lived in urban areas. 
Furthermore, I roughly distinguished between two groups: one group was com-
prised of Muslims who actively attended a specific mosque or religious com-
munity; the other group included Muslims who were believers, but who mainly 
practised religion on a personal level. This distinction was difficult to maintain 
at different field sites, as it became apparent that attending a specific mosque 
meant something different in the United Kingdom than it did in Egypt. However, 
the reason for starting out with this distinction was to get a wide and differenti-
ated spectrum of believers, and thus presumably also distinct ways of relating 
to Islamic TV. I did not establish specific criteria for how much Islamic TV the 
1 The project was financed by the Danish Council for Independent Research, Humanities. 
2 Umma refers to the community (or nation) of Muslim believers.
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interviewees watched. Instead, I wanted to explore how interviewees used Is-
lamic TV as an element of their general television consumption. Thus, I ended up 
having interviewees who reported that they liked watching Islamic TV once in a 
while, but would tune into programmes rather accidentally. On the other end of 
the spectrum, some interviewees reported that they mainly watched Islamic TV, 
but admitted that they sometimes watched other channels and programmes as 
well. In 22 interviews conducted in Arabic in three different countries, I examine 
the specificities in and similarities across each interviewee’s narrative about their 
television viewing habits. 
The aim is not representativeness in sociological terms. Thus, I am not specifi-
cally looking for nationally or ethnically defined specificities. Given the number 
of interviews conducted, I cannot definitively evaluate the influence of socio-
logical conditions. As such, in addition to anonymising participants by changing 
their names, I have also left out the national or ethnic origin of interviewees. This 
is done in part for anonymisation and in part to avoid speculation on the mean-
ing of differences without sufficient evidence. Instead, I examine diverse cultural 
narratives that might come from different life circumstances and contexts. I am 
interested in narratives of watching TV and how it becomes meaningful to an 
individual audience member. With interviews lasting from two to eight hours in 
length, the aim is to gain in-depth insight into the interviewees’ interpretations 
and negotiations of meaning and identity and how these could be related to their 
specific life circumstances and context.
My approach to audience research is influenced by Ien Ang and her attempt to 
bridge a sociological and semantic approach to audience studies (Ang 1996). By 
doing so, Ang challenges the widespread understanding of audiences as driven 
by choices as an insufficiently critical approach. Rather than looking for discrep-
ancies between the preferred reading of the media text and the audiences’ decod-
ing of it, Ang suggests looking at the interaction between the particularities of 
the text (e.g. fatwa programmes or musalsal [drama series] and specific viewers 
(in sociological terms). The approach to finding the relationship between media 
and audience becomes more dynamic by acknowledging that there are other fac-
tors outside the text that influence the way an audience makes sense of it (Ang 
1996: 19). Furthermore, I want to evaluate television viewing as a certain kind of 
practice that can be analytically addressed as well. Querying television-viewing 
habits by asking questions about ‘when’ and ‘where’ allows us to place the mean-
ing of watching TV within the context of everyday life of the interviewee, thus 
enabling us to emphasise the influence of factors outside the text. 
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With a focus on watching Islamic programming, the construction of mean-
ing and identity is not only influenced by programme content, but also by the 
global and local discourses on Islam, as presented above. Inspired by Stewart 
Hoover’s work on religious identity formation through the use of TV (2006), 
I explore how individual audience members make use of what they watch in on-
going identity formation. As Hoover states, there is not necessarily a correlation 
between what people watch, what they believe in and how they identify (Hoover 
2006). Islamic TV offers audiences a wide range of programmes and narratives 
within what they define as an Islamic framework. Channels like Iqraa, al-Majd, 
al-Rahma, al-Nas, and al-Resaleh are all owned by either Saudi or Egyptian busi-
nessmen.3 They broadcast a mixture of fatwa, fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] and 
lifestyle programmes. Most of them ascribe to a Salafi trend, which refers to the 
idea of going back to the early tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his fol-
lowers and to the authentic texts (the Koran and Hadith) as a basis for interpre-
tation. As described in the introduction to this volume, the spectrum of Salafi is 
varied across different Islamic channels, but what they have in common is the 
goal of re-islamisation and the recurring use of references to religious texts and 
the Sunna (Galal 2012a). Thus, Salafi discourses are not easy avoidable when 
watching Islamic programming. The question is, then, how audiences relate to 
these Salafi narratives, along with how such narratives influence audiences’ me-
dia use and formation of identity. 
Contexts and their influence
The development of Salafi trends within current Islamisation is not only influ-
ential in the Middle East, but also among Muslims globally. However, adopting a 
Salafi discourse in Egypt, Denmark or in United Kingdom has different repercus-
sions due to the varied religious and political contexts. Though the Salafi trend is 
neither popular among the majority of Muslims in Egypt, the consequences are 
different in Europe because the Salafi trend there is inscribed within a broader 
anti-Muslim discourse. Consequently, asking about religious television habits 
may invoke different associations among interviewees, depending on their con-
text. This was often the case before even conducting the actual interview. When 
identifying interviewees and meeting with them for the first time in London and 
Copenhagen, I was often met with a certain amount of mistrust and scepticism. 
Although I had presented myself, the project and its aim before meeting with 
the interviewees, I was asked again rather suspiciously during the interviews for 
3 Read more about Islamic channels in chapter one of this volume.
34 Ehab Galal
whom I was conducting the project and for what purpose. I did not experience 
the same kind of mistrust in Cairo. 
The method of using gatekeepers to identify interviewees in Egypt might be 
part of the explanation for what seemed to a greater sense of trust in the re-
searcher. However, when analysing the content of the interviews, the attitudes 
displayed towards me also seem to be reflected in various ways interviewees’ po-
sitioned the discussion of Islamic television. Because watching Islamic television 
is embedded in different socio-religious and political contexts, they appeared to 
take part in different dialogues on the role of Islam in society. Thus, as will be 
argued in the following section, interviewees in Egypt were preoccupied with lo-
cal or regional disputes over Islam’s role in society. Interviewees in United King-
dom and Denmark, on the other hand, inscribe their use and interpretation of 
Islamic TV within a global struggle over the securitisation4 of Islam along with 
local and national discourses of Muslim minority group issues. Several studies 
conducted in Northern Europe show that Muslims, particularly Muslim youth, 
do find themselves in a position in which they are constantly confronted with 
their ‘Muslimness’ by members of the majority society group. As a result, they are 
compelled to reflect on and defend their Muslim identity (Jacobsen 2011; Kha-
waja 2010). In Transnational Muslim Politics, Peter Mandaville also observes that 
the Muslim minority in diaspora is becoming more aware of their religion. As 
he argues, ‘travelling Islam becomes travel within Islam’ (Mandaville 2001: 115). 
The encounter with the Danish researcher may be seen as part of this travelling, 
which potentially causes the interviewee to think of existing European discus-
sions of integration and mistrust towards migrants’ use of satellite television and 
religious programming. 
The way in which interviewees positioned me strongly speaks to the influence 
of the context: as a researcher, I too am inscribed by the interviewee. Thus, the 
data produced in these interviews are not merely an account of facts, but rather 
of narratives produced and negotiated during interactions with the researcher 
(Järvinen 2005). The interviewees were not only responding to me and to my 
questions, but also to existent discourses associated with the interview topic. In 
terms of the discussion of Islam, this was very clear, but their awareness of on-
going discussions on the influence of television on viewer’s beliefs also came 
out during the interviews. As Hoover argues, peoples’ accounts of the media are 
4 With the term securitisation, I refer to policies that legitimise the use of extraordinary 
means in the name of security.
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informative because they present images and ideas about how people under-
stand themselves within social and cultural contexts (Hoover 2006: 88). 
Several of the interviewees argued that they were able to critically engage with 
different kinds of programming and therefore allowed themselves to watch these. 
They asserted, though, that other people were not as educated and therefore not 
as able to distinguish between television with good or bad influence. Thus, in the 
interviewees’ self-perception, they believed they themselves were able to objec-
tively judge their beliefs and values and were not subject to the media’s power. 
While this is very much in accordance with fieldwork conducted among Chris-
tian Americans in Hoover’s study (2006: 260), my interviewees differ from Hoo-
ver’s due to the fact that they did not trust the majority of others to be able to be 
critical towards what they watch. Due to this line of thought, they found the idea 
of censoring different kinds of broadcasting as reasonable. 
In the following analysis, similar examples of the interviewees’ active partici-
pation in existing discussions regarding the content and the viewing habits of 
Islamic TV will be further explored. As also argued by Ang, this kind of partici-
pation emphasises, that ‘the relation between television and audiences is not just 
a matter of discrete ‘negotiations’ between texts and viewers’ (Ang 1996: 51). The 
culture of modernity and the consumption of television have a much more pro-
found influence in offering new possibilities for social relations, identities and 
desires (Ang 1996: 51). How do these new possibilities, then, manifest in audi-
ences of Islamic TV?
Islamic TV: negotiations of definition
Islamic TV is a contested category by both researchers and media producers. The 
most popular Islamic channels have been Iqraa, al-Nas, al-Rahma, al-Resalah, 
and al-Majd.5 They all define their purpose with very general statements about 
5 The extent of their popularity is difficult to determine, not least in relation to viewers’ 
priorities among different types of channels. There are only a few audience studies 
dealing with religious channels. While one study by Amin suggests that al-Majd Ko-
ran TV is the most popular, al-Nas is the second and Iqraa the third most popular 
channel, al-Dagher identifies Iqraa as the first, al-Resalah as the second, and al-Nas 
as the third most frequently viewed Islamic channel. Shalabieh suggests that Iqraa is 
the most popular channel followed by al-Majd. The popularity of Iqraa may be related 
to its status as the first Islamic channel but also to the fact that the channel transmits 
through different satellites (Arabsat A5, Arabsat 4 Bader, Nilsat 101, Hotbird 8, Intesat 
19, Yahsat HD, Asiasat 5, CanalSat ESE 4 and Intelsat 21), thus reaching a potentially 
wider audience. Several Islamic channels have since been introduced and also been 
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Islam as a universal value that unites all Muslims and claim to facilitate knowl-
edge about religious, cultural, social, educational, economic and political issues 
based on the Koran and the Prophet Muhammad’s Sunna [traditions]. Further-
more, they want to strengthen Muslims’ belonging to ‘the Arab-Islamic nation 
and culture.’ While interpretations vary between different programmes broad-
cast on the same channel, the channels generally stress a view that there exists 
‘an Islamic perspective on all aspects of life.’ As Tash argues in an article about 
Islamic media, they are ‘a comprehensive and total system’ (Tash 2004: 3). At the 
same time, however, the concept of Islamic television is challenged by others, 
particular secularists, who claim that all television produced by and directed at 
Muslims could be considered Islamic, and therefore there is no need to establish 
specific Islamic channels.6 
In this approach of exploring the relationship between the media and its audi-
ences along with the factors influencing this relationship, the question becomes: 
how do audiences define and relate to Islamic TV as a specific genre? From the 
conversations with the interviewees, it became evident that they display a certain 
affinity towards particular elements of Islamic TV either in the form of a specific 
preacher, a particular channel or a specific kind of programme. On the other 
hand, when directly asked how to define Islamic TV, most definitions suggested 
were abstract and ideal – thus, not far from the channels’ own definitions. 
When asking Noura – a recently retired Egyptian lawyer living in Cairo – about 
her use of Islamic TV, she mentioned the name of Azhari TV and later al-Rahma 
TV, but immediately proceeded to mention a list of the names of scholars from 
Islamic programming she preferred. She liked Khaled al-Gindi, Mo‘ez Mas‘oud 
and Mustafa Husny. And among non-Egyptians, she liked ‘Ai`d al-Qarni from 
Saudi Arabia and al-Habib al-Jifri from Yemen, while she disliked ‘Atia Saqr and 
Mongi Farahat from al-Azhar in Egypt. Obviously, she was able to juggle a lot of 
names of specific scholars known from television without problem. From her 
way of addressing Islamic television, it appeared that she identified religious pro-
gramming with religious scholars. In other words, Islamic TV for her was first 
and foremost characterised by the teachings of religious scholars. Indeed, Islamic 
channels do present a large number of religious scholars who either have their 
own programmes or are invited guests in their capacity as religious authorities 
forced to close. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood’s channel Misr25 as well as al-Nas, al-
Rahma and Hafez channels have all been shut down by the Egyptian regime in the 
aftermath of the removal of president Mursi from office in July 2013. 
6 Nabil Fayad argues for this secular position as a guest on The Opposite Direction (al-
Jazeera, 27 February 2011).
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on different kinds of shows (cf. Galal 2009). They offer religious-based guidance 
and answers to different kinds of questions on topics ranging from religious to 
personal issues. Rather than seeing their media presence as a result of the posi-
tion they enjoy in the society as large, it is very often their presence on television 
that makes them recognized, which in turn strengthens their authority. In order 
to understand their influence, the audiences’ and in this case Noura’s recognition 
of their authority is therefore crucial. 
To Ibrahim, religious authority is everything when it comes to choosing what 
to watch. Fifty-year-old Ibrahim, an Egyptian school teacher since 1997, watched 
Islamic television in order to learn about religion from an expert. His preferred 
one particular Salafi sheikh, Sheikh Muhammad Hassan. Since Sheikh Muham-
mad Hassan endorsed the teachings and religious scholars on the al-Rahma 
channel, Ibrahim chose to watch this channel. Thus, to Ibrahim, Islamic TV was 
Sheikh Muhammad Hassan and what he defined as ansar al-Sunna [followers of 
al-Sunna]. 
Another way of identifying Islamic TV is by referring to a specific way of 
dealing with a topic. Samir is an Egyptian judge in his mid-fifties posted togeth-
er with his wife in Dubai. He explained that he preferred to see a programme 
that deals with a topic in depth, rather than the fatwa programmes with their 
all too often absurd questions and answers. Mohsen, a newly educated engineer 
of twenty two living in Cairo, had a similar approach. He asked for knowledge, 
and like Samir, he explained that he would prefer that religious programming 
were broadcasted on normal channels in between other programmes, instead of 
on specifically religious channels. They both thought that the so-called Islamic 
channels were influenced too heavily by self-appointed scholars from the Salafi 
tradition. Contrary to Noura and Ibrahim, both Samir and Mohsen questioned 
the religious authority of the television preachers. 
Seen as symbolic resources offered by Islamic TV, Noura and Ibrahim cited 
names of scholars as powerful resources and models for them, whereas Samir 
and Mohsen identified substantiated arguments and in-depth discussion of spe-
cific topics as interesting and relevant to them. More variations of these two ten-
dencies are present in my material, but what is important in this context is that 
these differences do not mean that the four of them do not agree at all. Surpris-
ingly, they all said that Sheikh Muhammad Hassan was okay, although neither 
Samir nor Mohsen identified as Salafi. On the contrary, they made a point of 
distancing themselves from Salafi. But they liked Sheikh Muhammad Hassan, 
though they both claimed to prefer the late Egyptian sheikh al-Sha‘rawi, who 
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became famous for his TV lessons in the 1980s and 1990s long before Islamic 
channels were introduced. 
When asked directly the question of what Islamic media is, the interviewees 
turned to identical kinds of explanations, despite their apparent differences in 
other respects. Ibrahim, the school teacher, answered:
They are media that may save the poor ones [non-practicing Muslims]. And pray to God 
to meet them in heaven in one way or the other and get points for their good works. 
In his answer, Ibrahim’s description of Islamic media is abstract and is presented 
in the form of a religious phrase, rather than as an attempt to explain or define 
Islamic media. Another kind of general statement was given by Samir, the judge: 
They have to be guided by Islamic rules and education to be named Islamic media. The 
programming has to follow Islamic ethics, as for instance in dress. 
He continued that Islamic TV does not lie or bring harm. Although this answer 
is more specific, it is also a very general statement that makes Islamic equivalent 
with ethical rules. 
Karim is a young man in his twenties, who had been living in London for 
three years. He holds a Bachelor’s degree but currently works in a supermarket in 
London at night. He is married to a British-born Muslim. He gave the following 
reason for watching Islamic TV:
It is God’s sharia that God has send to us to live it. 
All in all, when asked directly about Islamic television, the audiences’ answers 
were very close to how Islamic channels define themselves using Islamic termi-
nology and referring to what the channel Iqraa has named ‘an Islamic frame of 
reference’. They did not challenge the notion of an Islamic frame of reference 
despite their very different opinions about the consequences of the channels. 
Rather, an abstract and general definition made it possible for the audiences to 
make use of the same Islamic channels for different purposes, as will be exam-
ined in the following section.
Between filling up time and filling in religion 
Watching television in a western context has often been associated with the liv-
ing room, as implied by the title of Ien Ang’s book Living room wars. In Egypt, 
watching television has from the start also been a public activity – in a café or 
village, for example (Abu-Lughod 2005). Today, the places and hours for watch-
ing television has increasingly become just as varied as the number of channels 
and devices used to access television. For both researchers and producers, the 
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possibility of choice has an unavoidable impact on analytical as well as commer-
cial interests (as also pointed out by Ang 1996). However, choice does not equate 
to lack of structure, as the data from my fieldwork demonstrate. The choices 
made by my interviewees are deeply embedded in daily routines of work, reli-
gious duties, and leisure, on the one hand, but also in existing discourses. Thus, 
the structures of everyday life influence the manner in which Islamic TV is con-
sumed; watching it becomes a matter of organising time and space. 
Opportunity and intellectual relevance
When asking the interviewees about their television watching routines, it was not 
a surprise to find that watching Islamic television had very different functions in 
their daily lives. 
For Mohsen, the young Egyptian engineer, the choice of watching Islamic pro-
grammes seemed to be one possibility among many different programmes he 
could choose to help pass time. He repeated that he normally watched the Islam-
ic programmes in Super-Jet, referring to travelling by bus. Thus, he emphasised 
that it was a way of passing the time while travelling, which is often a frustrating 
and time-consuming experience in Egypt. While he mentioned the Super-Jet as 
a place for him to watch Islamic channels, he also explained that some other 
buses showed movies. As such, the choice of watching Islamic channels became a 
matter of accident rather than a deliberately planned activity or choice. However, 
his comment also reveals that Islamic channels are available in buses and must 
therefore be acceptable in public spheres. Time scheduling was another issue 
stressed by Mohsen, who explained that another way for him to watch Islamic 
channels is by finding them on YouTube or Facebook. His explanation revealed 
that he was motivated by discussions with friends and in public about specific 
preachers and programmes. He found and watched them on the Internet in order 
to form up his own opinion. Both opportunities to watch and social input were 
the striking features of Mohsen’s use of Islamic television. 
In London the young man, Karim who works in a supermarket, had similar 
concerns about finding time for watching Islamic television. Like Mohsen, the 
young Egyptian engineer in Cairo, Karim was a huge consumer of media – not 
only religious programming, but all kinds of shows including sitcoms, business 
and news: 
I watch my TV channels via YouTube. I watch them before noon. When I come home 
[from my night shift work], I go online and watch it. In 10 minutes I can get a quick 
overview about what happened the last 24 hours. Usually, I stay online until around 2pm. 
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I talk to friends, watch the news, play games, see my relatives [who live abroad] during 
4–5 hours; all of it through the Internet.
Though Karim was attracted by Salafi thinking, he was a very different media 
user from, for instance, the Egyptian school teacher Ibrahim. He consumed a lot 
of media from a wide range of programming, but mainly in small portions. As 
he said: 
… soon we don’t need television, because you can find clips of the programme or the 
whole programme on YouTube, or even recorded lessons [religious] uploaded on You-
Tube. 
Easy access was an important factor in Karim’s media use. When he explained 
that he preferred specialised programmes rather than a mixture of religious and 
non-religious programmes, he explained that it is not nice to have non-religious 
programming playing in which people are kissing, drinking alcohol, or making 
love, which is then interrupted with the call to prayer, after which the broadcast 
immediately comes back on. But his desire for specialised programmes may also 
be seen as a platform for easy access to the precise kind of programmes he would 
like to see at a particular moment. He can be categorised as an eclectic and con-
sumerist media user. 
Samir, the judge living in Dubai, is another example of a user who stressed that 
his watching of Islamic TV was relatively accidental, occasional and arbitrary. 
Very often, he came across religious shows by accident while channel surfing 
and tuned in if it seemed to be an interesting topic. As mentioned, he preferred 
programmes that examine a specific topic in depth. He did not have any specific 
religious programmes he watched regularly, and he preferred watching religious 
programmes on mainstream channels. As he said, he can easily enjoy a day with-
out watching religious television, although he actually watches some religious 
programming every day. In his opinion, TV is not the best place to gain religious 
knowledge. Thus, for Samir, Islamic programming is a potential resource – so 
long as it is intellectual stimulating. 
Purposeful teaching and contemplation 
In contrast to Samir, the judge, the retired lawyer Noura watched Islamic televi-
sion as a way to have a bit of religion on a day-to-day basis. She argued that it 
had become a necessary part of her life. Noura mostly watched TV after lunch 
(after 2pm) and in the evening. She explained that after lunch she would lie down 
on her bed and also in the evening after a long day to relax. Every day at 5pm, 
she would watch Mo‘ez Mas‘oud, who is a young Egyptian educated from the 
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American University in Cairo, but has made a living out of his Western style of 
preaching. Watching TV and specific Islamic programmes had become an im-
portant element in structuring and providing meaning to Noura’s daily life and 
routines after retirement. 
Amira, a 35-year-old single mother of three who immigrated to London seven 
years earlier, also used Islamic TV as a way of structuring her day while making 
room for religion. She argued that Islamic TV is a positive force:
We are very preoccupied with material life. Our soul does also need a little spirituality. 
We need words to help us getting closer to God. Life makes us too busy. We run, we are 
running all the time. Many people don’t find time to read the Koran. These programmes 
make it easier for me. You feel your soul relaxing. And, you feel recuperated and ready 
to continue working. 
By referring to the need for words, Amira very clearly saw Islamic programming 
as a resource for a specific spiritual language. But like Noura, she also liked to 
watch other kinds of programmes. Her situated use of Islamic TV as a symbolic 
resource among others was revealed when she said that if she had had a big 
argument with her ex-husband, she would only want to pray and listen to the 
Koran. Though, on another day she added that she would want to go out, listen 
to music, and would not do much else – except for observing the daily prayers, 
as she added. 
Confirming truth and safeguarding piety 
The schoolteacher Ibrahim represents yet another kind of audience. Like the re-
tired lawyer Noura, an important element of his daily routine included religious 
activities both in the mosque and by watching television. Ibrahim was a keen 
follower of Sheikh Muhammad Hassan, and he watched his programme every 
Wednesday. He emphasised his exclusive media use. The scholars he watched had 
to have a Salafi approach before he trusted them. For that reason, he did not like 
to watch films, drama series or even talk shows that mix the genders, because this 
is haram [sinful]. However, he did watch news and programmes on non-Islamic 
TV channels in which political and social problems were discussed, for exam-
ple ‘Amr Adib’s and Mona al-Shazli’s programmes. Confronted with the issue of 
watching a woman, he defended himself by arguing that he was not watching her 
in order to flirt with her, and he usually was very conscience not to stare at her. In 
any case, the people who rejected watching her were a million times better than 
him, he added. It also happened that he would watch part of a film, if he came 
home and it was playing in the living room where his twelve year old daughter 
was watching it. He argued that he did not want to make things too complicated 
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for his daughter by denying her the option of watching content he himself would 
prefer not to watch. As a media user, Ibrahim was an ideological exclusivist and 
an authority-based viewer. 
Another kind of exclusivist was Maher, who had been living in Denmark 
for about 20 years. He was in his late fifties and did unskilled work at his son’s 
company. He volunteers for many hours a week doing administrative work at 
a mosque. He watched all kinds of programmes, also those he believed to have 
been built on ‘lies,’ such as secular Arab channels like the Saudi-owned MBC 
TV. Maher placed his viewing habits in two contexts. One context comprised 
his daily routines; he watched television in the morning and the evening. The 
other was the context of what was happening in the world. The interview with 
Maher took place in the autumn 2011 during which time the events following 
the January revolution in Egypt were still in the world news. He argued that he 
watched much more television than normal, particularly the news stories on the 
events in Egypt. As for Islamic channels, he watched them at home since they 
require concentration, as he argued. Regardless of the channels and programmes 
he watched, Islamic or not, he used them as proof of his worldview. Television 
corrupts and misleads most people, he argued, and while he had the capacity 
to distinguish between right and wrong television, he therefore could watch all 
kinds of programmes, but believes that most viewers do not have this capacity. 
While Maher was exclusivist in his judging of what constitutes good television, 
this was not motivated so much by a religious position as a political one, much 
in contrast to the schoolteacher Ibrahim. Thus, for Maher, watching Islamic TV 
was not motivated by a specific authority, although he praised al-Rahma and 
Sheikh Muhammad Hassan. It was a way of confirming his faith and his political 
position in the world. 
As result of this section of the analysis, it has been possible to identify three 
different ways that people make use of the symbolic resources provided by Is-
lamic programming: (1) Opportunity and intellectual relevance; (2) Purposeful 
teaching and contemplation; and (3) Confirming truth and safeguarding piety. 
In the following section, I will further examine how these strategies of television 
use are embedded in the different negotiations and contestations of the role of 
media and how the interviewees made meaning of what and how they watched 
Islamic TV. By looking more closely at their articulations, it becomes possible 
to further evaluate how their routines are related to the use of Islamic program-
ming as symbolic resources. 
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Making meaning from Islamic television: between  
resistance and piety
Watching TV in specific ways, as explored in the preceding section, cannot be 
isolated from the meaning that audiences make of what they watch. None of 
the audiences interviewed came up with one single interpretation of Islamic 
TV. Instead, they appeared to oscillate between Islamic TV as a protector and 
educator of tradition and as a basis for making up one’s own mind about reli-
gious issues. Or, they went back and forth between perceiving Islamic channels 
as providing a foundation for differentiating right from wrong and as a place 
of worship. Despite the equivocations, it is possible to identify some dominant 
discourses that cut across the interviews. They are characterised by what I would 
call four ways of striving to be a Muslim, and therefore also four different vari-
ations of convergence between Islam and media in social practice. As I have ar-
gued elsewhere, one must do something to ‘achieve becoming Muslim’ (Galal 
2012b). Thus, by watching Islamic programming, Muslims ‘achieve becoming 
Muslim’ by emphasizing different values, interpretations, and religious activities. 
It is important to note that these should not be taken for categories of Muslim 
audiences, since they oscillate between different interpretations. More precisely, 
the different ‘activities’ may be seen as clusters of symbolic resources that emerge 
from the encounter between Islamic TV and its audiences. 
The four positions are: (1) Resistance against others’ understanding of Islam; 
(2) Spiritually striving for piety; (3) Education and protection of tradition; and 
(4) Intellectually striving for new knowledge. In the model below, the four posi-
tions are also placed in relation to each other. I provide examples of the positions 
as exhibited by the interviewees and at the same time elaborate on the meanings 
of each of the four positions (Figure 1).
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RESISTANCE (relation to Others)
Believers and non-believers  
Authority = particular scholar(s)
Space of positioning (different 
arguments) Authority = rational 
argument (scholarly supported)




Halal/haram (rules and truth)  
Authority = tradition
Place for worship (diverse)  
Authority = sincerity
PIETY (relation to God)
Above the horizontal line, the relationship to various Others is at stake. These 
may be infidels or secularists (on the left side), or they may be without rational 
argumentation (on the right side). Below the horizontal line, the relationship 
to God is what audiences find the resources which with to strengthen through 
Islamic TV, either in the form of tradition including rules (on the left side) or in 
the form of places for worship and remembrance (on the right side). Another 
analytical distinction of the model is between those who argue within an indi-
vidual perspective (right side of the vertical line) and those who focus on Islam 
as a clearly defined tradition and thus collectively legitimated (left side of vertical 
line). Additionally, the different positions are reflected in different approaches to 
authority, as indicated in the model and elaborated in the following section.
An arena of cultural struggle and resistance  
(above the horizontal line)
Several of the interviewees read media texts within the context of current po-
litical struggles. By doing so, their evaluation of Islamic TV was inevitably and 
simultaneously a positioning of themselves within the socio-religious political 
field. This political field is not only characterised by contradictions and tensions 
when it comes to religious feelings and values, but is also embedded in on-going 
societal changes on both a global and local level. However, the interviewees did 
not subscribe to identical kinds of differentiation, as the following examples 
show.
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Maher, from Denmark, was critical towards television in general from the be-
ginning of the interview. According to him, all Arab channels were potentially 
an extension of the power of the United States. Thus, he differentiated between 
American-influenced, secular, and liberal channels such as MBC TV, and those 
he was able to trust, which included mainly the Egyptian Islamic al-Rahma TV. 
Thus, Saudi owned channels in general were not to be trusted, regardless if they 
were defined as Islamic or not. He explained that many Islamic channels were 
created to fulfil the interest of their owners and to spread what he denoted as 
‘Islam light’ (‘light’ referring to diluted version). Maher’s differentiation of right 
and wrong Islam is embedded within the global struggle between a western lib-
eral discourse on secularism and a religious conservative discourse that in its 
Muslim version has been fed by anti-Muslim discourses that have swept western 
countries after the terrorist attacks of September 11 (Galal 2012a).
Among the Egyptian interviewees, the differences articulated were of a more 
internal, regional kind. The dominant divide was that between a pro-Salafi and 
anti-Salafi orientation. While Salafi seemed to be a reference point for both pros 
and cons, quite often the opposite of Salafi was denoted as wasatiya (meaning ‘the 
middle way’ and is referring to a moderate version of Islam). The retired lawyer 
Noura stated this preference very clearly when she explained how she preferred 
specific scholars because they represented a spiritual and moderate [wasatiya] 
approach to Islam, much in contrast to overly strict channels, like al-Nas (a Salafi 
TV channel), “which make people hate everything”, as she said. Hence, viewers 
like the schoolteacher Ibrahim, the young engineer Mohsen, the judge Samir, and 
the retired lawyer Noura interpreted their preferences into a regional discourse 
on Salafi versus moderate Islam. They positioned themselves clearly as pro Salafi 
(Ibrahim), or against Salafi (Samir and Noura), or as someone who previously 
subscribed to Salafi (Mohsen). 
The symbolic resources provided by Islamic TV offer viewers particular posi-
tions to adopt within the Islamic landscape and the means to respectively chal-
lenge them. However, Ibrahim, Samir and Mohsen, who were all preoccupied 
with positioning themselves, did not use the same strategy in order to reach a 
conclusion regarding the best or truest position. Here the understanding of au-
thority played a role, which was again motivated by the interpretation of the 
resources offered by television. Ibrahim made it very clear that he only accepted 
knowledge about Islam communicated by self-declared Salafi scholars or by 
scholars recognized by Sheikh Muhammad Hassan, whom he followed. That 
was why he preferred al-Rahma TV, because Sheikh Muhammad Hassan guar-
anteed its quality. Thus, Sheikh Muhammad Hassan was his chosen authority 
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on Islamic matters. While Samir and Mohsen also occasionally watched Sheikh 
Muhammad Hassan, their argumentation for the right interpretation was quite 
different from Ibrahim’s. Mohsen required clear references and arguments; Samir 
preferred well-argued and well-documented proof. They both also stressed that 
it was a question of making up one’s own minds on the basis of reviewing and 
thinking about information presented. This was reflected in their media use, 
which was much more inclusive than Ibrahim’s. For them, choosing trustworthy 
programming was their responsibility – not something to be left to one authority 
or scholar. 
An arena of piety (below the horizontal line)
Islamic television is not only used as a basis for differentiation. Just as much, it is 
perceived as a resource for coming closer to God. The need to be reminded of the 
message of Islam, as well as involve oneself in a religious space also seem to be 
important aspects. This mode of using Islamic programming is thus very similar 
to what Charles Hirschkind describes in his book on how cassette sermons are 
used to create Islamic counter publics (2009). 
For the twenty-two year old university student Khatib, who is born in Eng-
land, the Islamic programmes helped him to remember. As he phrased it:
I think that the stories about the prophet and his followers or a programme on education 
within Islam may influence me. Although I may have heard about these things before, we 
human beings easily forget. Therefore, I find that these channels are fine, because they 
encourage us and remind us of the right things and about being decent.
Khatib was convinced that religious space should not be contaminated by secu-
lar topics; he thus preferred the separation between religious and non-religious 
channels. As with other interviewees, his interpretation was closely related to 
his use of Islamic programmes, which he only watched when he stayed with his 
parents, mostly during Ramadan. The Islamic channels offered him a specific 
religious space of worship that was private and safeguarded tradition in a moder-
ate version. 
As previously mentioned, Amira, the single mother from London, also found 
emotional and spiritual support through Islamic programming. Like Khatib she 
emphasised the importance of protecting and handing on Islamic traditions to 
the next generation. Noura’s use of Islamic programming also reflected her need 
for specific spiritual spaces. But in contrast to Amira and Khatib, it was Noura’s 
own space – one that was not shared with her family. At the same time she was a 
critical user who stressed that one should not believe everything: 
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You have to listen to your heart and choose, what is the easiest to you, as the prophet 
Muhammad has prescribed”, she argued. 
Thus her spiritual needs were connected with the quest for sincerity and intel-
lectual fulfilment. 
Ibrahim and Maher also perceived the channels as a way to teach their chil-
dren about Islam or the (Salafi) tradition. They tried to watch religious TV to-
gether with their children in order to influence them without pressure, as they 
said. Furthermore, Ibrahim gave the impression that he would like to watch even 
more, if possible. Islamic TV became like prayers and lessons in the mosque: 
something to continuously strive for, a place for living in accordance with Islam. 
The authority, though, is still tradition. Contrary to Ibrahim, Karim, the eclectic 
user, argued that he himself would decide what was useful. He did not want to 
become a parrot, just repeating what the scholar said. Instead, he sought to find 
out and experience himself what was right. In other words, he found answers 
through argumentation and what he considered authentic or sincere. 
Conclusion
It is worth noting that several of the interviewees mentioned said that they 
watched the Salafi Sheikh Muhammad Hassan (Samir, Ibrahim and Karim). 
Considering the context in which they watched him and how they ascribed 
meaning to what they watched helps depict a much more complex picture of 
how audiences make use of the symbolic resources offered by programmes 
such as Sheikh Muhammad Hassan’s. Though they reported watching the same 
sheikh, they differed in how much they liked him. For Samir, Sheikh Muham-
mad Hassan was just one television scholar he saw by chance and found okay. To 
Ibrahim, Sheikh Muhammad Hassan was his religious Master. Karim found him 
charismatic and strong in his way of speaking. Thus, Sheikh Muhammad Has-
san influences audiences, but in very different ways. For an Arab user of Islamic 
television he appears to be difficult not to come across and have an opinion about 
between 2011 and 2014. Since my material is qualitative and I make no claim of 
representativeness, I do not argue that this most likely would be the case for all 
audiences. The point is that across different countries and across different beliefs, 
it is possible to identify shared frames of reference among Arabic-speaking audi-
ences of Islamic TV. 
Furthermore, audiences from different countries in general appear to use Is-
lamic TV to differentiate and position themselves in terms of religion and iden-
tity. What differs is how these articulations of difference converge with other 
discourses. For the Danish interviewee, they are part of a global discourse on 
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Islam, while Egyptian interviewees, for the most part, took part in a national 
or regional discourse for and against Salafism. Again, it is interesting that pos-
sible clusters of positioning and identification made available with the help of 
the symbolic resources of Islamic TV. While to some degree a viewer’s place of 
residence may influence his or her interpretation of Islamic television, it is just as 
relevant to consider the everyday circumstances that influence the use of Islamic 
TV. As judged by the interviewees, access and technology, combined with social 
practices of work, leisure time, family life etcetera are just as important. 
It is also noteworthy that British and young Egyptian interviewees were more 
likely to use the Internet or YouTube to view Islamic programming, which may 
clearly be related to easy access or programmes on demand. The findings could 
indicate that the more an audience depends on the Internet and YouTube, the 
more likely the possibility is of eclectic and situational interpretations. As for 
symbolic resources on spirituality, the greatest differences seem to be between 
those who largely accept the symbolic inventory of well-defined rules, rituals 
and practices made available to them by Islamic programmes, and those who 
appreciate the inventory of symbolic resources, but ultimately insist on making 
them their own. 
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Khalil Rinnawi
Cyber religious-national community? The case 
of Arab community in Germany 
Introduction
Since the 1980s, Arab diasporas in Europe and elsewhere have been connected to 
the Arab World through Arabic newspapers such as al-Hayat or al-Sharq al-Awa-
sat, allowing for the creation of a kind of primordial virtual community (Kraidy 
2008). This tendency was further strengthened during the 1990s and the begin-
ning of this century by the consumption of the Arabic satellite television chan-
nels and the Internet among these diasporas in the shadow of the globalization 
process. The main assumption here is that the process of globalization, which is 
inevitable and unavoidable one, has become an integral part of our world expe-
rience regardless of our location, means (e.g. satellite TV or Internet), or time 
(Appadurai 1996). A central claim of this approach is that globalization changes 
the ‘rules of the game’ because of the way it facilitates basic communication and 
cultural exchange (Fiske 1987). 
One important phenomenon of globalization is the cultural isolation of 
ethno-national minorities living in different countries from the cultural majority 
of the general population (Aksoy & Robins 1997; Rinnawi 2010). This is evident 
not only in the case of Arabs in Germany, but also in other places in Europe and 
elsewhere (Miladi 2006; Harb & Bessiaso 2006; Matar 2006). It is also evident 
among other minorities living in Germany – particularly among the Turks and 
Kurds (White 1997; Robins & Aksoy 2000). Continuing the research in this field, 
this study highlights the effects of the Arab transnational media, particularly 
satellite television and the Internet, among this community. The focus in this 
study is to determine to what degree a Berlin-based Arab community – mainly of 
Palestinian and Lebanese origin – is exposed to Arab transnational media. This 
study is also interested in how exposure to transnational Arab media influences 
this community. This chapter addresses two main questions: first, how do mem-
bers of this community consume media? Secondly, what are the implications of 
this media consumption among this community and across generations in terms 
of their relationship to German society and with their Arab homeland?
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Arab Community in Germany
Compared to the Turks who have been in Germany since the 1950s and 1960s, 
the Arab community of Berlin I refer to in this study is considered a ‘new’ collec-
tive as (Aksoy & Robins 1997). The majority of them are of Palestinian or Leba-
nese origin and came from Lebanon between 1973 and the mid 1980s during 
the civil war. Most of them entered Germany under the auspices of the German 
Asylum Law (1980). The exact number of Arabs in Germany is not known, but 
according to a report by Susan M. Akram and Terry Rempel, in 1999 there were 
approximately 45,000 refugees of Arab origin – most of whom reside in Berlin 
(Akram and Rempel 2003). Unlike Arab communities in other parts of Europe, 
the Arab community in Berlin lacks local supporting institutions that deal with 
culture, welfare, etcetera. Since they have refugee status, they are a social minor-
ity who is, to a certain degree, not really accustomed to being supported by local 
cultural and social institutions. A further distinguishing feature of Arab com-
munities in Berlin, particularly since the 1990s, is their high degree of politiciza-
tion relating directly to cultural and ideological divisions and struggles within 
the Arab world. The impact of these cultural and ideological dynamics has been 
reinforced by the consumption of Arab media among this community. 
Theoretical considerations
This study is based upon two main theoretical points of departure. The first is de-
rived from socio-political literature and addresses this topic from the collective 
dimension, while the second theoretical approach originates from psychological 
research and places an emphasis upon the individual dimension.
The concept of multiculturalism is important to the first theoretical approach. 
Population exchange and massive immigration resulting from the reconfigura-
tion of national borders has occurred in many countries around the world since 
the 1970s. These movements and migrations of populations have led to the crea-
tion of ethno-national minorities who seek to preserve their respective identity, 
cultural heritage, and mother language (Morley & Robins 1995; Geertz 2000). 
In the framework of the postmodernist intellectual and global climate since the 
late 1980s, this cultural segregation has gained a significantly large degree of le-
gitimacy (Kellner 1988; Featherstone 1995). This legitimacy is not only evident 
to social scientists who argue against the melting pot paradigm (Kimmerling 
2004). It was also recognized by the legislative community, who has accepted the 
principle that the bond with one’s culture, and in particular with the language 
people use to express and understand themselves, can be so strong that individu-
als cannot relinquish it (Rawls 1993). Therefore, the notion of multiculturalism 
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becomes the most important force in this reality. In this context, Grillo (2001) 
classifies two kinds of multiculturalisms: weak and strong. Weak multicultural-
ism refers to the idea that ethnic minorities share the same fundamental values 
and norms, employment patterns, health care and welfare and education systems 
with the mainstream population. Cultural differences, distinct beliefs and prac-
tices, religious traditions and language are permitted in the private sphere. Strong 
multiculturalism, on the other hand, recognizes cultural differences in the pub-
lic sphere, such as providing separate schools or hospitals for Muslims in some 
European countries. The weak version of multiculturalism is widely held as the 
Western ideal and has served as the foundation for French policies, while Britain 
has tended more towards a programme of strong multiculturalism. 
The second theoretical point of departure is derived from psychological re-
search, and places emphasis upon the individual dimension. This consists of 
strategies that individuals who belong to minority and immigrant groups use in 
their daily lives within their host societies (Pfetsch 1999). The cross-cultural psy-
chological approach, for instance, considers the links between cultural context 
and the behaviour of individual members of minorities, particularly immigrant 
communities (Berry 1997). According to this approach, the immigrant minority 
group faces two problems: (1) participating in the host society and (2) main-
taining their original identity and cultural heritage. Berry offers a model of this 
dynamic based on dichotomous attitudes towards two issues: the value of main-
taining one’s distinct identity and the value of maintaining relationships with 
the host society. As a result of such potentially dichotomous attitudes, minor-
ity group members may develop acculturation strategies including: assimilation, 
separation, marginalization and integration (ibid.). 
Within the framework of this discussion, transnational media plays a cru-
cial role in these processes by connecting minorities to the culture and herit-
age emanating of their countries of origin. This connection has both collective 
and individual aspects. The main outcome of these tendencies is threatening 
and challenging the nation-state formula by strengthening sectarian tendencies 
among the various communities that comprise the nation-state. On the other 
hand, many democracies work to promote policies that enhance the social inte-
gration of different national-cultural minorities into the mainstream culture of 
the nation-state. 
Transnational media and new cultural order
This brings us to the role of the media, cultural organisations, and cultural prac-
tices in the transformation of cultural spaces and identities. Studying the media 
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can provide rich insight into what is happening to these two dimensions in their 
various contemporary manifestations.
First, it is worth considering the wider transformations that are occurring in 
contemporary media industries and markets, such as changes associated with 
the development of new ‘space-transcending’ technologies like satellite TV and 
the Internet. An important consequence of this has been the construction of new 
transnational communicational and cultural spaces in and across continents. In 
the new media order, audiences who were once marginalized as ‘minority inter-
ests’ to national broadcasting regimes may now be transformed into significant 
elements for transnational services that embrace diaspora interests and identities.
The landscape of the Arab media has undergone revolutionary changes since 
the 1990s as a result of globalization and trans-nationalism. The most crucial de-
velopment has occurred in Arab television, where the historical monopoly of the 
state broadcasting organisations was undermined in the early 1990s due to both 
private broadcasting companies and new liberal economic policies (Sakr 2001; 
Rinnawi 2006). Consequently, there was a proliferation of commercial channels 
in the Arab world. Additionally, Pan-Arab television channels such as al-Jazeera 
and al-Arabiya and, of course, new religious channels such as Iqraa were also 
launched. As of 2014, there are hundreds of channels. These channels have ac-
tively sought to make their programmes available to Arab communities through-
out the world by using satellite and Internet links. Programming to this dias-
pora has now become integral to channel scheduling practices. This new logic of 
transnational marketing has also become apparent in other forms of production, 
such as television entertainment and general informational programmes. 
Essentially, Pan-Arab media enables Arab TV audiences and web users in the 
Arab world as well as in the diaspora to engage in cultural, religious and nation-
alistic issues. This engagement is particularly important to Arab diasporan com-
munities, who generally live in Western, non-Muslim, non-Arab environments 
(Kraidy 2002). Through the Arab transnational media, all Arabs throughout the 
world can become members of an invisible, imagined virtual community (Rin-
nawi 2006). Field research indicates that members of this virtual community are 
no longer a marginalized minority, but because they are members of a virtual 
community via TV and the Internet, they also belong to a majority. These groups 
are no longer marginal and remain less assimilated in their host societies. Being 
significantly exposed to these virtual communities somehow deepens their own 
societal marginality. Mark Sedgwick, for example, argues that the Internet makes 
Western Muslims less of a minority by increasing both the frequency and range 
of their contact (1998). Contact with Arab issues, which was previously limited 
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to their local mosque, may now extend across continents. Furthermore, infor-
mation is widely disseminated and sometimes acted upon quickly. In making 
Arabs and Muslims in the West less of a minority, the Internet increases not only 
their own sense of identity as Arabs and Muslims, but also their self-confidence 
(ibid.). Several field studies on Arab diasporas in Europe have reached the same 
conclusion regarding the crucial influence of Arab transnational media on Arab 
diasporas in the West since the 1990s (Miladi 2006; Harb & Bessiaso 2006; Matar 
2006; Rinnawi 2010).
In this context, Pintak (2009) argues that media plays a fundamental role in 
the formation of national identity, most famously detailed in Benedict Ander-
son’s theory of the imagined community. Consequently, we argue that the wide-
spread displacement of people and the re-creation of communities with shared 
ethnicity and/or language through transnational media has blurred social and 
national identities. It has opened up possibilities for ‘multiple affiliations and as-
sociations outside and beyond the nation state and the state where they live,’ giv-
ing rise to something Robin Cohen has described as a ‘diasporic allegiance’ – a 
proliferation of ‘transnational identities that cannot easily be contained within 
the nation-state system’ (1997). Arjun Appadurai uses the same terminology to 
describe, among other things, the displacement of people and the creation of 
‘invented homelands’ (1996). 
The main thesis of this study is based on what Rinnawi (2006) calls ‘McAra-
bism.’ According to Anderson, a nation is an imagined community despite the 
fact that not every imagined community is a nation, and nation is not synony-
mous with nationalism (Anderson 1993). In this context, we can argue that glo-
balizing effects of transnational media on the Arab community in Germany can 
be traced to the concept of an ‘imagined community,’ at both in terms of the 
nation and the Islamic religion. This suggests that instant nationalism, such as 
‘McArabism’ can be a form of an imagined community, composed mainly of Ar-
abs within the Arab world, as well as Arabs in the diaspora. According to Ander-
son, ‘the emergence of new nationalism is the result of a process of “re-imagina-
tion” conditioned by drastic transformations in the conscience and media within 
a modern framework’ (ibid.). The ‘imagined’ nations resulting from the process 
of re-imagining, positioned within the rise of contemporary nationalism are 
based upon philosophies of ethnic solidarity. This process of imagination occurs 
within the framework of radical social changes that have taken place following 
the industrial revolution (ibid.). In the case of the Arab community in Germany, 
the introduction of Arab transnational media has strongly impacted the process 
of re-imagination in the national context as well as in the Islamic-religious one, 
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built upon people’s nostalgic longing for the past in their homeland. Finally, it is 
imagined as a community because regardless of the actual prevailing inequal-
ity and exploitation, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship 
(ibid.). In effect, the thing that is imagined here in Anderson’s analysis is the 
nation. However, in this study we apply the term ‘imagined nation’ to the Arab 
community in Germany in order to try to explain the effects of consuming Arab 
satellite media, which is conceived by Anderson as limited, sovereign comrade-
ship. This will be elaborated later in this study, where we will empirically show 
the limits of this imagined community. 
In light of the above discussion, it is interesting to explore how and if the 
effects of transnational media differ according to generational lines in general 
and, more specifically, in our case study. Therefore, we theorize that first genera-
tion immigrants formulated an ‘Imagined Coherence’ or ‘Cyber Nationalism and 
Islamic-religiousness’ of a Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab nation by interacting with 
Arab media; their children, in turn, must demonstrate a ‘schizophrenic situation’ 
that differs from their parents’ experience and is evident in their media habits. 
These differences are explained in the following section.
Methodological considerations
This study involves an analysis of media consumption and cultural practices by 
the Arab community in Berlin. Media and cultural practices were considered 
from two perspectives: 
1.  In-depth, qualitative survey of the use and consumption of Arabic and non-
Arabic media by was conducted on 50 randomly selected Arab families living 
in Berlin. 
2.  An analysis of the impact of these modes of media consumption on their 
identity in different members and subgroups within the Arab community.
Studying media helps gain insight into wider questions regarding culture, iden-
tity, segregation, integration, and assimilation. In keeping with this focus, the 
study data is based on 197 face-to-face, open-ended question interviews con-
ducted among 50 families in Berlin during a four-month period in the summer 
of 2009. 197 participants were randomly chosen and all participating families 
were Palestinian and Lebanese refugees. Most of the interviews were done in 
Arabic. Finally, it is important to mention here that we have asked the interview-
ees about their general use of TV, thus enabling us to also find out about their 
use of religious TV. 
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Media consumption among the Arab community in Berlin
General modes of media consumption
In general, the data shows that for most of the interviewees, mass media plays an 
integral part of their lives and serves as a vital tool. Participants reported feeling 
that the media is not only an important pastime, but it is also the main tool that 
connects them to their homeland and Islamic religion. It also helps them retain 
their sense of belonging to their heritage, both at a national level and religious 
level. The interviewees revealed a high degree of adaptation to the media. Al-
most all the interviewees, particularly the parents, reported extensive television 
viewing, while the younger generation reported long hours of Internet surfing. 
Most parents belong to the first generation, which is characterized by high rates 
of unemployment; many live off welfare assistance they receive from the state 
authorities as refugees. Consequently, they have a great deal of leisure ‘time to 
kill.’ Most important is their strong and clear tendency to consume national and 
religious media content broadcast on Arab transnational media, such as the ‘all-
news’ television channels, as well as the religious ones. All families interviewed 
mentioned that electronic media, rather than written media, is their sole source 
of information. This is due to several reasons. There is no local Arabic written 
media source available in Berlin. Arab newspapers were available in the past, 
but most of parents are illiterate and/or are not accustomed to reading German 
newspapers. School-aged children reported that they sometimes read German 
newspapers, but are unable to read fluently in Arabic. 
Television is the first media form that interviewees rely upon in order to keep 
updated on what is going around them and, more importantly, what is going 
on in their homeland. They rely on television for news, Islamic-religious pro-
grammes as well as entertainment, and are accustomed to entertainment from 
their homeland rather than the other mass media. Ghassan, a 54-year-old Pal-
estinian, said: 
Normally almost all of my media consumption is TV such as al-Jazeera and al-‘Arabiya 
and other Arab entertainment TV channels like MCB and MBC. Sometimes I watch the 
German Channel ARD and ZDF. I have no access to Arabic newspapers because they do 
not exist here or to the German ones since I cannot read German well enough to read 
them. As for the Internet, it is very far from my world except when I talk on Skype to my 
relatives in Lebanon. 
Adult female interviewees reported spending even more time watching TV due 
to the long hours they spend at home during the day. ‘Aysheh, a 47-year-old 
woman, stated that:
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Television became my best friend. I spend hours and hours watching, moving from one 
TV channel to another, from one Arabic Drama to another Turkish one.1 When there is 
nothing interesting I move to Rotana Channel to watch Arabic video clips or to Rotana 
Tarab to be connected to my favorite nostalgic [Haneen] Arabic singers such as Umm 
Kulthum and Warda. 
Similar sentiments were also expressed in a study conducted by Miladi (2006) 
among Arab community members in Britain. 
The second general finding is ‘dual modes’ of media consumption. On one 
hand, our interviewees consume German media received through local cables. 
This includes German television channels such as ZDF, ARD and SAT1, which 
keeps them updated on the economy, weather, transport, and other issues in their 
daily lives in Germany, as well as entertainment programmes such as movies 
and TV dramas. This tendency is more evident among the young generation. 
On the other hand, interviewees extensively consume media in Arabic, which 
they receive through private satellite dishes (Nilesat and/or Arabsat). Hussein, a 
35-year-old man originally from Lebanon, explained: 
Almost all of the Arab families I know have access to both German media and Arab 
satellite media. The German media helps me feel more updated with what is going on 
here in Germany and makes my daily life here easier. But, at the same time, without satel-
lite TV channels coming from the Arab World I would feel bad, strange, and alienated. 
Generational-cultural gaps
These findings indicate important generational gaps. While television is consid-
ered the main media outlet for the parents, the Internet is the most important 
medium for the younger generation. This finding can be partially explained by 
differences in the education levels between both generations. Most of the par-
ents arrived in Germany with low levels of education, which has prevented them 
from learning to use a computer to surf the Internet. The younger generation, on 
the other hand, has received a higher level of education since they attend schools 
in Germany. The second reason for these differences can be attributed to the fact 
that the younger generation is as ‘computer oriented’ as their peers in Germany 
and elsewhere. Mohamed, a 19-year-old, stated: 
Most of the young Arab people my age and younger, including children, are familiar 
with the Internet. We get most of our news about the Arab World through the Arab 
news websites as well as through chatting on the web with our relatives and friends in 
our homeland. We know almost everything that is happening there. Our parents have 
1 Turkish television drama is dubbed when broadcasted at Arab TV.
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almost no idea about the Internet; they prefer to watch TV rather than Internet which 
they perceived as a very sophisticated machine.
These differences indicate deeper generational gaps, which have different impli-
cations for both generations.
Another significant finding within the context of generational-cultural gaps 
is in the modes of television consumption between the two generations. Among 
the first generation, there is a kind of ‘collective viewership’: parents frequently 
reported watching TV together and sometimes watching with their children in 
the living room, where the TV is connected to Arab satellite channels. How-
ever, their children display a kind of ‘individual viewership,’ as they reported 
normally watching television alone in their bedrooms – where the television 
is connected to German channels. This shows significant generational-cultural 
gaps between the two generations (Rinnawi 2012). These generational-cultural 
gaps are also evident at another level of television viewing, in terms of the type 
of television content that each of the two groups normally watches. The inter-
views revealed that parents watched mostly Arab channels and seldom viewed 
German channels, primarily because they do not understand German well, and 
do not feel the same cultural affiliation. The opposite was observed among the 
children, who viewed more German television and less Arabic television. Im-
portantly, the parents also felt that Arab channels had more credibility regard-
ing news on Arab issues, as opposed to the German channels. To this point, 
Miladi (2006) and Harb and Bessiaso (2006) reported the same findings among 
the Arab diaspora in Britain. Viewing Arabic channels, particularly news and 
current affairs, was also difficult for children due to the formal, classical Arabic 
dialect that is used instead of the colloquial spoken Arabic language – making 
it extremely difficult for these children to understand and remain interested in 
Arabic programming.
Unlike their parents, the children who arrived in Germany were quickly inte-
grated into German culture through schooling, and learned the language rapidly. 
They are immersed in German culture for a large part of the day, and are in 
continuous contact with the German language and culture. Most of the chil-
dren have difficulties reading or writing in Arabic. Many even have difficulties 
speaking Arabic well, particularly those between 4–18 years. The first generation 
is highly interested in al-Jazeera regardless of gender, while Western channels 
are more popular among the younger generation (Miladi 2006). Our interviews 
revealed that television-viewing habits of the children included mostly German 
programmes. When they did watch Arab TV, it was mostly for entertainment – 
particularly music. Abed, a 13-year-old youth stated: 
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I only watch Arabic music, especially Arabic music video clips that I am familiar with. 
The immersion in German culture and way of life for the young Arab genera-
tion is similar to the immersion other foreigners in Germany, such as Turkish or 
Kurdish youth, who feel some degree of alienation from German society (White 
1997). On one hand, they are like their German peers in terms of their daily 
media use, consuming German media content and culture (TV dramas, movies 
and video clips on MTV). They are also integrated in the societal modern youth 
lifestyle in terms of clothing, foods, and so on. However, these young people ex-
pressed having special concerns as outsiders living on the margins of German 
society due to their religious, cultural and political identity, resulting in signifi-
cant differences between them and the majority culture.
Many children claimed they watch Arabic programs with their parents if pre-
viously told the programme would be interesting. Rasha, a six-year-old girl re-
vealed: 
I sometimes watch Egyptian films or shows with my mother, but I don’t always under-
stand what is said and my mother has to translate or explain for me. 
Children and youth also reported watching some news with their parents, par-
ticularly during crises in Palestine or Lebanon, along with some religious pro-
grammes. They usually asked their parents for explanations and translations, 
although Arab channels usually show a great deal of pictures and footage, which 
help the children to understand visually. Most of the second generation said that 
such interactions help them to understand their heritage, religion and culture, 
while also making them feel part of the Arab and the Muslim world. Haitam, a 
17-year-old boy stated: 
After watching only German for two consecutive days, I feel like watching Arabic in 
order to understand what is happening in the Arab world and to improve my Arabic 
language skills while viewing a bit of my heritage.
It appeared that the children of Arab refugees in Berlin in their teenage years 
tended to feel a need to relate more to their Arab and Islamic heritage, and be-
came more interested in mastering Arabic. This appeared to occur simultaneous-
ly with their transition from school into the workforce, where many mentioned 
how Germans treated Arabs. Moreover, following the events of September 11, 
many revealed that they were treated differently or met with suspicion. This leads 
some children to seek answers from Arab transnational TV. Rula, an 18-year-old 
participant mentioned: 
As foreigners we never experienced any problems from the German students prior to 
the events of September 11, especially from my friends in the school. Now, during recess, 
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the German students form one group and the Arab students form another separate 
group and they do not associate with us. 
The Second Intifada (October 2000), the Lebanon War (2006), and the Gaza War 
(2008–2009) have also played a significant role. Children, as well as their par-
ents, watch more TV. As Germans get their information from German newscasts, 
which communicate a primarily Israeli perspective, Arab youths feel that they 
have to get the Arab perspective as well. A 15-year-old youth stated: 
I am now more interested and concerned with the Palestinian news and affairs because 
above anything else, I am a Palestinian. And when the German students accuse us Pales-
tinians of attacking Israel and committing terrorism, it is important for me to have the 
real facts, which are usually the opposite of what the Germans hear. I want to argue and 
defend the Palestinians.
Implications of the New Modes of Media Consumption 
The findings of this study indicate two main tendencies among the Arab com-
munity in Berlin concerning the effects of new media consumption, particularly 
those from the Arab World. The first is an impulse to return to Islam, Islamic tra-
ditions and ways of life. The second is a strong expression of a feeling of greater 
belonging to the Arab nation, culture and heritage known as ‘imagined coher-
ence,’ which was observed in most of the interviews. These processes are due to 
many factors. The first factor consists of the political and military events that 
have occurred in the Middle East during the last decade, such as the Second 
Intifada of 2000, the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War (2003–2011), the Lebanon 
War of 2006, and the Gaza War of 2008–2009. The second factor is the antago-
nistic attitude among some of the population in Western countries towards Arab 
and Muslim minorities, which has become more evident in daily life spheres for 
diasporans. A third factor in this process comprises the antagonistic and biased-
coverage of Arab and Islamic affairs in Western mass media, leading to suspi-
cious attitudes among Arab and Muslim populations in the West, as well as in 
the Arab and Islamic World. Finally, the emergence of Arab transnational media 
such as al-Jazeera, the large number of religious television channels and the In-
ternet revolution, together with new global media technologies, have allowed 
Arabs in the diaspora to access media coming from the Arab world. 
‘Back to Islam’ 
Given the media’s transnational and independent character, media theorists 
have been argued that ‘digital Islam’ has unevenly broken the authority of in-
stitutions controlled  by clerics, as the new generation is no longer dependent 
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on traditional sources for knowledge of Islam (Schleifer 2007; Galal 2008; Field 
& Hamam 2009). New contours of Islamic knowledge are being mapped due to 
these mediums (Mandaville 2001). Anti-media statements by religious authori-
ties can be traced their increasing marginalisation within their societies. This 
‘unprecedented access’ to Islamic sources of knowledge for common followers 
through the Internet and TV has prompted Jon Alterman to predict the follow-
ing scenario: ‘the days have gone when governments and religious authorities 
can control what their people know, and what they think’ (Alterman 1998: 14). 
Therefore, in terms of Islam as an ‘Umma’ (a collective with high degree of 
coherency), I argue here that transnational digital media can be understood, to 
a certain degree, as liberating believers from religious and the other forms of 
traditional leadership. This happens due to increased access to new media; fur-
thermore, new content horizons allow for a higher degree of individual media 
consumption with greater variety of ideas and ‘modes of thought’ in the reli-
gious as well as in other realms (Alterman 1998; Schleifer 2007). However, digital 
media has become a very effective instrument that connects believers to their 
authorities regardless of geographic location, giving them more access and op-
portunities to be connected to forms of religious education which was not previ-
ously available to them (Rinnawi 2012). Digital Islam has been adopted by global 
muftis, such as the famous Islamic preacher Amr Khaled, different Islamic web-
sites such as Islamonline.com, bloggers, and the large amount of Islamic satellite 
television channels such as Iqraa and al-Huda, among others. This is happening 
both in the Arab and Islamic world as well as in Arab-Islamic diasporas. Most 
research concerning the Arab-Muslim diaspora in the West concludes that one 
of the main effects of their exposure to the Islamic religious media in the last two 
decades has strengthening their sense of Islamism and Pan-Islamism through 
more involvement in Islamic affairs at both ideological and practical levels (Rin-
nawi 2010).
In general, our findings indicate a very strong tendency among the Arab/Mus-
lim community in Berlin to consume Islamic media content via satellite televi-
sion stations such as Iqraa and around 135 other Islamic channels, including 
those broadcast via the Internet (cf. chapter one of this volume). As a result of 
this pattern of consumption, a ‘back to Islam’ sentiment has emerged, which is 
a kind of religious conservatism in terms of values and daily life affairs. Dur-
ing the interviews, interviewees exhibited more Islamic attitudes towards differ-
ent social, cultural and even political issues raised during the discussions, which 
indicate a kind of ‘Islamic values ghetto’ within the Western German-Christian 
environment. By better understanding their daily routines, the effects of Islamic 
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principles on their daily life practices become particularly visible. These rela-
tively new religious trends are partially a result of their exposure to the religious 
television programming from the Arab World. 
Moreover, our findings indicate two aspects of the ‘back to Islam’ sentiment 
among this community. The first is a ‘Fundamental practical back to Islam,’ 
which was more noticeable among the parents. However, among the younger 
generation we noticed a more ‘emotional back to Islam’ sentiment. While the first 
generation emphasised the content and structural dimensions of watching Arab 
satellite media, especially Islamic channels on the religious level, the younger 
generation tended to emphasise the emotional dimensions. Younger interview-
ees stated that they felt a greater sense of belonging to the Islamic community, 
culture, and heritage than before. These feelings are based primarily on their 
need to experience the principle features of Islamic religion, and largely result 
from antagonistic attitudes expressed towards them by the host society. However, 
their parents felt the need to practice the Islamic religious way of life and to learn 
about it in a more nostalgic manner.
In general, for Muslim Arabs living in a primarily Christian environment, the 
interviewees do not have the opportunity to experience the Islamic way of life 
from a religious aspect or, more importantly, from a social and cultural aspect. 
They do not necessarily experience the festive atmosphere of Muslim holidays 
and Ramadan or other social-religious ceremonies and traditions the same way 
they would if they were living in the Arab World. Prior to the introduction of 
the Arab satellite TV to Germany, Arabs could not experience holidays or cul-
tural events to the degree they now can with television. In fact, sometimes holi-
days would come and go without people realizing it. This is evident in Hussein’s 
statement: 
One of the reasons I connected to the Arab satellites is so that my children would get a 
sense of their Islam, especially during the holidays and Ramadan. 
During holidays, Arab satellite TV bases a large percentage of its programming 
around the festivities; German media agencies at best only briefly mention the 
Muslim holidays. Indeed, particularly during Ramadan, competition is strong to 
hold viewers’ interest during fasting hours with entertainment shows. Ameera, a 
35-year-old participant explained: 
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I watch Arabic only during the period of Ramadan or other holidays because they 
broadcast many entertaining programmes like ‘Jameel and Hanaa’ or ‘Abu al-Hana’ and, 
of course, ‘Bab al-Hara’2 and the other Turkish Telenovelas on MBC4. 
This tendency was even more evident among the younger generation. For exam-
ple, Ahmed, a 19-year-old participant stated: 
I was never religious and I rarely prayed before. Now, I understand Islam especially 
through the Arab TV stations and I have somehow returned to it. I can pray and I un-
derstand its implications and meanings from many things in my daily life. But at the 
same time I continue to practice the German daily life style. 
Furthermore, Arab satellite programming not only creates a pleasant environ-
ment for the Arabs in Berlin during holidays, especially Ramadan, but it also 
draws people closer to their religion and their heritage. Arab satellite program-
ming has made it easy for people in Germany to feel the Ramadan atmosphere – 
to follow prayers during Ramadan and to know when to break their fast. Prior 
to being able to access Arab satellite programming, it was not easy for believ-
ers to fast during Ramadan because prayers and fasting had to be individually 
scheduled. As such, it seems that by guiding viewers, television channels may 
also enable more individualized religious practice. This point was observed more 
among the first generation who returned to Islam, as was clearly indicated by this 
mother’s remark: 
Since the introduction of the Arab satellites I have been able to create a festive environ-
ment for my children during the holidays, especially during Ramadan. I can also teach 
them the customs and prayers of Ramadan and how to enjoy it. Also, now I know the 
precise times for prayer and fasting and can respect them. 
Arab satellite programming also plays a role in educating viewers of the values 
and traditions of Islam, especially for parents. The majority of interviews indicat-
ed that families, primarily parents, follow a great deal of religious programmes. 
This point is clearly evident in 64-year-old Ibrahim’s comment: 
I always follow religious programmes on the Arab channels, especially on Munajah TV 
and Iqraa TV, such as the Friday sermon, or other religious programmes on al-Jazeera 
where they discuss religious issues and questions. This way they provide us with answers 
2 One of the highest-rated, bestknown Syrian dramas in the history of Arab TV. This 
socio-political drama, which began to be screened on MBC during Ramadan in 2007 
and continued to be screened through 2010 with new episodes, tells the story of the 
Syrian and the Palestinian resistance to Western colonialism in the Arab world at the 
political level, while at the social level it emphasises the authentic and nostalgic Arab 
lifestyles and values at that time in a positive way. 
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to our daily problems through religion, which we can’t find here because there are no 
religious authorities. 
Arab satellite programming also teaches Arab families, especially the parents, 
what is allowed and what is not from a religious perspective. They learn about 
their religion not only as passive viewers, but also as active viewers. The term ac-
tive refers to some of the talk-show style programmes in which a Sheikh comes 
to answer questions from the audience, including those who can call in. The 
‘Awad family stated, 
We [the mother and father] follow religious programmes that teach us what is right 
and wrong according to the Sharia [Islamic law] and we can now also teach this to our 
children. 
Consequently, Arab satellite programming empowers parents to teach their chil-
dren about Islam (Harb & Bessaiso 2006). 
‘Imagined coherence’: cyber-instant nationalism – McArabism
As was mentioned above, most research in this field concludes that one of the 
main effects of this phenomenon is a strengthening of the sense of Arabness 
and Pan Arabism due to greater involvement in Arab affairs afforded by new 
media (Sakr 2001; Alterman 1998). Others go further by claiming that this effect 
is beyond regular Pan Arabism and, in Andersonian terms, constitutes a kind of 
instant nationalism. Rinnawi (2006) calls this ‘McArabism’ and explains that it 
is based on an ‘imagined coherence’ or ‘cyber-instant nationalism,’ while Pintak 
(2009) calls it ‘imagined watan’ [Imagined nation], referring to the instant influ-
ence that Arabs elsewhere experience when they consume Arab satellite broad-
casting, the Internet, or other transnational media.
To be more specific, we can argue that our findings demonstrate two kinds 
of ‘imagined coherence.’ The first is ‘nostalgic imagined coherence’ among the 
parents, which is a kind of imagined national belonging based more on nostalgic 
experience. Among the younger generation, we observed a kind of ‘patriotic im-
agined coherence’ based on their desire to be affiliated with an imagined national 
community and culture due to the antagonistic attitudes expressed towards them 
by the host society. Regarding the effects consuming Arab transnational media, 
first-generation interviewees stated that they felt a greater sense of nostalgic be-
longing to the Arab World, culture and heritage than before. Nasser, 55, was very 
clear about this when she said: 
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After extensive exposure to the different Arab TV channels, I feel that I went back to my 
Authentic Arab society. Besides the fact that I now know more about the Arab World, I 
really feel that I am living there, not here in Germany. 
Others went further, saying that these television channels were like a ‘breaths 
of fresh air’ that allow them to reconnect with their Arab culture and heritage. 
Nasreen, 47, said: 
During Bab al-Hara Drama, I really feel the really good Arab culture that I always feel 
nostalgic about. 
To conclude, we can argue here that ‘imagined coherence’ and ‘cyber national-
ism’ among the first generation stems mainly from nostalgia, which they per-
ceive through Arab and Islamic TV dramas and other media content that remind 
them of their homeland. However, interviews among members of the younger 
generation reveal a quite different effect: for them, ‘imagined coherence’ and 
‘cyber nationalism’ are more imagined than among their parents. Unlike their 
parents, they have never lived in ‘real’ Arab society and culture –some of them 
were born in Germany and others came at an early age. For them, information 
about their homeland, culture, religion and heritage is not based on nostalgia, 
since the majority of them have lived most of their lives in Germany. For in-
stance, 21-year-old Fatima said: 
The reports coming from Arab TV channels bring me back my people which urges me 
to feel greater solidarity with what’s happening in the Arab World, particularly Palestine, 
Iraq and Lebanon. Sometimes when I watch al-Jazeera or al-Manar news reports from 
these places I feel the need to go there and fight against the enemies of the Arab nation. 
There are now two generations in Germany with varying degrees of fluency in 
both languages and widely disparate lifestyles. The first generation consumes 
Western/German physical products together with Arab-Islamic cultural-nation-
al products via transnational homeland media. The second generation of the 
German-Arab community has an identity of its own that has been constructed 
at one level, set off for and against both German and Arab identities. This co-
herence is clearly imagined. In other words, new modes of media consumption, 
along with the antagonist reaction of the host society towards them (especially 
after the events of September 11) have contributed to a ‘schizophrenic situation’ 
among this generation, in which they are exposed to Arab and Islamic content 
through the media that refers them back to Arab and Islamic traditions on the 
one hand. On the other hand, the antagonism displayed by the host society pre-
vents them from becoming assimilated or feeling solidarity with the Western way 
of life. They cannot identify with all aspects of Islamic broadcasting (especially 
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the traditional and conservative aspects). One path future research should pur-
sue in this context is to conduct a deeper analysis of both generations concerning 
their integration in and segregation from German society.
Conclusion
We can conclude on basis of this study that the Berlin Arab community’s access 
to Arab-Islamic transnational media content has clearly influenced them as a 
collective, both on a religious-cultural and a national-cultural level. The findings 
indicate a very strong tendency among the Arab/Muslim community in Berlin 
to consume Islamic TV programming and other new media content such as the 
Internet. Such modes of media consumption result in a tendency towards exhib-
iting ‘Back to Islam’ sentiments, which is a kind of religious conservatism both in 
terms of values and practices. This was observed among the Islamic community, 
who showed greater Islamic attitudes towards different social and cultural and 
political issues, indicating a kind ‘Islamic values ghetto’ within a non-Muslim 
environment. The effects of Islamic principles guiding their daily routines and 
practices, especially within their community, were very apparent. These relatively 
new religious trends are partly an outcome of an exposure to religious televi-
sion programming from the Arab World. In generational terms, the findings also 
demonstrate two kinds of ‘back to Islam’ among this community: parents and 
adults experience a more ‘fundamental practical back to Islam’ sentiment, while 
an ‘emotional back to Islam’ response is dominant among their children. While 
the first generation focused on the religious content and structural dimension 
of the Islamic satellite media, the younger generation emphasised the emotional 
dimensions, stating that they felt a greater sense of belonging to the Islamic com-
munity, culture, and heritage than before. These feelings were strengthened pri-
marily by the antagonistic attitudes expressed towards them by the host society. 
However, their parents felt the need to practice the Islamic religious way of life 
and to learn about it in a more nostalgic manner.
Exposure to Arab global media has transformed viewers into an imagined 
community. While Arab transnational media and its content have become an 
integral part of the lives for the first generation in Germany, for the second gen-
eration, these images are not drawn solely from the Arab World. In other words, 
we argue that first generation immigrants formulate an ‘imagined coherence’ of 
a Pan-Arab nation and Pan-Islam by interacting with Arab transnational me-
dia. For the young generation, this ‘imagined coherence’ stems mainly from their 
desire to become informed about their culture and religion in order to increase 
their sense of belonging. The general tendency among this generation is towards 
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a kind of solidarity not only with Arabness and Muslimness, but also or even 
primarily with their social class, with a particular regional or non-Arab ethnic 
origin, with a transnational creole ‘third culture,’ or as a part of German society. 
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Ratiba Hadj-Moussa
Maghrebi audiences: Mapping the divide 
between Arab sentiment, Islamic belonging and 
political praxis
Introduction
This chapter attempts to illustrate the ways in which the shift towards Arab sat-
ellite television has re/opened a number of questions related to identification, 
identity affiliation and belonging. Indeed, the advent of satellite television in the 
Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) has generated a number of new prac-
tices and has led to new identity affiliations, which call for careful analysis due to 
their impact on the ways people negotiate their beliefs, bring forth their identity 
affiliations (particularly their Arab and Islamic belonging) and define how to live 
together. This and other new communication technologies compel us to reflect 
on the ways identity affiliations are expressed and shaped. I draw on the work of 
various authors who view identity not as much as a starting point defined by an 
origin, but rather as multiple stations that the individual takes, or is compelled 
to take, while dealing with crossroad encounters in his or her daily life (Deleuze 
& Guatari 1980; Bayart 1996). In his seminal article, ‘Ethnicity and Identity,’ 
S. Hall (1991) gives preference to the term ‘identification’ over ‘identity.’ The pro-
cessual functioning of the former prevents any pretention of a given fixed origin, 
and more importantly, precludes assigning and imposing identity to groups and 
individuals. This argument, which has gained consensus, is instrumental in sup-
porting my approach toward Maghrebi people and the ways they construct their 
identity affiliations and belonging in relation to new media technologies.
Few works, if any at all, have been concerned with the intricacies of identity 
construction of Maghrebi (and Arab) audiences and satellite television. Fewer 
still have investigated the relationship between these two elements, nor ques-
tioned the social and political issues at stake they have generated, as satellite 
television broadcasting is a relatively recent phenomenon, especially when ap-
proached from a sociological point of view. In this study, I argue that new media 
technology, in particular satellite television and the massive flow of images it 
has produced, constitutes an unprecedented moment in which a novel space has 
taken shape and new forms of belonging are elaborated and developed. Through 
the viewing of satellite images, large sections of the Maghrebi population have 
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come in close contact with images of people from other nations, particularly 
Westerners, possibly for the first time since the region’s period of independence. 
This is not to say they had not had representations or images of the West in the 
past, but rather that they now have continuous and direct contact with Western 
visual worlds. The main issues studied in this chapter are how, on the one hand, 
the image of the Self portrayed and produced by Arab satellite channels enables 
more self-accepted identity affiliations, while, on the other hand, these affiliations 
release a voice that reinforces the critique of political regimes. Already knowing 
that neither criticism, even when it is forcibly repressed, nor the issue of identity 
affiliations are new phenomena, how do Arab satellite channels sketch them out 
in a novel way in the Maghreb? Finally, how do satellite television programmes 
highlight the relationships that these audiences construct among themselves and 
with others?
Elements of Context 
To provide some context for my arguments, I will begin by giving some general 
insights on the introduction of satellite television to the Maghreb. I do not dis-
cuss the issues of political economy surrounding the arrival of satellite channels 
or the power struggles that have accompanied their introduction (and generally 
oppose them), as a number of books and articles have already documented these 
aspects.1 Belkacem Mostefaoui’s ‘La télévision française au Maghreb’ (1995) is 
the first account of the political economy of the media in the three countries of 
the Maghreb. The author has documented the initial phases of satellite television 
and the ‘mini cable networks.’ The arrival of satellite television in the Arab world 
prompted a number of research works that highlighted the political economy 
and the guiding lines of television programming, economic investment and fi-
nancial strategies. It also led to industry analyses, particularly on insiders such as 
programme designers and producers, as the connection of satellite television to 
the political world, particularly to political parties and politicians. Ethnographic 
work on television viewing, however, remains marginal. Lila Abu-Lughod’s book 
(2005), although not specifically on satellite television, could be considered the 
first ethnography on state-controlled television and its audience in Egypt. In-
deed, a few published research studies have targeted specific audiences (Sala-
mandra 2005) but have remained limited in scope. Despite the importance of 
this topic, research on Maghrebi audiences is even spottier, almost nonexistent 
1 For an updated bibliography, see N. Mellor et al (2011). 
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save for a few contributions (Chouikha 1995; Hadj-Moussa 1996, 2003; Sabry 
2010). The present study is but a modest contribution to this vast, controversial 
and open field.
Satellite television was introduced in the Maghreb in the 1980s. In Morocco, 
the King’s palaces were the first to be equipped with satellite dishes. People living 
nearby benefited from being in proximity to the palaces and enjoyed the de facto 
‘foreign images’ (Poindexter 1991). In Tunisia, an influential businessman intro-
duced satellite television privately (Benbelgacem 1999: 39), which prompted au-
thorities to try to regulate dishes purchases and attempted to require individuals 
wanting to have it obtain authorization; however, this restriction soon became 
meaningless due to the popularity of satellite television and its high demand. In 
Algeria, it was a high-ranking military officer who installed a dish in a very sym-
bolic site (Hadj-Moussa 1996), called Makam al-Shahid [Martyr’s Shrine]. In all 
cases, attempts to regulate satellite television in Morocco and Tunisia have been 
unsuccessful, and in Algeria the regime was thwarted.
A short history of satellite television in the Maghreb requires taking into ac-
count how this technology unfolded temporally and chronologically, its techno-
logical changes and the launch and emergence of new (Arab) channels. From 
the late 1980s to 1996, European and Western channels were predominant2, and 
the only Arab television available during this period was MBC TV, which was 
broadcast from London. The technology initially employed a parabolic antenna, 
the ‘collective dish or parabola’ (called ‘la parabole’ in the Maghreb), to which 
groups of neighbours collectively subscribed, sharing the costs and selecting to-
gether the channels received. Each subscriber’s residence was connected to the 
‘parabole’ through a cable. This collective parabola was used in Morocco and Al-
geria. In the former, the upper-middle classes were among the first who could af-
ford it, whereas in the latter, the bureaucratic elite acquired it first and then were 
followed by the other classes. In Tunisia, access to the parabola was individual 
and required official authorization until the late 1990s. With the later decrease in 
dish prices, Maghrebi residents began acquiring individual dishes. Although not 
always explicitly expressed, I believe the main reason behind the keen interest for 
the dish was the arrival of Arab satellite channels in 1996. In general, Maghre-
bians had a very negative reaction to Operation Desert Fox, which was orches-
trated from the air by the Americans, and cheerfully endorsed by the coalition 
2 Due to their knowledge of the French language, Maghrebians watched French chan-
nels, such as Antenne 2, TF1, Arte, M6, Canal Plus (a pay channel) and TV5. Tunisians 
also had direct access to RAI UNO, and Northern Moroccans to the Corporación 
Radio Televisión Española (RTVE).
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which included Morocco. During this period, the ‘foreign channels’ broadcast 
only ‘bright spots in the sky’ rather than showing Baghdad being bombed. Tu-
nisian viewers living along the Algerian borders and Algerians have indicated in 
interviews that I conducted with them3 that they were able to see a reality other 
than that of ‘the war controlled by CNN,’ thanks to Algerian television, which had 
sent Algerian journalists to the field ‘who did a good job.’ Since then, Maghrebi 
viewers have had access to hundreds of television channels, in addition to the 
ones they had before. Parallel to the arrival of Arab channels, another major 
technological change occurred: the transition from analog to digital broadcast 
allowed viewers to choose more specialized satellite programming in specific 
languages. The majority of North Africans have chosen Arabsat (Sabry 2010). 
The word used by Maghrebians when referring to the selection from the satellite 
provider is ‘couloirs.’4 The wording is significant insofar as it refers less to the 
house (the known) than to the borders and boundaries that it presupposes. These 
‘couloirs’ protect them from seeing anything undesirable. Maghrebi audiences 
have finally accessed Arab satellite channels and almost all of them have turned 
their dish in the direction of the Middle East.5 Indeed, Arab satellite television 
arrived at a time when most viewers were deserting national television channels, 
3 This research project consisted of a series of interviews I conducted between 1994 and 
2009. I first started in Algeria, because at that time I was intrigued by the fierce opposi-
tion of Islamic armed groups to the parabola. I extended the research to Morocco and 
Tunisia in the beginning of the 2000s. Between 1994–1995 and 2009, I interviewed 
193 people: 101 women and 92 men. Two thirds of the participants were youths, aged 
between 16 and 32 years old. The ‘snowball’ was privileged, as I wanted to have access 
to their houses, i.e., their intimate spaces. The fieldwork was built one element upon 
the other, and I relied on participants to introduce me to other participants, while 
being very attentive to not remain in one area or group. However, I was not looking 
for any representativeness, but rather for a certain interpretative depth from the par-
ticipants.
4 In the English meaning of ‘hallways’ and not ‘corridors.’
5 The reliability of the surveys on the trends and audience habits is highly problema-
tic in the Maghreb. When they exist, they are incomplete (see http://www.ipsos.com/
mediact/sites/ipsos.com.mediact/files/MENA_AudienceMeasurement.pdf) or rely 
on government statistics. In terms of information and communication, the caricature 
prize should be given to the Algerian Ministry of Communications whose page ‘com-
munications’ is… blank! (accessed 2 December 2011 and 12 February 2012). 
Aziz Douai (2010) has documented the difficulties and pitfalls in doing audience 
fieldwork in Morocco. His remarks could be applied to the three countries of the 
Maghreb as well.
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and criticizing their programming for having a repressive political stance, as well 
as for their poor technology and outdated equipment.
Thinking the shift…
The answers to the issues raised above on the ways identity affiliations are being 
reformulated through contact with Arab satellite channels and in the relation-
ships that television programmes incite among these audiences, are informed, I 
argue, by social actors’ experience of these channels and their discourse – not on 
conclusions built upon general observations. To better grasp how identity affilia-
tions unfold and what paths they take, the concept of experience appears useful. 
Experience is central to some disciplines, such as sociology (Durkheim 2003; 
Goffman 1991). Likewise, inspired by François Dubet (1995), I consider experi-
ence as part of the sociology of action, which sees it as the way in which social 
actors experience their practices and organize them in plural and diffracted en-
vironments. In other words, experience is not located in an external relationship 
to the actors.
Experience is central to the understanding of the relationship between what 
people say they are and what they do. Indeed, identifications are not depleted in 
the ‘saying’ [le dire] or representation and they are not contained in or limited to 
the ‘saying.’ They are also expressed in acts and practices, however practice is not 
devoid of reflexivity. Joan Scott, among others, warns against the temptation to 
seize experience as evidence, that is to say, to subscribe to the idea that factual-
ity has in itself an interpretative virtue, an ‘authoritative evidence.’ She suggests 
that experience is produced through historicity, which in its turn allows it to be 
interpreted: ‘It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are con-
stituted through experience’ (1991: 779). However, Scott’s insistence on the dis-
cursive dimension precludes us from reflecting on the importance of small acts 
and practices in the processes by which experience is constituted. The ‘practical 
aspect of experience’ is not a secondary element in the affiliation and identity 
processes; at times it validates the representational identification, and at other 
times, it displaces and challenges them. To allow experience to emerge, for exam-
ple, I privileged the use of open-ended questions while conducting interviews, 
letting the participants tell their own ‘story with television.’ Thus, while most of 
the questions were the same, participants could use their own knowledge and 
perception of the situation to develop what was important for them. This direc-
tion was crucial, as it helped to integrate specific and ‘peripheral’ information 
that concerned not only the representation of a given programme but also the 
acts and practices that parallel its viewing. Given the nature of my fieldwork, 
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I spent much time in participants’ personal spaces, sharing with them their daily 
chores and discussing all sorts of matters, so that I could acquire in-depth knowl-
edge on what has constituted that experience. However, although the separation 
of the latter from other types of experience (e.g., hosting a tea/coffee afternoon, 
working) is not delineated with certainty, there are often moments where ‘some-
thing from satellite television’ springs up. To give an example, wearing the Is-
lamic scarf while being at home with other women was highly intriguing to me, 
knowing that a little more than a generation ago women went freely ‘bare headed’ 
and hardly wore the traditional scarf, which was associated with older and rural 
women, until I was told ‘this is what Islam teaches us,’ or ‘what I saw’ or ‘heard’ [in 
the religious television programme].
Political modes of affiliation: On being citizen
The issues of belonging and affiliation are central to my approach because they 
help us understand how international television programmes inflect their view-
ers’ positioning vis-à-vis the West, local and regional political regimes, as well 
as cultural politics. By cultural politics, I refer to the ways in which some prac-
tices that characterise specific societies – such as television viewing practices, 
aesthetic preferences, living emotions, the selection of valued artefacts, artistic 
production, and types of belonging claims, among others – produce a certain 
kind of ‘sensible,’ to use Jacques Rancière’s term (2000). This ‘sensible’ is no less 
political than any political rules insofar as it shows how the distribution of places 
and positions is organised, what is ‘sayable’ and not, what is audible and not.
In my analysis, I provide some examples of the ways these viewing and interpre-
tative practices function, as well as their effects on processes of identity affiliations. 
In so doing, I show how, in the context of the globalization of images, regional iden-
tities are emerging and how they coincide with specific national histories, inclina-
tions and regional sensibilities, whether these relate to gender relations, geographi-
cal entities, supra-national ideologies or religious identifications. Relying on the 
elements of the context stated above, one can argue that from the inception of sat-
ellite television, the most important constituent relation in the identity process was 
the positioning of the ‘Maghrebi Self ’ towards the Western world, notably France. 
The specificity of the relation to France did not only arise from historical and sub-
jective factors, but also from objective ones, as the majority of channels available 
at that time were French (e.g. Antenne 2, M6, France 1, TV5, Canal Plus). Beyond 
the vicissitudes of representation conveyed by the French channels and criticism 
of them by Maghrebi audiences, the challenge, according to participants in my re-
search, relates to the difficulty Maghreb countries experience in overcoming the 
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political difficulties associated with implementing democratic rules that include 
their citizens’ views, ending their blatant and less visible repressive methods, as 
well as actively promoting political accountability. Indeed, although France is said 
to be biased towards the Maghreb, and the West is said to perceive the Arabs only 
through the prism of ‘terrorism,’ the West does have democratic political institu-
tions along with transparent and open television networks. The desire for demo-
cratic rule among the people I met cannot alone sum up the complexity of their 
affiliations; these people were made to feel rejected or ignored as citizens not so 
much at higher political levels but in everyday and mundane situations. The demo-
cratic model as implemented in France and in the European Mediterranean coun-
tries such as Italy and Spain, with which North Africans feel geographical or lin-
guistic proximity, is more evident in their public spheres, including the relationship 
between citizens and politics, civility and a certain sense of equality. For example, 
Murad (29 years old, from Morocco), a translator who works for an international 
organisation in Tangiers, said: 
Inhabitants of Tangiers feel more Spanish than Moroccan.
He adds that he only watches Moroccan television ‘when obliged to.’ He much 
prefers Spanish television and admires it for its presenters’ finesse and profes-
sionalism, and the choice of subjects. He particularly likes ‘a show that is broad-
cast every Monday and hosted by a woman.’ He adds: 
I found the idea great because the show pays tribute to the people who worked hard in 
their lives even if they are unknown. 
Murad insists on the importance of the shows, which, in contrast to the ‘garbage 
television that focuses on the dating of this and that [celebrity],’ teach him ‘how 
to talk to people, and how to frame certain types of questions.’ As he elaborates: 
I learn that there is no difference between a minister and a vagabond, whose TV host 
does not distinguish between a celebrity and an ordinary person and who asks them the 
same type of question about their lives.
Similarly, for Najib (32 years old), a Moroccan participant, who was a sympa-
thiser of the Islamist movement Jamaa‘t al-‘Adl ou al-Ihsan [Justice and Charity], 
said that, for him: 
Obviously, [I prefer] the foreigners [the French programmes]. I like watching the debates 
and the ways that each participants tries to convince the others. […] This does not exist 
here. We, the Arabs, are not taught how to respect the other’s opinions.
However, without completely disappearing, identification with the French 
political and social model and those of certain other countries bordering the 
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Mediterranean splintered in the 2000s and has become more complex since the 
advent of Arab satellite channels that have given rise to a new constellation of 
identity without totally overturning the pre-existing one.
Feeling who we are: Images of our own
By referring to the choice of Western channels made by Maghrebi viewers during 
the first period of satellite television, I have deliberately ignored the normative 
issue that characterizes the viewing of those channels, that is, the ‘prescriptions’ 
that orient the actors’ conduct and actions, and whose frames are shaped by the 
family and the household. At this point, it is important to analytically distinguish 
between two dimensions in the process of belonging: the first is related to the 
social level, and the second to the political one. I will dwell upon the first level in 
discussing the meaning and location of television sets within the home as well as 
the relation between textual content and an embodied and gendered viewership. 
Additionally, I will discuss the second level by analysing the processes through 
which Maghrebians identify themselves with Arabness. 
First, if Maghrebians are able to consider themselves, even partially, as pupils 
eager to conform to the initiation of democratic rule, they could not (and do 
not want to) see themselves deprived of what constitutes their ‘culture and tradi-
tion’ – in this case, a certain codification of the body and sexuality. Indeed, as 
stated in the interviews and according to my own observations, it is hardly con-
ceivable to collectively watch underwear items, sexual relations, or even a ‘benign’ 
love declaration. However, these restrictions apply less to the body and sexually 
related signs themselves than to their visibilization and, thus, to their viewing. 
They need to remain within the confines of privacy and intimacy. The idea that 
certain things or scenes cannot be seen in a family setting without subverting 
the gaze one has on oneself and one’s relation with others is a starting point in 
a series of avoidances. But, as stated before, things that should not be watched 
in the company of others does not mean that they cannot be viewed privately. 
Viewing, therefore, is a variegated practice that adjusts itself to various situations: 
time of day, space within the home, gender (there are distinct modes of reception 
attributed to men and women with regard to various textual genres), selected 
channels, number of television sets available in a given location, etcetera. 
How are such viewing adjustments performed? For example, it is not uncom-
mon to find in each household two, if not several, television sets located in the 
house according to their use – be a shared set for a family or group, or a separate 
set used by either the men or the women. In most cases, the television set used 
by the family is located in a common room, which is also a space for women 
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and visitors alike. Family viewing is generally geared toward national television 
channels or Arab satellite TV, but rarely Western satellite channels. The location 
of the television sets falls under the logic of what can be called ‘cultural proxim-
ity.’ Considered to be closer to national channels insofar as they conform to gen-
eral viewing norms, Arab satellite TV is the most viewed6 when watched by the 
whole family. The television set that serves as a mediator and an agent of cultural 
proximity is located in the shared spaces of the home. On the other hand, the 
television set that receives ‘foreign’ television programmes is put in places that are 
either occupied by couples (often the eldest brother and his wife), or by young 
men, who do not necessarily use it together. However, the rules that otherwise 
dictate what ought to be said or kept silent with regard to particular topics re-
lated to romance, the body and sexuality, are not, as a matter of fact, followed à 
la lettre, and their ‘implementation’ varies from one family to another, from one 
individual to another. These rules, nonetheless, situate those who adopt them, 
even if only partially, within a specific cultural sphere in which they express their 
belonging and their relative or strong adherence to the ‘values of [their] society.’ 
The viewing practices that are framed by and integrated in such rules on a daily 
basis indirectly ‘compel’ social actors to self-identify – that is to proceed to self-
recognition while positioning themselves vis-à-vis the others.
The political level7 is based on the Arab world’s political history and the mean-
ing given to Arab identity or ‘Arabness’ [al-‘Uroubiya].8 An in-depth discussion 
6 According to my field observations and the quasi-unanimous interview responses. 
7 The political level could be divided into two dimensions: the internal and, for a lack of 
better word, ‘generic,’ on the one hand, and the trans-historical/trans-regional, on the 
other. I will not be dealing thoroughly with the former in this chapter, because it would 
take us away from our primary purpose, i.e., the relationships between identity affiliation 
and satellite television. The relation of the social dimension, mentioned above, and the 
‘internal’ political dimension has been discussed by several authors under the intertwin-
ing of women’s locus in national political projects. In this debate, the consensus was that 
women, specifically their bodies, are subsumed in the national project (among many, see 
Yuval Davis and Anthias (1989)). Although this approach illuminates several angles of 
the relationships between nationalism and women, to which I myself have adhered, it 
seems now limited; in particular when one considers the paradoxes and the various po-
sitionings which characterize women and their bodies, whether the latter are integrated 
within society or marginalized (prostitutes, lesbian, etc.). Film and fiction in general are 
the most interesting loci to understand this debate (Hadj-Moussa 2014).
8 Arabness is by no means a simple phenomenon. Some Arab speakers refuse to consi-
der themselves as Arabs, while [some] Berbers or Jews claim their Arabness (cf. Nai-
ma Bendris 2005).
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of this notion warrants more space than possible in this chapter; it is difficult 
to provide a succinct, intelligible definition. Arabness is indeed reversible and 
multiple, but it can be approached from two elements, namely the shared his-
tory and the common language. Despite the diversity of vernacular languages, 
the modern Arab language constitutes a cultural and civilization foundation for 
the Middle East and the Maghreb (Berque 1976). It has been a powerful ideo-
logical motive for nationalist and independence movements. Muslim reform-
ist movements have used it as well in strategies to counter colonial powers and 
to define the specificity of Arab nations. Later, all three countries have adopted 
linguistics policies and laws that promulgated Arabic as the national language. 
Furthermore, the Arabic language has played an important role in all nation-
alist claims, in particular that of pan-Arabism. Historically, the first Pan-Arab 
political parties (Choueiri 2000; Hourani 1993) emerged well before the rise of 
Nasserism and Ba‘athism, following the political project initiated by England, as 
early as 1916, to divide Palestine. The anti-colonial sentiment, aroused mainly by 
the ‘Palestinian question’ and by English and French hegemonic redeployments 
in the region, was a major marker of Arabness. Notably under Nasser’s rule, radio 
played an important role in propagating Pan-Arabist thought and claims (James 
2006). Radio programmes, such as the Sawt al-‘Arab [Voice of Arabs], broadcast 
from Cairo and received via shortwave radio in Arab countries, served as a chan-
nel for Arab national movements and as a clarion voice of the then-triumphant 
Nasserism.
One way to discuss the sentiment mobilizing the concept of Arabness is to ad-
dress the feelings people experience as they watch events unfolding in the Arab 
world and broadcast on Arab channels. The latter are described as ‘efficient, pro-
fessional, but do not hide their sympathies [as do Western channels].’ Sami (29 
years old, Tunisia-TUS) ‘senses’ these ‘sympathies.’ He says:
We saw this during the Gulf War. We felt it. Not in the images, which are the same [as 
on other channels]. 
Sami uses the word ‘hamas’ (enthusiasm, passion) and ‘houzn’ (sadness) to ex-
press the sentiment conveyed to him not by the image but by the ‘texture of the 
voice,’ to use Roland Barthes’ expression (1981). Hamas is not necessarily located 
in the content but in, for example, an al-Jazeera journalist’s voice on 11 Septem-
ber 11 2001: ‘The reporter talked about Sept. 11th in ‘hamassi tone.’ We also felt 
houzn [sadness] on April 8th, 2003, just before the fall of Baghdad,’ to quote Sami 
again.
The identification with the Arab world hinges on a sensibility that nourishes 
the political stances participants take. The emotion one feels during a programme 
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broadcast, be it hamas or houzn, also leads to an identification with Arab or 
Muslim worlds. This emotion resembles baav, which Purnima Mankekar (1995) 
pointed out in her work on television in India. Like baav, blending emotion and 
understanding/reason, hamas and houzn do not undermine the critical stance. 
In fact, they remain parallel to it by stabilizing the identification and anchoring 
it within a shared feeling. 
Without question, the television station that conveys that feeling is al-Jazeera. 
From its inception, it has positioned itself within a ‘double identity’ frame: Arab 
and Muslim (Lamloum 2004: 32). Al-Jazeera helps recover a self-image pervert-
ed by the Other’s gaze. The image produced by this channel is one that comes 
from inside, from an imagined territory named al-Umma al-‘Arabiya [the Arab 
nation] or al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi [the Arab world], which pertain to shared overall 
categories that ‘make a culture.’ In François Roussillon’s words (1992): 
The relation to the historicity that allows the inscription of the Self in an environment 
defined as a system of proximities and antagonisms, and helps to express the significa-
tion of the collective existence.
In this specific relationship to the historicity shaping the Arab world, Palestine 
occupies the forefront. The ‘Palestinian question’ is not a banal issue; it is a con-
cern shared by the majority of Arab populations and crosses all social classes, 
religious and ethnic boundaries. Like culture, Palestine is what remains after all 
is forgotten. The Palestinian question reactivates affiliations and awakens ‘Arab-
ness,’ even when the latter is denied, and even among the most distanced Berber 
who rejects Arab culture and Arab identity (Hadj-Moussa 1996). 
The success of Arab satellite television networks, particularly al-Jazeera, stems 
from them giving more in-depth coverage to a question debased and reduced to 
its simplest expression by the repetition of the same imagery. Marc Lynch shows 
that the Arab television networks devote considerable airtime to events in Pales-
tine, keeping Arab sentiment and outlooks alive (2006: 79–80). The participants 
in this research appeared to be very sensitive to the daily images of Palestinian 
victims. Al-Jazeera is seen as the station at the heart of the action, with the live 
broadcast of ‘the abuses experienced by our brothers,’ as one participant puts 
it. The centrality of Palestine, as the principal bonding element of Arabness, is 
political, in other words a principle based on the will and desire for emancipa-
tion and autonomy. Attached to this ‘question’ in which Arab satellite networks 
play a major role, a certain ethos is at play, an ethos and feeling accompanying 
it nourished by ‘consciousness’ [wa‘y] and political events, as well as by the idea 
that Palestinians are abandoned and left under the power of others.
82 Ratiba Hadj-Moussa
Even if we agree with Olivier Carré (1996) that pan-Arabism, with the defeat 
of Nasserism and the fatal fall of Ba‘athism, is dead and buried, its themes do 
persist and remain present in people’s daily life representations. Thus, the sense 
of Arabness relies on the concept of an ‘Arab people’ with a meaning very similar 
to its role in Pan-Arabist ideology;9 at the same time, quite far from it insofar 
as it supersedes or ignores states. Therefore, identification with Palestine does 
not rely on recognition of its leaders, with the exception of Arafat as a ‘histori-
cal’ figure. Likewise, Iraqi leaders are also sidelined, while Iraqi people are seen 
as the victims. A young Algerian activist told me that during the first Gulf War, 
aid sent to Iraq was clearly meant for the ‘Iraqi people’. This was also said, more 
than ten years later (2003), by a Moroccan high schooler, Dahbiya (16 years old), 
who explained her participation in the big rallies against the second Gulf War to 
warn Moroccan authorities against any implications on their part and to show 
her ‘solidarity to Iraqi people and not Saddam.’ The ethos is reinforced here by 
the pathos, the one that considers the ‘orphan people.’10 Solidarity is shown to 
the people first, and it is a principle shared by participants in this research who 
addressed the Iraqi ‘question.’ It is thus based on identification; it relies on anal-
ogy (‘they are like us’) and is defined by ‘brotherhood’ (‘they are our brothers’). 
Along with this identification process, Arabness is problematic. It is the locus of 
extremes, of victory (‘al-Jazeera is better than CNN’) or of defeat (Palestine, Iraq, 
lack of democracy, corruption, poverty).
However, Arabness is not a myth. It is a shared universe – if only through the 
use of a common language. It remains an expectation and a horizon, including for 
those who claim it. As Benedict Anderson (1991) reminds us, the efficacy of the 
nation concept lies in the imaginary projection that it allows. Anderson argues 
that fiction is constitutive of the idea of nationhood; it is neither a misconception 
nor an evanescent idea far from reality. But like the nation, which needs to see 
its elements reiterated or invented (borders, an ethos, language, politics, culture 
and identity), Arabness is revived by the return to the stage of the Palestinian 
9 In a remarkable article, François Roussillon (1992) highlights the issues raised by pan-
Arab ideology in Egypt and its impact on the Egyptian identity.
10 The figure of the orphan produces, especially in popular Islam, a deep compassion, 
echoing the Prophet who himself was an orphan. Among the younger generation, this 
biographical element, while still well known is not mobilized in the same way. Indeed, 
instead of departing from the figure of the ‘abandoned,’ this generation targets those 
who abandon and do not care about their people. They are the ones who are fiercely 
criticized. According to this political critique, it is thus the Arab states and Arab poli-
ticians that have failed in their duty of solidarity.
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question, Iraq, Maghrebi immigration, etcetera, and reactivated by Arab satellite 
televisions and news media in general. One imaginary link, writes Anderson, is 
the relationship established between the media and the market (1991: 33), with a 
specific stress on readership. The strengthening of Arab identity and its constant 
reactivation are facilitated by the many messages widely broadcast by satellite 
televisions and by the ‘mass ceremony’ dimension (ibid.) of listening to and view-
ing daily television. In the formation of identity-based affiliation, choosing one 
television station over another will orient the interpretation that the Self enter-
tains with the Other.
The context in which Arab satellite television emerges globalizes the produc-
tion of identities more than ever before, but in doing so, it splits them into sev-
eral layers whose importance is anchored to specific contexts, moments11 and 
conjunctures. The plurality of identifications does not only occur at the level of 
representation, but is also carried out through action and practices that may help 
to better reflect on the formation of social ties at micro and macro levels. 
Islamicities: On opening and closure
In the present analysis, I see evidence in the practices and ideas of what Jocelyne 
Dakhlia (2005) has called Islamicities (islamicités), which reflect the diversity 
of thinking of oneself and being Muslim. Although Dakhlia’s main purpose of 
the use of the concept of islamicities is to counter homogenizing and damaging 
views, this notion has some heuristic value. Indeed, it calls for a transversal of 
practices that are open to mobility and syncretism, and serves as a link between 
the context, the structure and the circumstances. Indeed, what is more perva-
sive than the flowering of these Islamicities? Since the meteoric rise of Islamism 
(which is, by definition political), all eyes have been focused on the violence it 
has generated and left in its wake; very little has been said yet about the ways of 
doing and viewing that have fuelled Islamism and, more importantly, that have 
been reformulated by contact with it. 
Let us review a few key facts: an increasing number of women now wear the 
hijab (headscarf); the phrase bismillah [in the name of God] has become com-
monplace and above all falsely discreet; more and more inscriptions of Koranic 
verses and religious CDs hang inside cars; Koranic recitation has spread to mar-
ket days (now daily ones); the hijab is often worn even indoors even when wom-
en visit one another or perform household chores; women and men of the same 
11 I use this term to refer to a configuration that exceeds the event and/or the tempora-
lity of an event.
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family impose more restraint upon themselves and avoid kissing each other in 
countries where such contact was not so long ago a sign of decorum or respect; 
some men wear khamis, the outfit ‘imported from Afghanistan’; the djalaba is 
worn on Fridays; and finally, the ‘common prayer’ that ‘pleases God and is more 
rewarded by Him’ has become a new practice conducted in homes by a leader 
who recites the prayers. All these practices are novel, as are composite practices 
particularly noticeable in choice of clothing. Incongruent combinations, such as 
young women wearing headscarves with skinny jeans, pregnant women wearing 
leggings, or veiled women wearing showy ‘Lebanese’ makeup, reminiscent of the 
flamboyance of Middle Eastern pop singers. These practices and imperceptible 
changes will be better understood if we rely on a diachronic interpretation of 
television viewing.
In Algeria in the mid 1990s, without being invisible, the ‘Islam’ adopted by 
the people I interviewed was ‘dormant’ (Moussaoui 2006), meaning it was inte-
grated, without poorly timed and repeated bismillah. The participants did not 
attempt to make an ostentatious show of devotion. Their Islam was so much part 
of what they were that they had nothing to show off, but simply to ‘be’ – often in 
paradoxical and ad hoc ways. For authors such as Mohamed Benkheira (1997), 
this quietist Islam is named ‘popular Islam.’ The Islamicities (Muslimness) reviled 
and criticized were in fact those of the state and Islamists because their visibility 
meant constraint and imposition, superficiality and the obligation to abide to 
them. For one woman I interviewed, Baya (36 years old, Morocco), who rejected 
the hijab, her faith transpired in her behaviour and her beliefs – not in the hijab. 
In my research, this instrumentalisation of Islam was at the heart of participants’ 
concerns, especially for youngest ones. During that period, the new Islamic prac-
tices ‘imported’ by those that Algerians nicknamed ‘Afghans,’ were considered 
‘foreign to Algerian customs’ (Djamel, 51 years old, Algeria). Afghanistan was far 
off the map of identifications, as was Iran, with its unusual practice of ‘marriages 
of convenience’ [djaouz mout‘a], performed on women kidnapped by Algerian 
Islamists who justified it as a Muslim practice. During the Algerian Civil War 
(1992–1999), some television stories released by official state television, often 
with the aim of winning people over, documented the distress of helpless par-
ents and the poignant, heart-breaking testimonies of young abducted women. 
As Hassina (47 years old, Algeria), a feminist and democracy activist told me in 
1996, during one of the worst periods of the civil war: 
We cannot dialogue with the fundamentalists who call into question the symbols [of 
the Algerian nation], the State, our way of life, and even our traditions. They introduced 
garments. They introduced ways of life: rape, ‘marriage of convenience’ unknown to us 
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and that we should not know. We are not Shiite, we are Sunnis. Iran and Afghanistan are 
far away. It is miles away geographically and in every respect. 
A few years later, the landscape of geographical affiliations changed. With the 
events of September 11 and the Iraq War (2003), not only were the events in 
Afghanistan watched closely, thanks to al-Jazeera, but that country had become, 
as stated by most of the participants to my research, a ‘Muslim country we care 
about and whose events trouble us,’ as became Iran once it was threatened by 
U.S. aggressions. The interviews I conducted in Morocco already showed a con-
cern for Iran and above all, a visionary reading of developments in this country’s 
relations with the West. Lalla (56 years old, Morocco) evokes the region’s future 
after Iraq: 
They attacked Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, it is Iran’s turn, to ensure Israel’s security. Af-
terwards, they will attack Syria, protect Israel from all sides… They kill people to ensure 
Israelis live in peace. And other people, don’t they have the right to live too? 
With the shift in news reporting carried out by Arab satellite television networks, 
in particular by the channels that are considered to be more politically charged, 
the Islamic world has become more visible to Maghrebi audiences who consider 
that their understanding, closeness and shared experiences solidify their ties 
to the rest of the Islamic world. As I will show it in the next paragraphs, this 
‘political’ identification intersects with the more individual sense of belonging. 
Afghanistan and Iran, like Bosnia and Chechnya, are now included within the 
identity-based Self, fuelled by emotion and memory of the colonial experience 
in the Maghreb. My aim in this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive list of the 
reasons which contribute to increasing affiliation with Islamicity or Arabness, 
but rather to trace how certain practices and representations are related to the 
rise of Arab satellite television. 
The wind from the East
The present study demands deeper reflection on what viewing audiences make 
of the Arab satellite channels and their programmes in order to follow their iden-
tifications, often contradictory and saturated with tensions as they are, and to 
understand the ways in which individuals define their place within their socie-
ties. Ten years after the arrival of satellite television to the region, the Islamicities 
of our research participants were no less quietist. This quietism, however, was no 
longer located in the same register. It had lost its innocence or naivety, so to speak. 
It pervaded other common areas that were, and are still, louder and more visible 
than the quietist version of Islam. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, practices 
86 Ratiba Hadj-Moussa
and beliefs are now not only justified ‘by the customs and traditions,’ but also by 
sermons watched on television or listened to on cassettes or CDs. In these three 
countries, popular Islamicities have become globalized and have turned more 
towards the Middle East. In terms of satellite television, the Maghrebi public, 
especially its younger age groups, choose to watch religious programmes such 
as those by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Amr Khaled, who had dazzling suc-
cess before being surreptitiously censored by the Egyptian authorities and forced 
into ‘exile’ in London. Indeed, religious figures and new preachers mobilize an 
extremely varied and vast audience. 
Star preacher Amr Khaled’s programmes have many viewers and a strong fol-
lowing among young people, particularly young women, in the three countries 
in question. Amr Khaled is young and modern, in stark contrast to traditional 
sheikhs schooled at al-Azhar, such as the very famous above-mentioned Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi. Amr Khaled has managed to gather a following among youth from 
various social backgrounds (especially the urban middle classes and women) and 
convinces them that Islam can be modern. His fame and influence astonished, 
for example, the three female professors I interviewed in Rabat, who described 
his reach as ‘the sudden contagion.’ A high school teacher voiced her alarm off 
the record that her pupils were increasingly wearing the hijab. The impact of 
Amr Khaled is so strong that it has encouraged young girls to defy their parents’ 
advice by wearing the veil. The ‘newness’ of Amr Khaled, who presents himself 
as an ordinary person, is based on the distance he takes vis-à-vis the Islamic es-
tablishment, both in terms of the language he uses, which is closer to spoken lan-
guage, and his clean-cut, ‘modern’ look. On the other hand, his language and look 
distinguish him from the austerity and the intransigence of radical Islamists. His 
commitment is not political; he refuses to issue fatwas unlike sheikhs, limiting 
his contribution to merely encouraging his supporters to ‘love Islam.’ The runa-
way success of his first video, Kalem al-Qalb [the words of the heart] propelled 
him from Cairo sidewalks to Iqraa (Wise 2006). In a nutshell, unlike the other 
rhetoricians, he speaks more of heaven than hell, avoiding doctrinal political Is-
lam and focuses on everyday Islam, the Islam of the heart and brotherhood.
A novel development is that more women are watching Iqraa, an Islamic 
television channel, as well as other Islamic television networks.12 Religious tel-
evision programmes have superseded religious programmes broadcast on the 
radio. Some women told me that while in bed, they ‘listen to Koranic recitations 
[broadcast] on satellite television programmes.’ However, it is among the younger 
12 For an overview of these channels, see Kraidy and Khalil (2009).
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ones that the attraction is more visible. Nawal, a 23-year-old woman whom I 
interviewed in Tunis, had been wearing the djilbab for ‘a year and a half,’ and 
practically only watched Iqraa. She was first ‘convinced’ by Amr Khaled, but she 
subsequently favoured the ‘lessons’ provided by Iqraa. Nawal, ‘who does not like 
reading,’ built much of her religious knowledge from television by comparing 
the programmes of various television channels. She learned how to ‘behave with 
her parents [and] in [her] religious conduct.’ She did not like al-Manar, Hizbol-
lah’s channel, because they asserted that ‘the Koran could not be held by a wom-
an during her period,’ while ‘many people [on other channels, including Iqraa] 
stipulate that a woman may hold the Koran if she covers her hands with a tissue 
or gloves.’ She watches al-Jazeera with her parents, but refuses to watch films 
and other programmes ‘where women are naked,’ including when she is alone. 
Even when it comes to music programmes, if she watches Melody (an Egyptian 
music channel), she prefers the videos of the young religious singer Sami Yusuf. 
Nawal’s life is almost totally orientated towards a religious ethic fuelled mainly by 
satellite television. Her positioning and the learning she acquires from religious 
channels bear similarity to the experiences of those encountered by Hirshkind 
(2006) who have adopted the ethic of Da‘wa and whose main medium is the au-
diocassette. Nawal started wearing the veil after having ‘heard’ tapes and ‘viewed’ 
sermons on CDs and CD-ROMs. Neither Nawal nor other interviewees ever re-
ferred to the Da‘wa movement. Nevertheless, their behaviour and discourse have 
remarkable similarities to it. Nawal did not just watch but shared and ‘discussed’ 
her discoveries and questions with her brother and ‘some friends,’ who provided 
her with cassettes and CDs. The identification with the ideas of what I believe to 
be a Da‘wa ‘ethics,’ in Hirschkind’s sense of the term, supposes that both indi-
vidual practices and conduct are projected onto the public sphere. Indeed, having 
noted that the movement merges ‘two types of agency’ – an ethical one based on 
Koranic moral psychology and a political one – the author recalls that the teach-
ings of the Da‘wa ‘have come for many to provide a model for the attributes of 
Muslim-Citizen’ (2006: 116). Thanks to media technologies, as exemplified by 
Nawal’s case, ways of doing and the identifications that accompany them have 
shaped and inflected a shift to individual interiority or to shared spaces.
More so than in Algeria and Morocco, where Islam has been greatly instru-
mentalised and where wearing the hijab is accepted in public institutions, it is 
liberal Tunisia that seems to shed a clearer light on the issues surrounding the 
new forms of Islamic affiliations. Two newly veiled Tunisian girls told to me 
that in adopting the Islamic veil, not only were they obeying God’s law, but also 
were also qualitatively ‘better Muslims.’ As one interviewee said, ‘Watching Iqraa 
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allows me to be a better Muslim and helps me to think as a Muslim,’ (Nadya, 
23 years old, Tunisia). They knowingly practise a certain Muslim ethic without 
which they cannot claim to have found their ‘Islam.’ In other words, they con-
struct their Muslim identity and are appealed to on this basis. Charles Taylor 
(2001) argues that this operation is typically modern. Indeed, just ‘being’ does 
not suffice; it requires that the subject proceed to a self-reflection that is more 
ethical than psychological. This posture does not resemble New Age teaching, 
but is closer to the practices advocated by the supporters of the Da‘wa movement 
(ibid.) whose aim is to establish a just society based on the precepts of good and 
virtue. The introspection is at once a desire and an obligation to project oneself 
into society, as we have just seen. But, unlike the Da‘wa, this projection is not fol-
lowed by action, however minimal. Watching Iqraa and other religious television 
channels consists of both connecting themselves to others and feeling that their 
faith is shared. These women are involved in on-going self-revision. They make 
their piety visible and audible, but, more importantly, they do not do so based on 
a comparison between what is said and heard with what is written. They relate 
mainly to television and discussions they have with their friends. 
In her work with young Muslim women (and men) in France, Jocelyne Cesari 
(1998) contrasts traditional ‘Islam of the parents’ with ‘Islam of youth,’ as one of 
‘scriptural reference’ (see also Benkheira [1997]) in which knowledge and adher-
ence to Islam are based on autonomous individual interpretation. The Islam of 
youth is ultimately scholarly driven but is not generated by a body of established 
knowledge. Individual knowledge forms the basis of the identification to which 
these young people aspire. In my case study, the Koran is hardly consulted, as 
the sources for these young women are mainly television programmes on Islam 
or Islamic television channels. These present either ‘on-trend Islam’ as promoted 
by Amr Khaled, or ‘orthodox Islam’ as conveyed by the sheikhs. But the divide 
between the latter two sources is not clear-cut. Indeed, these women could either 
compare them, oppose one to the other, or they could successively rely on one 
and the other, depending on the circumstances.
Alongside this adherence to religious discourse, especially of young girls, a 
plethora of other channels is also part of their daily viewing. These broadcast 
loops of Arabic classic films (e.g. Rotana Cinema), Arab soap operas, music vid-
eos (clippettes in Tunisia), reality shows, and other popular programmes, such 
as Star Academy. It would be misleading to claim that only young people watch 
these religious programmes, because that would arbitrarily divide a very com-
plex dimension that crosses the various generations with subtle distinctions and 
unduly homogenize them. The ‘we,’ fed by Arab satellite channels (one might say 
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the political ‘we’) is also based on new forms of religiosity and beliefs, although 
we must stress that these televisions only accentuate an existing movement sup-
ported by old media, such as audiocassettes (Hirshkind 2006), videos and book 
publishing (Eickelman and Anderson 1998; Mermier 2005). These new forms of 
religiosity are relatively unstable phenomena and are constantly being redefined 
and reframed. Thus, some behaviours, such as wearing the veil, are threatened 
and challenged on all sides, even among those involved in them as was the case 
with Nabila, a 21-year-old Tunisian student. Nabila wears the headscarf despite 
her parents’ opposition and is reluctant to comply with the guidelines of the uni-
versity where she studies that stipulate she covers her hair with a ‘cap’ (sic). Nabila 
is not a devout shrouded in the multiple folds of the so-called Islamic dress. She 
was dressed very ‘young and trendy’ when I met her, wearing a beautiful head-
scarf that enhanced her facial features, and stated:
By God, I, for example, for clothing… I like… I wear what is original, what is new. […] I 
mean, fashionable, contemporary, of our time. I’m not going to wear something archaic 
or time… or something that does not fit… I still love fashion. But fashion is my fashion. 
I am the one who designs things for myself, that go with what I wear. Something new, 
that is not worn by too many people, and that is modern.
Nabila sees her salvation in Amr Khaled, as if she was ‘a born-again Muslim,’ 
discovering Islam for the first time, as if her spirituality or her deep belief was 
faulty and had to be constantly regenerated. Recognizing that satellite television 
has changed her life, she adds,
Nabila: For me, [it is] in the field of religion. It [television] changed my life a lot. It has 
taught me many new things. You can see in my country, wherever you turn [your eyes], 
you see nudity. […] It is television and people on it… For example Amr Khaled, I do not 
know if you’ve heard of him? […] Amr Khaled, by God the Almighty, thanks to him, [I 
got to wear the hijab]. He guided me in the right way, as he did with many others. With-
out television, without digital [television], without Iqraa, I would… Without Iqraa and 
al-Majd [another religious channel], I would be myself… I do not know…
Ratiba: Ignorant?
Nabila: Exactly! You understand that? It changed my thinking a lot. 
Ratiba: What do you find in Amr Khaled?
Nabila: His ambition. […] Yes, his ambition because he wants to reform an entire nation. 
The Muslim nation. […] Khaled for me and for many others, is like the charger. I speak 
on behalf of those who listen [to him], like me, he gives you a charge. He will recharge 
you inside. By God, yes! God bless him! […] He made arrangements in several countries. 
Because there are several… For example, in Egypt, the khemar [another name of the 
veil] is not banned, in Lebanon neither. It is only Tunisia [that it is prohibited]. And they 
say it is a Muslim country! You understand? It is a Muslim country in name alone… And 
you see, even at the university, they will not let you wear the hijab!
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The ‘Muslim nation’ extends without doubt beyond the Arab world, but in 
terms of comparison it is very strongly centred on Egyptian and Lebanese shows. 
If it is difficult to divide world outlooks into exclusive categories, it is never-
theless possible to point out that in identity configuration, the ‘regional,’ (e.g. 
the Eastern Mediterranean region) has become an important referent of youth 
identifications. This process is not strictly endogenous, especially if we consider 
Arab channels’ mimesis of European and American programmes (Kraidy 2008), 
however the referring forms need to be from the region. Indeed, it does not mat-
ter that the dances in the clips (hip hop and R&B especially) are Western. What 
matters is that they are performed by young dancers who are recognized as local 
people. These young people are from ‘our part of the world,’ despite their non-
conformity to normative behaviours. This is not the least of many paradoxes.
Conclusion
Arab satellite channels have undeniably reactivated a sense of ‘regionality’ that 
calls into question the concept of global images. It is within this very frame that 
Arab satellites television reaffirms Maghrebi audiences’ affiliation to their Arabic 
roots and culture. How does this appropriation occur? What does it allow us to 
understand in terms of Maghrebi identity affiliations and political culture? These 
are the central questions that the present chapter has addressed in a field that is 
vast, controversial and open. 
It is presumptuous to think that the advent of Arab satellite television has com-
pletely changed the spectrum of the identifications of Maghrebians to Arabe ness 
and Islam. This would be a terrible blindness to the historical reality that binds 
the Maghreb to the Arab and Islamic worlds. Similarly, it is methodologically dif-
ficult to assert any strong causal relationship between media content and identity 
affiliations. Yet, in this chapter, I have shown that the unprecedented exposure of 
Maghrebi audiences to the images broadcast by the Arab satellite channels has 
produced a new awareness of Islamness and Arabness, along with new ways of 
thinking about the self and the collective. The fact that it is no longer the enemy, 
for example, a colonial power, who dissects the information and interprets it for 
them, or shows ‘negative’ or ‘distorted’ images of themselves. Now, Arab satellite 
television enables not only an indigenous creativity of the Self, but it also helps 
to shape the parameters of being Muslim and/or Arab. Needless to say, these 
parameters vary according to the subject matter and the actors that are involved 
(e.g. an admirer of Amr Khaled could also like and apply the teachings of the 
more conservative Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi and wear, if she is a female, a very 
trendy hijab or a combination of what a Moroccan participants to this research 
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called the ‘Nancy Ajram sister’). While religious channels have had an impact on 
religious practices, as shown in the audience ‘awakening’ to Islam (see especially 
Nabila’s case), its major effect is the public visibilization of the social arena. 
References
Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities. London and New York: Verso. 
Abu-Lughod, L. 2005. Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Barthes, R. 1981. Le grain de la voix, Paris: Seuil. 
Benbelgacem, H. 1999. Les journaux télévisés et leur public en Tunisie: une étude 
sociologique. 2 vols., unpublished thesis. Paris: University Paris II-Assas. 
Bayart, J. F. 1996. L’illusion identitaire. Paris: Fayard. 
Bendris, N. 2005. Représentations sociales, ethnicité et stratégies identitaires: Le 
cas des femmes arabes du Québec. Unpublished thesis. Montreal: University 
of Montreal. 
Benkheira, M. H. 1997. L’Amour de la Loi. Essai sur la normalité en islam. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France.
Berque, J. 1967. Les Arabes d’hier et de demain. Paris: Seuil.
Carré, O. 1996. Le nationalisme arabe. Paris: Payot & Rivages. 
Cesari, J. 1998. Musulmans et républicains: Les jeunes, l’islam et la France. Brus-
sels: Editions Complexe. 
Choueiri, Y. M. 2000. Arab Nationalism. A History. Oxford and Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Chouikha L. 1995. ‘Le patrimoine familial dans le Ramadhan ‘télévisuel’: Le cas 
des familles ‘modernes’ de Tunis.’ Communications, 16, 2: 105–130. 
Dakhlia, J. 2005. Islamicités. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 
Deleuze G. and F. Guattari. 1980. Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme et Schizophrénie. 
Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.
Douai, A. 2010. ‘Media Research in the Arab World and the Audience Challenge: 
Lessons From the Field.’ Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research 3, 1–2: 
77–88. 
Dubet, F. 1994. Sociologie de l’expérience. Paris: Seuil. 
92 Ratiba Hadj-Moussa
Durkheim, E. 2003. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Presses uni-
versitaires de France.
Eickelman D. F. and J. Anderson. 1997. ‘Print, Islam and the Prospects for Civic 
Pluralism: New Religious Writings and their Audiences.’ Journal of Islamic 
Studies 1: 43–62.
Goffman, E.(1991), Les cadres de l’expérience, Paris: Éd. de Minuit. 
Hadj-Moussa, R. 1996. ‘Les antennes célestes, les émirs-apparatchiks et le peuple: 
L’espace public en question.’ Anthropologie et Sociétés 20, 2: 129–55.
—2003. ‘New Media, Community and Politics in Algeria.’ Media, Culture and So-
ciety 25, 4: 451–468.
—2011. ‘Riots in the Maghreb: The Web and The Revolt Without Qualities.’ Avail-
able at http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Re 
search/InternationalTransnationalRelations/MediterraneanProgramme/MRM/
MRM2011/ws05.aspx
Hall, S. 1991. ‘Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities.’ In A. King (ed.) 
Culture, Globalization and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the 
Representations of Identity. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Hourani, A. 1993. Histoire des peuples arabes. Paris: Points.
Hirschkind C. 2006. The Ethical Soundscape. Cassette Sermons and Islamic Coun-
terpublics. New York: Columbia University Press.
James, L. M. 2006. ‘Whose Voice? Nasser, the Arabs, an ‘Sawt al-Arab’ Radio.’ TBS 
16. Online. Available at http://www.tbsjournal.com/James.html (accessed 4 
January, 2010).
Khraidy, M. M. 2008. ‘Reality TV and Multiple Arab Modernity. A Theoretical 
Exploration.’ Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 1: 49–59.
Kraidy, M.-M., J. O. Khalil. (2009), Arab Television Industry. Houndmills, Basing-
stoke: Palgrave & MacMillan. 
Lamloum, O. 2004. El-Jazira, miroir rebelle et ambigu du monde arabe. Paris: La 
Découverte. 
Lynch, M. 2006. Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, al-Jazeera, and Middle East 
Politics Today. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mankekar, P. 1999. Screening Culture, Viewing Politics: An Ethnography of Televi-
sion, Womanhood, and Nation in Postcolonial India. Durham & London: Duke 
University Press.
 Maghrebi audiences 93
Mellor, N., M. Ayysih, N. Djadni, and K. Rinnawi. (eds.). 2011. Arab Media. Cam-
bridge and Malden: Polity Press. 
Mermier, F. 2005. Le livre et la ville. Beyrouth et l’édition arabe. Arles: Actes Sud/
Sindbad.
Mostefaoui, B. 1995. La télévision française au Maghreb. Structures, stratégies et 
enjeux. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Moussaoui A. 2006. De la Violence en Algérie. Les lois du chaos. Arles: Éditions 
Actes Sud & Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l’Homme.
Poindexter, M. 1991. ‘ Subscription Television in the Third World: The Moroccan 
Experience.’ Journal of Communications 41: 26–39.
Rancière, Jacques. 2000. Le Partage du Sensible. Esthétique et Politique. Paris: La 
Fabrique.
Roussillon, A. 1992. ‘Égyptianité, arabité, islamité : la recomposition des référents 
identitaires.’ Égypte Monde arabe Première série 11. Online. Available at http://
ema.revues.org/index316.html (accessed 31 March, 2010). 
Sabry, T. 2010. ‘ Modernness as a Multiple Narrative Category: Encountering the 
West.’ In T. Sabry Cultural Encounters in the Arab world. On media, the Modern 
and the Everyday. London: Taurus. 
Salamandra, C. 2005. ‘Television and the Ethnographic Endeavor: The Case of 
Syrian Drama.’ Transnational Broadcasting Studies 14: 1–22. 
Scott, J.W. 1991. ‘The evidence of Experience.’ Critical Inquiry 114, 4: 773–799. 
Taylor, C. 2001. ‘Modernity and Identity.’ In J. W. Scott and D. Keates (eds.) Schools 
of Thought. Twenty-Five Years of Interpretative Social Science. Princeton & 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 

Noha Mellor
Religious media as a cultural discourse: The 
views of the Arab diaspora in London
Introduction
This chapter aims to contribute to the debate surrounding media as a cultural 
practice, focusing on Islamic channels and how they might contribute to enforc-
ing the cultural identity of a selected sample of Arab diaspora in London. The 
term diaspora here is not a term that can be applied to any dispersed population 
who may be bound by the same ethnic identity. Rather, diaspora can denote a 
process that binds several communities around the world who engage in build-
ing an imagined community based on their ethnic or religious identity (see e.g. 
Brubaker 2005; Cohen 1997). This process of building a certain diasporan iden-
tity is communicated through debates about the characteristics of this identity 
and what it means for these communities across the world. Diaspora can be de-
fined as ‘any minority community within a multi-ethnic polity’ and this com-
munity seeks ‘to reproduce inter-generationally a sense of identification within 
this group…Diaspora suggests a commitment to maintaining a sense of roots 
that lie outside of the country where one lives’ (Cheng and Katz 1998:72). Thus, 
diaspora is usually seen to rest on two coordinates: homeland orientation and 
boundary maintenance (Brubaker 2005). Muslim communities provide a good 
case in point in analysing diaspora communities of Muslims scattered all over 
the world, who are bound by one religious identity. 
Media here plays a crucial role in articulating this identity through the sub-
jective narratives of members of these communities. In these narratives, subjects 
engage in the process of (re-)identifying their own cultural boundaries vis-á-vis 
other cultural groups in their host societies (see e.g. Hall 1990). In so doing, they 
enforce a collective identity with their homelands by invoking memories of com-
mon history and geography in their cultural practices, such as consumption of 
ethnic and transnational media. Such media can indeed provide alternatives to 
mainstream media (see e.g. Ahmed 2003) while facilitating new venues to dis-
cuss identity and belonging. For instance, Chong examines the relation between 
religion and ethnic identity and argues that this relationship has not always been 
clear; religion can be ancillary to ethnic identity while serving ethical and le-
gitimating functions (1998: 264–265). In addition, recent scholarly analyses of 
the proliferation of Islamic media, whether on satellite or digital media, such 
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as Salvatore and Eickelman (2006) and Eickelman (1999), argue that the pre-
sent times witness a new Islamic public sphere characterised by its open debates 
through the use of new media including the Internet. In particular, Salvatore 
and Eickelman define the Islamic public sphere as ‘public Islam,’ where Muslims 
scholars and intellectuals can engage in open debates and discussions about is-
sues of common interest (2006). Indeed, the Internet technology has contributed 
to enforcing this conceptualisation of Muslim public sphere, particularly on the 
Internet. Gary Bunt, for instance describers this space as digital umma, refer-
ring on particular to the Muslim community debate online (2000: 17). Although 
this openness should reflect the egalitarian status of participants in this dialogue 
whose aim is to seek consensus on what is good for the whole umma [nation], 
it is by no means given that the Habermasian (western) concepts of dialogue 
and consensus, let alone common good, can be applied wholesale on the diverse 
Muslim populations spread across several continents around the world. These 
concepts are rather fluid and dynamic, i.e. what can be characterised as ‘common 
good’ may change through times and continuous debates (El-Nawway & Khamis 
2010: 233). Peter Mandaville also argues that the Muslim umma has emerged as 
a re-imagined community where members engage in discussion through me-
diated communication across geographical boundaries. But he also argues that 
‘we need to understand these media as spaces of communication in which the 
identity, meaning and boundaries of diasporic community are continually con-
structed, debated and reimagined’ (Mandaville 2001: 169). 
Indeed, the analysis of the communication, facilitated by this technology, can 
also reveal the diverse needs and demands of these audiences. For instance, it is 
by no means given that Arab Muslim audiences in the diaspora share the same 
concerns, problems and demands of Arab Muslims within the Arab region, yet 
recent scholarship does not give enough scrutiny to such comparative approach-
es analysing the voices and topics in this virtual sphere. The aim of this chapter 
is to demonstrate this difference through an exploratory study among a selected 
sample of young Arabs in London by focusing on their views about religious 
programming. 
In the following, I argue that Arab-Muslim communities in London consti-
tute unique diasporan communities that seek to foreground their multicultural 
identity, which serves a two-fold role: it helps enforce virtual boundaries between 
those Arabs and other ethnic Muslim communities in London while accentuat-
ing the difference between their unique situational contexts (in Britain) vis-á-vis 
other Arabs within the Arab region. 
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In line with Hoover (2006), I argue that media here constitute spaces of cul-
tural and social practices integrated in the cultural discourse, and as such, cul-
tural identity is not just a variable separate from religion. Instead, cultural iden-
tity is the sum of the interaction between media and religion. Because Islam as 
a religion is a mediated practice (see e.g. Galal 2006), it is important to analyse 
religious identity in relation to the unique surrounding social and cultural con-
text of the audience. I begin by defining the concept of audiences, before I discuss 
this case study.
Diaspora audiences joining the umma
Audience as a word denotes a collective mass of receivers, although it is more 
fruitful to acknowledge the diversity and fragmentation of media audiences 
(McQuail 1997). Several scholars (e.g. Moores 1993) enforce the latter allusion, 
arguing for analysing audiences in the plural based on the diversity of their 
socio-cultural positioning. In his overview of audience studies, Webster divides 
this body of literature into three models according to the definition of audience, 
namely audience as mass, as outcome and as agent (1998). Seeing audience as 
mass is more about patterns of consumption than the interpretation of this par-
ticular consumption. Clearly, such a model undermines the heterogeneity of 
audiences, not to mention its connotation of audiences’ passivity. The second 
model sees audience as an outcome and is concerned with the effect of media 
on people, while the third model scrutinises people’s use of media and how they 
freely interpret media texts. 
There is also a range of studies that cannot be neatly categorised in these three 
models and are instead based on a creative combination of these models. Other 
scholars, however, problematize the simple definition of media, including dias-
pora, as addressing mass audiences across different geographical spaces. For in-
stance, Abercrombie and Longhurst suggest the concept of ‘diffused’ audiences to 
denote the new category of audiences who no longer share a ‘mass’ experience 
consumed in domestic surroundings, e.g. living rooms (1998). Rather, audiences 
are now likely to consume media in an individual setting such as personal com-
puters, and hence form their own personal experience as media consumers, in 
contrast to mass audiences who are exposed to a certain medium such as printed 
newspapers. Couldry develops this argument by suggesting that audiences can 
now be characterised as “extended audiences” who draw on various media in-
cluding speech and thought where boundaries are rather blurred between media 
and audiences (2005). Here, Muslim Arab communities in Britain are a case in 
point: they arrive in European cities only to find themselves grouped with other 
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ethnic groups into Muslim communities, which forms a ‘virtual reality’ which 
‘exists above all in the minds of western politicians, ‘experts’ and journalists …
[although] no one would consider immigrants to western Europe from two strict 
Catholic countries such as Poland and the Philippines as belonging to a single 
‘Christian community’’ (Bechir and Saghieh 2005). Also, Nagel and Staeheli’s 
study among selected groups of Arab youths in Britain shows a significant con-
tradiction: while the youth stress that religion is important for their identity, they 
reject the priori British categorisation of them as ‘British Muslims’ thereby equat-
ing them with other Muslim communities such as the Asian. For them, such 
categorisation is a politicized classification that glosses over inherent cultural 
and ethnic differences. And while they work hard on “validating” their own Arab 
identity, they end up validating Islam as well in an attempt to educate the British 
society about Islam (Nagel and Staeheli 2009: 6–9).
Arabs in London
There are large groups of Arab and Arabic-speaking communities living in the 
UK and different countries across the European Union. The word ‘Arab’ as an 
ethnic classification usually refers to residents whose country of birth is an Arab 
State (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestinian Territories, Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emir-
ates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq). Two other countries, however, namely Mauri-
tania and Somalia, and particularly the latter, are sometimes classified as Arab 
states due to the intelligibility of Arabic in these countries. It is also worth men-
tioning that Somalia and Mauritania have been members in the Arab League 
since the 1970s. 
According to the 2011census in the UK, the number of Arabs living in the 
UK is estimated to constitute approximately 0.5% of the total population, with 
the largest concentration in London, where 1.5% of all inhabitants come from an 
Arab background. Yet, these are not exact figures that reflect the actual number 
of the Arab community in the UK, and this is because the ethnicity census usu-
ally does not classify all ethnic groups, which makes the Arabs more inclined to 
choose between White, Black or Others (Georgiou 2002). For instance, according 
to the UK national statistics, one in ten Muslims in the UK is classified under the 
White ethnic group, e.g. those from Turkey, Cyprus and North Africa. Although 
Britain dominated large parts of the Arab world from the nineteenth century un-
til the independence of these states in the mid twentieth century, the Arab world 
was not considered part of the British Commonwealth and thus Arabs did not 
have the right to move to Britain in the same way Algerians were able to move 
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to France under the French rule (Nagel 2001: 387). Instead, Arabs migrated to 
Britain for purposes of work, trade and education. Still, their status in Britain 
remains that of ‘foreign’ nationals rather than an integrated minority (ibid.). The 
Arab influx to Britain can be dated back to the 1950s when immigrants came 
typically from Egypt and Algeria. Palestinians, Somalis and Lebanese have also 
increased in number since 1989 (Georgiou 2002). The oldest Arab communi-
ties are the Yemenis in Cardiff and the Syrians in Manchester. Increasing trade, 
moreover, attracted Yemeni and Somali labourers, in particular, to the British 
cities of Cardiff and Liverpool.
In addition, there are a large number of Arabian Gulf nationals who consider 
London an important business site. Indeed, London has become an interna-
tional centre of Arabian Gulf enterprises. Particularly since the mid 1970s with 
the oil boom in the Arabian Gulf, nationals from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) counties (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates) have chosen London both as a tourist destination but also more 
importantly as a place for investment. There are several reasons for this: the his-
toric link between the Arabian Gulf and Britain, the importance of the English 
language to the labour market in the GCC countries, the perception of the UK as 
a friend and ally to Arab states, the position of the UK as a link between Europe 
and the USA, and the increasing number of Arab immigrants in the UK (Sala-
mandra 2002). 
The extent of Arab communities’ integration in British society differs across 
age and socio-economic groups. For instance, Caroline Nagel (2002) provides 
a comprehensive study among Arab communities1 in London, dividing them 
into three types. The first type is what she called ‘middle class negotiators,’ who 
seek to show their assimilation to mainstream culture while in public spaces but 
nurture their distinct Arab identity in private spaces. In so doing, they accom-
modate for the mainstream construction of a British or English identity while 
negotiating their group identities as Arab, English and ethnic (ibid.: 274). 
The second type is referred to as Arab multiculturalists, who are mainly first-
generation Arabs, some of whom have moved to Britain as refugees. They gener-
ally belong to a lower-income group than the middle class negotiators. Unlike 
the latter group, Arab multiculturalists frame their ethnic identity within the 
discourse of multiculturalism, in an attempt to assert their Arabness as a vis-
ible minority group. In so doing, they sustain an identity ‘situated in the political 
1 It is worth noting that Nagel’s study was aimed at Arab activists, but I find her catego-
rization also relevant to the present study.
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context of the host society’ while accentuating their cultural differences vis-à-vis 
white mainstream groups (ibid.: 274). 
The third group is coined ‘young cosmopolitans,’ a group of Arabs who share 
the socio-economic status of the middle-class negotiators and enjoy a comfort-
able socio-economic background. They are also generally mobile in terms of 
education and employment. Although this particular group does not reject their 
Arab identity, they tend to distance themselves from Arab networks, preferring 
not to mingle with other Arab groups. In so doing, they do not seek to assert an 
English mainstream identity, as is the case with middle-class negotiators, because 
they still share the feeling of being generally excluded from mainstream. Instead, 
this group seeks to identify themselves as cosmopolitans or citizens of the world, 
with a home base in London. 
These communities have ample opportunities to remain connected with their 
homelands thanks to the technological leap that facilitated the use of Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) in the transmission of satellite channels. Arab com-
munities have now the choice of a few hundred free channels, not to mention 
subscription channels. One British-Iraqi expressed contentment with this new 
choice, saying: 
We used to watch only BBC TV channels. There was a scarcity in news. We got news 
about the Arab World by listening to Arab radio stations on short waves, [which] did not 
have a good reputation, except the Arabic service in the BBC World Service. We used to 
stay late in the night to listen to this channel. (Ben Moussa 2004)
There are also a few studies about Arab diasporas and their media consumption, 
primarily with news. For instance, Miladi provides an audience analysis among 
selected Arabs in Britain focusing on their viewership of al-Jazeera Arabic in 
comparison with the BBC and CNN. His main conclusion is that Arabic-speak-
ing viewers turned to al-Jazeera after 11 September, because they found it more 
credible (2006). Similarly, Matar considers the mediation of the events of 11 Sep-
tember in UK and Arab news media with focus on the Palestinians in Britain, as 
an ethno-national minority and diaspora (2006). Clearly, such analyses tend to 
see Arab diasporan communities as members of a global Arab public sphere due 
to their political interest in Arab news and hence their solidarity with the Arab 
nations. Although this literature acknowledges the complexity of generalising 
the identities of these communities, it is yet to be acknowledged that diaspora 
indeed “is constituted as much in difference and division as it in commonality 
and solidarity” (Anthias 1998: 564, emphasis in original). In other words, Arab 
transnational television here represents a new site for resistance, contestation 
and negotiation of their identities as diaspora Arabs rather than unquestionably 
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accepting the subject positions offered on TV. For instance, Arab communities 
in London are diverse in terms of their nationalities, religious orientations, reli-
gious and cultural practices and degree of integration in the British society; their 
interpretations of religious programmes are manifold rather than uniform. 
In the following sections, I present an exploratory study into these communi-
ties, focusing on a small sample of young Arab-British students (between 20–36 
years old) who study at undergraduate and postgraduate levels in London. The 
overall aim is to explore how their views of religious media may differ from the 
views of their counterparts within the Arab region.
Analysing narrative
The following analysis is based on ten interviews with young Arab university 
students in London. I have chosen the interview method based on my belief that 
we construct the world through stories and verbal interaction. As such, these in-
terviews were analysed as providing practical insights into the interviewees’ per-
ception of religious media and the way they understand, explain, and organize 
experiences (Cortazzi 1993). Thus, interviews can be analysed as discursive acts 
(Mishler 1986) in which the interviewer and interviewee are engaged in creating 
the narrative framework (Riessman 2001). 
The following sections are based on the analysis of collected interviews, where 
each interviewee was encouraged to elaborate as to how they perceive themselves 
as Arab and Muslim in Britain. I collected these narratives through semi-struc-
tured interviews with these ten young Arabs, relying on the snowball technique, 
where one contact leads to another. All interviews were conducted in Arabic and 
transcribed. The analysis is based on thematic coding of the interviews based 
on the research questions. Because the sample is rather small, I do not aim to 
generalize any themes here, but instead, I identify issues of interest for future 
studies. Interviews were analysed as samples of personal narrative, and thus a 
tool to understand people’s perspectives and perceptions (Clandinin & Connelly 
2000). As people use narratives to tell about their lives, they also use and draw on 
such narratives to make sense of the world as they perceive and experience it, or 
as Clandinin and Connelly put it, ‘Stories are the closest we can come to experi-
ence as we and others tell our experiences…is the stories people live. People live 
stories and in the telling of them reaffirm them, modify them, and create new 
ones’ (Clandinin and Connelly 1994: 415). The following sections build on my 
informants’ narratives and views of religious programming.
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The interviews were conducted between January and April 20112, with ten 
students: three of Iraqi origin, five of Egyptian origin, one Saudi citizen and one 
Jordanian citizen. The latter two informants did not have British citizenship, 
while the remaining interviewees were British citizens either by birth or natu-
ralisation. All informants were at that time enrolled in different universities in 
London, either as undergraduate or postgraduate students. In terms of age, they 
were all between 20 and 25 years old, except the two non-UK citizens who were 
postgraduate students aged between 35 and 36. Although the sample is by no 
means representative of the Arab populations (or youths) in London, it can still 
serve as an illustrative case study of this group’s sense of belonging to a virtual 
Islamic public sphere. 
Scrutinizing religious media content 
The past decade has seen an increase in the number of Islamic satellite channels 
and an equal increase in the number of young Muslim preachers using such 
channels to promote a moderate vision of Islam in an upbeat preaching style. 
These new talk shows mark a significant break from the old style preachers, who 
cited the holy Koran in white robes and preached in eloquent, classical Arabic 
while warning his audiences of the punishment in hell if they do not live by the 
Koranic texts. Two prominent preachers have claimed a vast audience inside and 
outside the region: Amr Khaled and Mo‘ez Mas‘oud. 
Amr Khaled, 48 years old, was dubbed by the Time magazine as one of the 
100 most influential people in the world. His message is of tolerance and love, or 
as he put it in one of his early lectures, ‘It would break your heart to know how 
much God loves you. No matter how sinful you are, God will forgive all if you 
repent. Isn’t it time to give up your sins?’ (quoted in Shahine 2002). Moez Ma-
soud, 33 years old, also comes from an affluent background and is conversant in 
English and life in Europe. His shows centre on messages of love and compassion 
to others including homosexuals and non-Muslims (Sullivan 2007).
When I asked my informants whether they watch talk shows such as those 
hosted by Khaled or Mas‘oud, they said that their parents usually follow religious 
broadcasting, particularly Iqraa channel, whose content was deemed as rather 
‘irrelevant’ to their particular situation as Arabs in London. Mahdi (m, 23), for 
2 Although the Arab uprisings broke up during that time, I chose not to make those 
events the main topic of the interviews. Suffice to say here that the interviewees, parti-
cularly those with Egyptian background, expressed their pride in the uprising and the 
fact that Egyptian youths were credited for it.
 Religious media as a cultural discourse 103
instance, said that he would rather spend his time attending to his university 
lectures than watching this kind of programmes. He would also rather follow the 
Arab news such as al-Jazeera, BBC Arabic and al-Arabiya than religious chan-
nels. For many of my informants, religious channels are mostly relevant dur-
ing Ramadan when families stress the importance of fasting and prayers. When 
asked about Amr Khaled’s programmes in particular, the majority of my inform-
ants expressed disengagement with these programmes and rather disengage-
ment with a preacher like Amr Khaled. Amani (f, 21) for instance, said that Amr 
Khaled’s presentation style is rather undemotivating for her to follow him:
Amr Khaled shouts a lot, and this can scare young people like me…his talk about the 
torment of the grave is also scary…I want [programmes that]…tell young people about 
the good things in Islam…that we are all going to paradise…they [youths] need to know 
God can help them be good.
Tariq (m, 23) reported that he sometimes finds the language of such programmes 
too difficult to understand, especially when the preachers cite references to Ko-
ran and Hadith that he did not learn by heart. He would rather have programmes 
in English targeting people like him in diaspora communities. Nonetheless, an 
English-speaking channel like Islam TV, broadcast from London, is not an at-
tractive option, as he affiliates it with the ‘Asian Muslims.’ Although his parents 
are fervent followers of Amr Khaled’s programmes, Tariq thinks that this preach-
ing ‘does not concern [him].’ Also, Marwa (f, 25), agreed that Islam TV is not a 
viable option although her family tunes into it in Ramadan just to know the time 
of the evening ’΄adaan’ [call for prayer]. 
Likewise, Amani (f, 21) said that her parents regularly watch Amr Khaled’s 
programmes and they would urge her to watch with them, especially when there 
is an episode about family in Islam:
I watch with them whenever there is a preach about family…it’s boring stuff for me…
and I’d usually tell them that I’d watch it online later…I don’t know why I was supposed 
to watch this…I knew all of this stuff already…I know what is right and wrong.
She also stated that she finds this type of programming rather irrelevant for 
young women like her who live in different cultural context:
They say things that are not very relevant for my life here…for example they always say 
that women should wear an ‘Abaya-like dress…maybe this is relevant in Egypt but not 
here in London…I could wear a top and jeans here [in London], and I’d still look de-
cent and no one would look at me…in some programmes, people talk about their own 
personal problems and ask for fatwa, but I cannot see how relevant these fatwas are to 
my life here.
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Moreover, Amani wishes there were programmes for people of her age; for 
her, Amr Khaled and other similar preachers address people in their 30s and 
older. Yasmine (f, 20) shared this view and recalled a programme that used to 
be broadcast on MBC (The Middle East Broadcasting Center), entitled Yalla ya 
Shabab, co-hosted the Egyptian actor Ahmed al-Fishawi with a group of young 
people:
I liked Fishawi’s programme…I felt like I learned something out of it…but I do not like 
Amr Khaled…his language is hard…and I do not like his style…why should I listen to 
someone on such channels everyday for a whole hour…I already know the difference 
between right and wrong…I do not know why my parents ever watch this boring stuff.
Similarly, Hany (m, 21) was not attracted to preachers like Amr Khaled but re-
ported seeking out younger generations such as Mustafa Husny, who present 
programmes on the Islamic channel Iqraa TV targeting young audiences. If 
given the chance, Hany said he would like to revamp those religious channels’ 
websites and make them more informative for youths in the diaspora. Marwa 
(f, 25) also saw such religious channels as a political tool: ‘I think such channels 
have political agendas and they target more people inside the region.’ 
On the other hand, the older students expressed more critical views about 
such religious media. For instance, Mohamed (m, 36) believed that some of 
these Islamic talk shows are moulded after Christian televangelists’ programmes, 
particularly in matters related to personal development and positive thinking. 
But preachers like Amr Khaled, according to Mohamed, ‘jump on the moral 
bandwagon of religion rather than religion itself ’ rather than creating a new 
programme concept that teaches Islam in relation to ‘western’ concepts such as 
socialism, racism and tolerance.
Another older student, Najat (f, 36) described the real problem in religious 
programming as the fact that audiences tend to nearly ‘sanctify’ the preachers 
on TV:
In Saudi Arabia, life is based on religion…one of my friends there holds a degree in 
Finance but does not want to work in a bank because she heard a fatwa that says it’d 
be haram for a Muslim to work in a bank….the problem is that those preachers have 
become experts in everything in life…and the audiences almost sanctify them…but I 
think they [preachers] shouldn’t be given more than they deserve…people should ask 
them about religion only…not economy, banking or politics.
Indeed, she echoes the Islam scholar Ahmed Ben Baz’ arguments, whose re-
cent statement to al-Arabiya’s flagship programme Ida´aat [Spotlights] made 
headlines in the Kingdom. Ben Baz said that the Islamic world need more in-
tellectuals than fatwa-issuers, and that right and wrong are clear in Islam, but 
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audiences tend to ask about everything in life, and television preachers may take 
advantage of this to promote themselves in fatwa-programmes (Ida´aat, episode 
aired on 18th January 2010 on al-Arabiya). This critique of religious channels 
and preachers should be seen in contrast to the views of other youths within the 
Arab region. For instance, the latter group feels that television evangelists like 
Amr Khaled and Tarek Swidan address their particular issues and sees them as 
figures that ‘are knowledgeable and humble…[and] would like to help heal the 
society’ (Karam 2007: 156). This cohort of youths within the region sees these 
programmes as having a positive influence on their lives. As expressed by an 18-
year old Emirati man, ‘some religious programmes helped me change some of 
my bad habits’ (ibid.).
In summary, this cohort negotiates and (re-)interprets the teachings of Islam 
to suite their particular demands and circumstances; this is in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Mandaville 2001: 107). This cohort of young people in London is 
critical of the linear communication in preaching styles and they offer up a new 
vision for new programmes directed at young diaspora communities, who long 
for more engaging programming when compared to youths residing in the Arab 
region. 
Muslim identity as a tool for resistance 
For Arab Muslims in Britain, it is rather difficult to strongly affiliate with existing 
Muslim networks and societies. The main reason for this is the tendency to con-
flate Muslims with ‘Asian Muslims,’ rather than seeing the nuances and diversity 
of Muslim communities in the UK (Nagel 2009: 14). In fact, Arab Muslims feel 
strongly that ethnic differences distinguish them from Asian Muslims, particu-
larly Pakistanis, in terms of both lifestyle and faith practices. As a Yemeni-British 
young man put it, ‘I’m not entirely sure I believe in what they [Asian Muslims] 
do. Every time I have a chance to talk to them about what they do, the response I 
get is not convincing to me. But I am a Muslim, a Yemeni, an Arab, and I associate 
myself with that’ (quoted in Nagel 2009: 14–15). 
For one of my informants, Mahdi (m, 23), for instance, being Muslim was not 
a criterion to use when it comes to choosing friends. He preferred to define him-
self as ‘conservative’ rather than Muslim, thereby stressing the moral aspect of his 
identity. When he first moved to London as a young boy, it was important for his 
family to surround him with Iraqi and Arab-Muslim children, but this changed 
as he grew up and moved out to live near his campus. For him, religion is the sum 
of moral values that can guide his life, such as not drinking alcohol or indulging 
in a relationship out of the wedlock. The ethnic identity of Mahdi as an Iraqi is 
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by far more pronounced in his life, his future plans, for example, include raising 
his own children as Iraqis and teaching them the Arabic language. 
For other young people, being Muslim was a fact they sought to hide rather 
than proudly boast about. For instance, Tariq (m, 23) remembered how he was 
teased during primary and secondary school by other children whose curiosity 
about Islam added to Tariq’s pressures: ‘for instance, they would ask me why I 
didn’t eat pork, and I felt like I had to answer on behalf of all Muslims.’
It is especially after the events of 11 September that young people like Tariq 
felt the pressures of being both Arabs and Muslims. This view was shared by 
Yasmine (f, 20) who lived with her family in Kent county where they had very 
few Arab neighbours:
I did not tell anyone at school that I was Muslim…because I felt other pupils were sur-
prised in the RE classes every time the teacher explained something about Islam, and 
they even said negative things…they also asked me strange things… like if those fun-
damentalists were demented…so I was not proud of my background… as I am now. 
It started to change in the high school where there were girls from diverse ethnic and 
religious backgrounds.
When Tariq and Yasmine entered the university, they found new friends of simi-
lar ethnic backgrounds and it was particularly then that they felt proud of their 
identity as Egyptians and Muslims. Both of them identify themselves as Muslims 
even if they do not pray or fast on a regular basis: ‘I do not go to mosques, but I 
still feel Muslim…I know what is right and wrong,’ said Yasmine. For them, re-
ligion is more about morals and a ‘good lifestyle’ in which they would not drink 
alcohol and refrain from promiscuity. Moreover, Tariq proudly recounted of his 
intention to raise his children as ‘Egyptian Muslims’ lest they would be ‘too west-
ernised.’ 
Indeed, both Tariq and Yasmine do not deny their British identity, preferring 
to highlight a multicultural view that reconciles their Egyptian Muslim roots 
with their British/Western life. Embracing both British and Egyptian/Muslim 
identities equips them with this strong sense of ethics and virtue and confidence 
in understanding both Western and Muslim values. 
Both male and female informants confirm their gender differences, which 
have marked them since childhood and which are now more obvious in terms 
of the degree of freedom allowed by their parents. Both Yasmine and Amany 
(both of Egyptian origin, aged 20), for instance, complained that their brothers 
seem to enjoy more freedom than they do. Their brothers could club or party late 
into the night, while their sisters could not claim the same right. Parents also do 
not pressure the boys to show religiosity in the same way they do with the girls. 
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For instance, Yasmine said, ‘I used to tell my friends that I’d pray in front of my 
mum so she could let me go out with them,’ thereby using religious practices as 
a means to gain her parents’ trust. Although her parents took a decision to live 
in a ‘non-Arab’ neighbourhood, they are still cautious about their social image as 
a conservative family, which is why Yasmine’s mum restricts Yasmine’s outings: 
‘I tried to explain to my mum that the [British] neighbours would be more sur-
prised if I didn’t leave the house than if they see me going out with my friends.’
Amany also admitted to frequently arguing with her parents because they 
overlook her brother’s negligence of his religious duties outside the house: ‘my 
brother only prays when he is at home…but when he’s out of the house, you can’t 
tell that he is Egyptian at all.’ While Yasmine had not gone so far as to adopt the 
hijab (headscarf) in order to gain her family’s trust, Amany adopted the head-
scarf at the age of 14, much to the surprise of her school mates, who made rather 
sarcastic remarks that expressed they believed she was forced by her parents to 
wear the veil. Amany insisted that she was not forced to wear it to follow her 
mother’s example, but she spoke about her extended family in Egypt and how 
proud they are of her for wearing the hijab. 
Moreover, Amany sees Islam as ‘part of her ethnic identity’:
Islam is important for my family to understand our cultures and ethics, what is haram 
and halal [wrong and right] not to stay out the night, girls should not do things, so they 
favoured me mixing with other Muslim girls. Although they allowed my brother to mix 
with English boys and come late at night, and this is a source of dispute between me 
and them.
She is proud of her Egyptian relatives’ praise, which for her symbolises her suc-
cess in embracing British and Egyptian Muslim values. In so doing, she illustrates 
successful multiculturalism that combines British values and education with the 
traditional veil. 
Macleod’s study in Egypt showed that Muslim women in the lower middle 
classes may adopt the hijab for economic and cultural reasons rather than for 
religious or political motivations (1991). For instance, wearing the hijab may 
mean that women spend less on doing their hair or buying fashionable clothes. 
For others, it can mean avoiding sexual harassment in public spaces. Thus, the 
meaning Muslim women attach to the hijab, or any religious practice for that 
matter, is a multifaceted act resulting from each woman’s particular social and 
cultural surroundings. Macleod also argues that these women’s choices regarding 
adopting the hijab indicate their active negotiations of rigid dichotomies such as 
religious and cultural, or public and private. Likewise, Arab-Muslim women in 
London may engage in similar negotiations and challenges. Arab-British women 
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may choose the hijab as a symbol of their rebellion or disagreement with western 
(foreign) policies. In this case, the veil can be a decision that can be taken rather 
abruptly to express this disagreement, e.g. following news about the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict (Nagel and Staeheli 2009: 12–13), or it can be an interactive 
tool of political commentary (Tarlo 2010: 41). 
In summary, this cohort has strong perception of prejudice in London, due 
to their ethnic identity as Arabs particularly in the post 9/11 era. This awareness 
began early in primary and secondary school, but seems to have shifted during 
their university years partly because of the multicultural nature of London uni-
versities and partly because they began to surround themselves with likeminded 
young Arabs. Nonetheless, this perception confirms their feeling of being notice-
ably distinct from native (white) Brits – hence their passionate plan to pass on 
the Arabic language and Islamic teachings to their children.
Religion as cultural practice
For my informants, being Muslim is not only a religious matter but also, or 
more importantly, a cultural issue. They define their religious identity through 
their national identity and in so doing conflate the religious with the cultural 
practices and values. Some of them, however, are aware of the distinction be-
tween religious and cultural practices, such as Mahdi, who deliberately avoid 
social gatherings with Arab youths who appear to be ‘very religious’ as he called 
them: 
I don’t want [them] to tell me I should pray and fast…they have to realise that other 
Muslims and non-Muslims are also fine people…they are like the old generation who 
kept telling us that we ‘the best nation to have been raised up for humankind.’
Mahdi prefers to cling to a multicultural identity to define himself and he also 
would rather call himself conservative than religious referring to his respect of 
Iraqi values and traditions, not necessarily of the Koran and Hadith. He spoke 
fervently about the need to adopt a sense of multiculturalism in London that 
does not favour certain religions or racial backgrounds but sees diversity as en-
riching. 
By seeing religion as part of their ethnic identity, my informants clearly distin-
guish themselves from other Muslim youths in London, such as Asian Muslims, 
or as Mohamed put it:
We do not belong to the same tribe or culture, we share religion but it is not enough to 
classify us as one group…I would rather identify myself as Arab…they [Asian Muslims] 
are different…even their way of practising Islam is quite different from the Arabs. 
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Moreover, Mohamed (m, 35) equated religion with ethics:
Religion teaches me about ethics…like fasting to feel with the poor….it can relieve you 
from depression…it can make you live at peace…give you good ethical standards…so 
we shouldn’t lie or cheat.
Likewise, Yasmine does not necessarily pray five times a day or fast all Rama-
dan, but she still described herself as a practising Muslim because she knows the 
‘basics’:
I know the basics, like we should not drink wine, no sex out of wedlock and so on, so I 
don’t need someone [Amr Khaled] to tell me how to become Muslim.
Also, Marwa (f, 25) reported praying daily and fasting during Ramadan, but she 
does not wear the veil and she does not like attending Shiite gatherings. She also 
deliberately chooses not to mingle with other Iraqi girls, especially those who 
wear the veil just to make their patents happy:
I think I am responsible girl and this proves my religiosity more than wearing the veil. I 
know what’s right from wrong…. they [Iraqi veiled girls] make sarcastic comments if I 
tell them that I’m going home early…they’d sarcastically say, ‘really? Are you going home 
or somewhere else?’ if I wore the veil, they’d not tell me this stuff.
Thus, Marwa, like Yasmine and Mahdi, prefers to cling to a multicultural identity 
to justify her unease in mixing with other Arab nationals or with other religious 
factions, e.g. Sunni Iraqis.
For Hany (m, 23), religion is important ‘to go to paradise’, as if it is a criterion 
one needs to fulfil rather than an integral part of his identity. Yet, he noticed 
that many of his peers exaggerate their religious practices compared to Mus-
lim youths in his native Egypt; for instance, he recalled one of his friends who 
changed his lifestyle rather radically by praying daily and refusing to shake hands 
with girls or join social gatherings. For Hany, this is because of the parents’ failure 
to specify his friend’s ethnic and national identity at fairly young age. A similar 
example was cited by Mohamed (m, 35): 
[A] talented man…a graduate of the best universities in the world…but suddenly he 
quit his job and left for Egypt to learn Arabic and was very angry with his parents that 
they did not teach him when he was a child. 
The moral here is that language and ties to homeland are important ingredients 
for a balanced life in the diaspora. And it was perhaps therefore that all my in-
formants stressed the importance of learning Arabic and passing it on to their 
children. Moreover, Marwa (f, 25) saw the problem with rigid religiosity to a 
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greater degree in the second generation, who never really grew up in an Arab 
country: 
[Y]oung women here who have not lived in Iraq tend to overdo it…they wanted to make 
a point [by wearing the veil] or to prove something, but I lived in Iraq and I know it was 
not like this. 
Thus, this cohort conflates their Muslim identity with their ethnicity in that they 
see in Islam a set of core values bound to their ethnic origin, e.g. abstaining from 
alcohol or having sex out of wedlock. This is so even if they could not express 
deep knowledge about Islam beyond ’the basics’ of praying five times a day and 
fasting during Ramadan. Clinging to their religious identity may be a defensive 
response to feeling different (as non-white) in a society that may politicise Mus-
lims, regardless of their ethnicity (Nagel 2002). As such, the religious identity can 
appeal to this generation as a source of support and group empowerment. On the 
other hand, they cling to a multicultural identity in situations where they need to 
justify their unease with other Arab nationals. 
Conclusion 
In summary, religious channels may contribute to the reproduction of the cul-
tural identity of the second generation Arabs in London. This process also sup-
ports the transmission of Arab-Islamic values through the identification with 
Arab-Islamic morality and views. The above case study also illustrates the het-
erogeneity of the Islamic views, as shown in the need of some audiences to dis-
tinguish themselves from other Muslim communities in London, such as the 
Asian communities. 
Indeed, Arab communities may see their ethnicity as a tool to distinguish 
them from other Muslim communities in the diaspora, such as Asian Muslims 
in Britain. Nonetheless, it is equally important to see Arab communities as a 
complex cohort characterised by their differences rather than similarities, which 
speaks to the difficultly of grouping them under one single community or equat-
ing them with youths in the Arab region or even with youths in other European 
societies. The fact that they share the same ethnic attribution is not in itself a 
proof of any similarity (Anthias 1998: 565). For instance, Lewis illustrates this 
point in her examination of the role of religion and nation in diasporic imagi-
nation. Her study argues that Iraq Sunni women in Toronto prefer to maintain 
strong class and national ties, thereby overshadowing ties to other Muslim and 
Arab communities within Toronto (2008). 
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Moreover, this cohort of youths has been made more aware of their religious 
identity after the events of 11 September, and they conflate it with their ethnic 
identity as a tool to demarcate the differences between them and other British 
Muslims (e.g. Asians). In addition, watching religious programming makes this 
cohort aware of the fissure within Arab communities inside the Arab Region and 
the generational differences between this cohort and their parents. 
Future studies could investigate the degree of religiosity, which seems to vary 
among young Arabs, ranging from a “westernised” life-style to very conservative 
Muslim practices. Could religious media, in any format, play a role in nurtur-
ing either extreme? Recent scholarship on religious media tends to highlight the 
role of such media as a source of information about Islam, but it would be also 
fruitful to consider the role of other media genres such as TV soap operas [mus-
alsalat] as equally viable sources of such information. There is still place for more 
studies to unearth the subtle differences within the multiple layers of the Muslim 
public sphere.
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Vivian Ibrahim
Watching the history of the ‘present’: Religion 
and national identity in the Egyptian diaspora
Introduction
During the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in 2010, an Egyptian drama se-
ries or musalsal entitled al-Gama‘a [The Group] aired in Egypt and the Arab 
World focusing on the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
series, which was partially sponsored by the state-run television, was initially 
perceived by commentators to delegitimize the contemporary leadership of the 
Muslim Brotherhood while highlighting the important – if not misguided – role 
of the founder of the group Hassan al-Banna in the 1920s. The 2010 musalsal 
was set between two time periods: the first, took place in 2006, only a year after 
the Brotherhood’s gains in parliamentary elections, while the second time period 
historicised the roots of the organisation, narrating the life of the founder and its 
spiritual guide [murshid], Hasan al-Banna. Like many musalsalat [plural form of 
musalsal] before it, al-Gama‘a caused great controversy, which outlasted its 28 
episodes and the duration of Ramadan.
By 2010, the Brotherhood, an eighty-year-old organisation, had pragmatically 
negotiated a public space for itself in the political arena, despite being banned 
since 1954. The turbulent image that had dominated the Brotherhood in previ-
ous generations was slowly being eroded and under President Hosni Mubarak 
the organisation actively played an important and vibrant role in the social, 
economic and political life of Egypt (Fahmy 2002: 86–87). In the parliamentary 
elections of 1984 and 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood, though officially still a 
banned party, ran ‘independent’ candidates who won a significant percentage of 
seats. During the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood won 20 percent 
of the total number of seats, gaining 88 seats in parliament for the organisation. 
While the elections were widely dismissed as extremely fraudulent and corrupt, 
they were also a significant indicator of the potential support the Brotherhood 
could muster, should free elections take place (Blaydes 2010: 150). The elections 
positioned the Brotherhood as the largest opposition group with an unprece-
dented victory of seats. 
The series was aired approximately six months prior to the unexpected 
Egyptian uprising of 2011, which toppled Mubarak’s presidency. According to 
Berenger and Labidi, most serials tend to focus on issues relating to societal 
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problems. They argue, however, that strictly speaking, musalsalat are not social 
critiques that seek to analyse past or present failings in order to suggest brighter 
solutions for the future (2005: 90). In 2012 Muhammad Morsi, a formal mem-
ber of the Muslim Brotherhood, became the first civil president to be elected in 
Egypt under free elections. It is impossible to know how the musalsal would have 
been received had these events taken place prior to the airing of the series. This 
chapter will argue, however, that the content, format and timing of al-Gama‘a 
were all deliberately considered issues that effectively render a social critique 
of the organisation, particularly since it was aired only two months prior to the 
scheduled (and known) parliamentary elections that took place in late 2010. The 
series tackled several key themes prevalent in contemporary Egyptian society, 
including the issues of acceptable religiosity and national identity. 
At the centre of this chapter is an examination of whether, as Berenger and 
Labidi argue, soaps set the agenda for public discourse (ibid.: 90), and if so, to 
what extent. Two small diasporan groups were interviewed immediately after 
the airing of the musalsal in 2010. The case studies investigate whether religion, 
time or reasons for emigrating from Egypt played a role in their interpretation 
and engagement with the musalsal. The results highlighted that the subject mat-
ter of the series often served as a commentary for the groups’ own disaporan 
narratives. Like most other groups in society, the two groups interviewed for the 
diasporan case studies were constantly [re]positioning and [re]negotiating their 
own identities, histories and reflections on Egypt and the nation based on their 
own experiences, while also projecting their own interpretations and narrations 
on to the musalsal itself. 
Narrating the story
The musalsal is divided over two time periods, using the turbulence of mass stu-
dent arrests in 2006 to introduce viewers to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ashraf 
Helal – played by Hassan al-Radad – is the main protagonist in the contemporary 
period, a prosecutor who is unfamiliar with the Muslim Brotherhood, their aims 
and ethos. He is abruptly shaken from his sheltered upper-middle class Cairene 
haze, when he unexpectedly investigates a number of student supporters of the 
Brotherhood detained for their activities on university campuses. Amongst those 
who are arrested is Taymor ‘Abdul-Hamid Yunis – played by Karim Kassem – a 
medical student who lives in the lower socio-economic neighbourhood of al-
‘Abbasiyyah. Ashraf, who is largely unexposed to the economic realities of Cairo 
due to his fairly privileged upbringing, is shocked by testimonies from the young 
Ikhwan or Brotherhood supporters concerning why they joined. The result of 
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this is a quest led by Ashraf to search for the roots of the Brotherhood and learn 
more about its ideas and teachings. Introduced to the life of Hassan al-Banna, 
the founder of the movement, through the narrative and books of his fiancée’s 
grandfather (‘Abdullah Kassem—played by ‘Ezzat al-‘Alayli), the musalsal alter-
nates between the events of 2006 and the early years of Hassan al-Banna and the 
Brotherhood in the 1920s.
The audience is first introduced to Hassan al-Banna as a young boy in the 
idyllic countryside village of Mahmoudiyya. The young Hassan al-Banna is a 
likeable but slightly zealous character who, from early on highlights his religious 
fervour in a game of mo’miniyn wa kufar [believers and heathens]. Surveying his 
friends, he tells them that he will decide who is in each group and when chal-
lenged by the ‘heathens’ that they should swap roles after a while so that they 
too can become ‘believers’ Hassan al-Banna replies: ‘No! A mo’min [believer] can 
never become a kafir [heathen], but if a kafir becomes a mo’min then it is God’s 
will’ (Episode 4). This continued religious fervour of the young Hassan al-Banna 
is highlighted sporadically as we see him confronted with a number of situa-
tions, which range from the difficulties of obtaining a secondary education after 
leaving the traditional kuttab [religious school], to the creation of his first secret 
society (Episode 5).
A week into the musalsal, the audience are introduced to the older Hassan 
al-Banna, played by Jordanian-Palestinian actor Iyaad Nassaar, as he embarks on 
his higher education in Dar al-‘Ouloum in Cairo (Episode 7). It is at this junc-
ture that the musalsal transitions its focus from the mobilisation of the mislead 
Brotherhood youth of 2006, to Hassan al-Banna and the ideals in the formation 
of the early Brotherhood which largely takes places in rural settings. In contrast 
to the dark faced, plump and sinister Muhammad Mahdi ‘Aakef – played by 
Sami Meghawri – who was the murshid [spiritual guide] of the Brotherhood 
from 2004–2010, Hassan al-Banna of the 1920s is a handsome and well-groomed 
character, thoughtful and multi-dimensional. While the modern structure of the 
organisation is portrayed as bleak, the past is romanticised with bright natural 
cinematic landscapes. 
Following Hassan al-Banna through his journey first as a teacher in the city of 
Isma‘liyya where he formally created the Brotherhood in 1928 after preaching in 
coffee shops across the city, the audience is led through some of the early chal-
lenges that meet the organisation as it undertakes its stated role of da‘wa [spread-
ing the message]. The struggle against colonialism, funding the organisation and 
the emergence of different ideas are all battles that Hassan al-Banna needs to 
face. As the series continues, a darker side—literally and figuratively speaking—
118 Vivian Ibrahim
emerges of the Brotherhood. For instance, the audience slowly witnesses Hassan 
al-Banna’s sporadic outbreaks despite his usually calm portrayal. The actor Nas-
sar provides both serenity and yet intensity to Hassan al-Banna’s character that 
has led Lamis Gabir – the writer of another historical musalsal al-Malik Farouk 
[King Farouk] aired in 2007 – to comment: 
One moment I would watch and get infuriated at Hassan al-Banna and at other times 
I would feel sympathy, this is the role of real drama. (Masr al-Naharda 23 September 
2010) 
It is precisely this unpredictability of Hassan al-Banna’s character and his out-
bursts that make him a volatile hero/villain. This is particularly the case in the 
final few episodes where the director and writer cleverly highlight Hassan al-
Banna’s role in creating a militia/secret military wing while simultaneously insin-
uating that he was unaware of orders that were issued to assassinate key political 
figures including Prime Minister Ahmad Mahir (1888–1945), Judge Khazindar 
(d. 1948) and Prime Minister Nuqrashi (1888–1945) (Episodes 24, 25 and 27). 
Here we see the humanised, as well as semi-historicised Hassan al-Banna strug-
gle over the nature of his organisation in addition to its fight against British colo-
nialism. Al-Gama‘a ends abruptly at Episode 28 with a dejected Hassan al-Banna 
in an apartment alone, while most of the major Brotherhood members have been 
imprisoned. The closing credits point to a second series, presumably to be aired 
in Ramadan 2011, although this never materialized. 
Cultural production and telling history/ies
If one is to regard the specific historical association of radio, television and drama 
with national pedagogy – the ultimate goal being the encouragement of cultural 
literacy and information – al-Gama‘a can be viewed as an educational exercise 
in Egyptian history and contemporary society. The musalsal serves to substanti-
ate and re-assert nationalist [re]constructions of Egyptian history, in addition to 
reinforcing paradigms of social, political and religious state defined ‘norms’ in 
contemporary Egypt. In doing so, the series converged the interpretation of an 
historical moment with social myths. 
To begin with al-Gama‘a blurred the line between fiction and fact. For in-
stance, speaking on the popular evening programme Masr al-Naharda [‘Egypt 
Today’], presenter Khairy Ramadan said that: 
al-Gama‘a had entered people’s discussions and had a tangible impact as a historical 
document. (ESC TV, Masr al-Naharda 23 September 2010)
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For Khairy, the musalsal clearly served a more important role than enter-
taining the population during the month of Ramadan: it had educational value. 
Moreover, evidence that the musalsal was interpreted as a living, breathing his-
torical document, can be seen by the Brotherhood’s response. 
Gamal al-Banna, Hassan al-Banna’s youngest brother and a critical thinker on 
Islam was disappointed with the outcome, criticising the writer, Wahid Hamid, 
for an inaccurate historical portrayal of his brother (Ash 2007). Concerning the 
controversial scene of Hassan al-Banna, who repeatedly banged his head against 
his desk upon hearing of the news of the dissolution of his organisation and the 
arrest of the main party members by Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha in 1942, 
Gamal al-Banna commented, ‘this didn’t happen. Hassan al-Banna may have 
cried…but this was due to the responsibility of [being in charge of] so many 
families.’ (ibid.). Gamal al-Banna was also critical of the way that his brother’s 
philosophy and actions were portrayed, claiming that the musalsal purposely 
blurred his brothers vision of wataniyya [nationalism], siyasa [politics] and hizb 
[party], three distinct concepts and tools to serve state propaganda aims (Dream 
TV, 24 September 2010). Gamal al-Banna’s interpretation of his brother’s role in 
Egyptian history therefore firmly places Hasan al-Banna within the camp of a 
nationalist, fighting British colonialism whilst also practicing his religion. More 
broadly, the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation was also angered by the 
series, issuing a statement before al-Gama‘a had even been aired. Ahmed Seif 
al-Banna, son of the founder and active member of the Brotherhood, filed a law-
suit against scriptwriter Wahid Hamid. Ahmed claimed that as a member of the 
family and a representative of the organisation he had a legal right to view what 
would affect his father’s image as a public and historical figure (al-Youm al-Sabi‘, 
7 August 2010). 
In addition to blurring fact and fiction, the musalsal also served to reinforce 
the historical grand narrative of ‘great men,’ or at least potentially great men in 
a bygone era of Egypt under British occupation. According to John Tulloch, tel-
evision typically represents history either as nostalgia or as epiphenomenon: ‘on 
one hand, history [is the] radical other, the sealed past—a lost Eden of tradi-
tional values…on the other hand, history as utterly familiar, the banal quotidian’ 
(Tulloch 1990: 91). Indeed, Tulloch correctly argues that in addition to their spe-
cific ideological functions at particular historical moments, ‘TV histories have 
more deeply based and systematic connections with conservatism, they repro-
duce an empiricist notion of history’ (ibid.: 96). Put differently, TV histories of-
ten replicate the narrative of the politics of ‘great men,’ a romantic notion seen in 
al-Gama‘a, in which Hassan al-Banna is portrayed as a fallen and potential great 
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leader. Here television serials, and in particular their producers, betray their own 
fact ‘fetish’ analogous to the historians ‘source’ (ibid.: 97). 
Al-Gama‘a served a dual role: it was not only a historical drama but a con-
temporary commentary on Egypt in 2006, but also of the near past. Abu-Lughod 
emphasises the importance of producers and makers of musalsalat as ‘represent-
atives that define and redefine the Egyptian Nation’ (2005). Lughod has argued 
that television is a key instrument for the production of national culture. Bor-
rowing Benedict Anderson’s model of imagined communities, she states that TV 
plays an important role in the production of nations and national feelings as well 
as shaping the imaginaries (ibid.: 8). Anderson alone however does not explain 
the importance of power and hegemony and, as a result, one should also consider 
the ‘power that is used to keep citizens in line and regimes in control and the ide-
ologies that mask inequalities and force national homogeneity over deep cultural 
differences’ (ibid.: 9).
Abu-Lughod’s work makes a serious contribution to how the nation has been 
systematically defined in and by television and al-Gama‘a highlights both the 
nostalgic history of the nation, as well as the grand empiricist narratives of ‘great 
men.’ Popular television presenter Khairy Ramadan commented that ‘the mus-
alsal gave the impression that Hassan al-Banna was the single most important 
person in modern Egyptian history’ (ESC TV, Masr al-Naharda 23 September 
2010). Public media personalities, from television academics to actors focussed 
their critiques on the character of Hasan al-Banna: ‘Hasan al-Banna is equal to 
Hitler and Mussolini’ (Actor Hussein Fahmy); ‘Hasan al-Banna collaborated with 
the English against the Egyptian people’ (Nabil Zaky) and so on. 
The musalsal, while broadly discussing the contemporary political activities 
of the Brotherhood – against the main backdrop of the historical emergence 
of the religious group – links the modern political activities of the group with 
its long historical roots. It presents the complicated history of the Brotherhood 
not only as ‘fact,’ but also attributable wholly to one man, Hasan al-Banna. Thus, 
according to these interpretations, a linear historical trajectory of the Brother-
hood could be traced from the early roots of the organisation. During the month 
of Ramadan and the immediate following months, Hassan al-Banna – who had 
died over sixty years earlier – was one of the most divisive and controversial 
characters of discussion in Egypt through an ahistorical interpretation of events. 
Despite this ahistorical interpretation, programmes including musalsalat, are 
polysemic—they are capable of bearing multiple meanings for the individual 
viewer (Mullan 1997: 17). Serials vary in content and style, which are both issues 
that the audience can easily identify with, and in turn may or may not influence 
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their perspective. In the case of al-Gama‘a, the musalsal was distinguishable 
from its counterparts by its cinematic quality. For instance in an interview, Mu-
hammad Yassin, the director of the series laughed at reports that the musalsal 
only cost 15 million Egyptian pounds. Production costs for the serial aired in 
the holy month of austerity and prayer, was actually between 40 and 50 million 
Egyptian pounds – approximately 6.5–8.5 million U.S. dollars (Masry al-Youm, 
10 September 2010). This placed al-Gama‘a as one of the most expensive musal-
salat in Egyptian television history, marking Yassin’s television directorial debut. 
Appraised for its beautiful cinematic quality, the musalsal in many ways broke 
with the tradition of low quality shooting which characterised many previous 
Egyptian serials. Shot at various locations, the cinematography depicted sweep-
ing natural landscapes, which helped the musalsal communicate the importance 
of space as a symbol. Both Hassan al-Banna’s childhood and the discussions be-
tween Ashraf and ‘Abdullah during the contemporary period, were shot against 
unspoilt acres of farmland. The greenery, soil and hard-working peasants in the 
background complimented and reasserted the traditional nationalist discourses 
of early twentieth century writer Tawfik al-Hakim in ‘Awdat al-Ruh [The Return 
of the Spirit]. The novel was famed for its usage of rural setting as an allegory of 
the Egyptian nationalist spirit. In contrast, the oppressively dark and confined 
nature of the modern Brotherhood, who meet in closed quarters and dimly lit 
offices, is carefully pitched to highlight the organisation and its ethos as dark, 
foreign and often urban. 
The direct impact of this polysemic approach is that numerous genres of se-
rials, television programmes and media outlets have given audiences the tools 
to be more sophisticated and to hone their own perspectives. This is the case 
even if audiences do not consciously embrace or choose to embrace the reading 
of the programme intended by the producer. As a result, the question becomes: 
are audiences passive receptors or do they possess agency to consume, interpret 
and feign opinion? Mullan has argued that viewers often, but not always, engage 
in meaning making: ‘they do not always sit there empty minded awaiting edifi-
cation. When a viewer watches TV they do not leave their histories at the liv-
ing room door: neither do they abandon their cultural, class racial, economic or 
sexual identities’ (Mullan 1997: 18). Further classifications can be added to this 
list including the importance of religious identity, an issue that is raised continu-
ously in the musalsal. 
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Émigrés and exiles
Informal interviews were conducted with upper-middle class and/or profes-
sional Egyptians in two diasporan communities in the UK and the US during, 
and shortly after, the airing of the musalsal in 2010. Two key themes were of 
importance during the interviews: perceptions about religion and ideals of the 
nation and national identity in the musalsal. The subject matter of the series, as 
will be demonstrated, served as a commentary of the groups’ own disaporic nar-
ratives. Views on religion and on the nation varied in the two groups interviewed, 
one of which predominately Muslim and well established, the other Coptic and 
largely composed of new migrants to the US. The analysis of the case studies 
below examines whether religion, time or reasons for emigrating from Egypt 
played a role in their interpretation and engagement with the musalsal. 
In the UK, interviews were conducted with eight families (33 persons in total); 
six families were ‘practicing’ and/or considered themselves ‘cultural’ or sociologi-
cal Muslims (Kuhle 2010: 5). In addition, interviews were conducted with two 
families who were Copts. All interviewed subjects in this group were long-term 
migrants to the UK, having lived in the South of England for between twenty-five 
and forty years. Many had children who were born and raised in their adopted 
country, who were also interviewed. The serial was watched in the evenings on 
satellite television. Interviews and informal discussions were also conducted in 
the US, with a smaller and more vocal diasporan group. Conducted over a rela-
tively short time period, all of the four families (20 people) spoken to were regu-
larly practicing Copts who self-identified as the ‘true Egyptians’ and frequently 
mentioned their persecution and their former life with ‘Muslims.’ Unlike the 
UK-based group, the Coptic families in the US were more recent migrants, hav-
ing arrived over the last ten years. Due to the time differences, these individuals 
watched the musalsal in a downloaded format from the Internet or and circu-
lated the DVD to one another. All interviews were conducted in Arabic, English 
or a mixture of both languages. All names given below are pseudonyms.
These two particular diasporan groups vary from one another considerably, 
as will be discussed in more detail. These differences are not only due to their 
demographic backgrounds and length time in diaspora, but are also due to the 
ways in which both groups defined their experiences and understandings of the 
concept of ‘diaspora’. Edward Said’s distinction between exile, refugee, expatriate 
and émigré is a useful tool here in better understanding the differences of these 
two diasporan communities (Said 2000: 178). All UK interviewees, irrespective 
of religious affiliation, identified themselves as émigrés, largely due to economic, 
employment or educational purposes. Having worked in the UK for a quarter 
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of a century or longer, they all actively contributed to society via taxation to the 
state. Many vocalised their respect for the efficiency and bureaucracy of Britain, 
in contrast to their native Egypt. Several noted their opposition to the 2003 Iraq 
War and in particular their opportunity to publically protest in opposition to 
Blair’s government. For them, this served as evidence of democracy in practice. 
Here there seems to be no contradiction between being an active member and 
contributor to society and opposing the state on certain issues. This, however, 
stands in contrast to the Coptic group based in the US, who rather than viewing 
themselves as émigrés, regarded themselves as exiles. Unlike the most common 
usage of the word exile, which denotes being forced out of a country of origin 
(this is often associated with Palestinians when used in an Arab context), mem-
bers of this diasporan community articulated their chosen exile out of fear of 
religious persecution and discrimination based on practising Christianity in the 
predominately Muslim country. Only one family in the US-based group, who 
had emigrated in the early 1980s, discussed economic and employment issues 
as their reason for emigration. Interestingly, several individuals within the U.S. 
group emphasised the importance of being a ‘good citizen’ by adopting ‘civilised 
ideals’, unlike what they perceived to be the case in Egypt, which was often spo-
ken in terms of the ‘backwards East.’
Zahia Smail Salhi has argued that regardless of reasons of ‘exile,’ communities 
keep ‘an idealised image of home as a paradise they were forced to flee’ (2006: 
3). While individuals in the U.S. group did not always view Egypt as ‘paradise’, 
as the case studies reveal, they nonetheless maintained a longing for an ideal-
ised nation, even if they did not or indeed could no longer claim it to be ‘home.’ 
Emphasis on a micro-community in the diaspora is evident in both groups. This 
manifests itself most clearly during special celebrations, where a sense of belong-
ing to this artificial entity induces solidarity and consolidates the group sense 
of identity. In considering this, the following section examines some of the key 
themes of al-Gama‘a, looking at state and religion while analysing how certain 
scenes in the musalsal were interpreted by specific diasporan audiences. For both 
the British and the American groups, their own national and religious identi-
ties are constantly being scrutinised and re-negotiated in light of their diasporan 
lives, adding an additional interesting dynamic.
‘Religion is for god and the nation is for all’
If we are to accept a variation of Anderson’s model of nations as constructions of 
imagined communities, it follows then, that representations of Egypt in written, 
oral or visual format are also a product of the same process. They are imagined, 
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mythical or constructed to create a national narrative. For instance, Egyptian 
and Western historiography has portrayed the 1919 revolution as a moment of 
Egyptian national unity between religious communities against British hegemo-
ny (Al-Bishiri 1980: 133–163). Writing on the revolution, Coptic historian Milad 
Hanna argues that: ‘March 1919 instilled feelings that are prevalent in the con-
science of every Egyptian until today and these are that ‘religion is for God, and 
the nation is for all’ [as well as] the slogan ‘long live the crescent [entwined] with 
the cross’’ (Hanna 1980: 77). While the 1919 revolution is not covered in the mus-
alsal, the ongoing propagation of the nationalist myth that Egyptians in a united 
and monolithic manner put the country first and foremost above religion, and 
that Muslims, Copts and indeed Jews lived harmoniously side-by-side in Egypt, 
is a theme frequently portrayed. Consciously or not, there is a national ‘narrative 
of unity’ that is repeated by the state as well as some Egyptians. An example of 
this could be seen during the 2011 uprising when banners of the cross and cres-
cent were held in Tahrir Square. 
In an early episode of the series this narrative of unity is emphasised. A young 
Hassan al-Banna while working in his father’s watch repair shop reminds the 
viewer of the amicable relations where each religion is able to practice its faith 
freely, so long as it is clear which community one belongs to, and that one does 
not infringe on the other. Hassan al-Banna tells a man who has asked for his 
watch to be repaired to go and perform his evening prayers, after which the 
watch will be ready. The man awkwardly replies he has not performed his ablu-
tions, to which Hassan al-Banna rebukes the man and tells him that he should 
not neglect his Islamic duty. Upon finding out that the man is in fact a Copt, Has-
san al-Banna replies, ‘Why didn’t you say?! Sit down and I will put some music on 
by Daoud Hosni,’ a Jewish Musician (Episode 5). The theme of religious freedom 
of practices within the nation continues throughout al-Gama‘a, when in 1948 a 
series of bomb attacks are carried out against the Jewish populations living in 
Egypt, most notable in Harat al-Yahud [the Jewish alleyways]. This leads Prime 
Minister Nuqrashi Pasha to state: 
these are Egyptians [referring to the Jews] that are killed, go to Israel if you want a war. 
(Episode 25) 
A distinction is clearly being made between Egyptian Jews and the political real-
ity of the new Zionist state of Israel. This is the portrayal of national unity in the 
face of discord at its best. 
For Samiha and her husband, however, who have lived in the US for seven 
years, these scenes prompted a tirade of commentary explicitly highlighting 
the unlikelihood of this scenario. Instead she recalled how she as a Copt had 
 Watching the history of the ‘present’ 125
frequently faced insults in the streets during Ramadan for entering a coffee shop 
while the Muslims were fasting: 
Who are they kidding when they try to present an image of tolerance? 
When asked what Samiha meant by ‘they’, she explained ‘the makers, society, the 
Muslims,’ all three parties here are pitched as a cohesive ‘other’. Samiha, while 
aware of the role of production, which she later mentioned specifically, saw no 
reality in the scene, and no romanticisation of tolerance. More importantly, this 
scene was not interpreted as a possible scenario of a ‘by-gone era’, but instead a 
metaphor for contemporary Cairene life – one which she did not agree with. A 
recent spate of films and musalsalat in Egypt, the most famous of which is the 
2008 box office hit Hassan wa Murqus [Hassan and Marcus], starring ‘Omar 
al-Sherif and ‘Adel Imam, as a Muslim and Copt who switch places in order to 
avoid religious extremists who threaten their lives, have appeared. The final scene 
of the film is an image of Alexandria in sectarian flames as Hassan and Murqus 
walk through the city hand in hand in an image of national unity. Lina Khatib 
has argued that there is a tendency in recent discourse, be it film or rhetoric, to 
highlight ‘selective integration, celebrating the nationalism of the Copts while 
portraying Islamic fundamentalists as intolerant of people from other religions’ 
(Khatib 2006: 68). Interestingly, Hassan wa Murqus was one of the first attempts 
which places equal emphasis on both the Muslim and Coptic communities as 
responsible actors that possess agency to hate, whilst also alluding to ‘invisible 
hands.’ These non-specified entities, or ‘hands’, are often depicted as foreign – 
a theme also apparent post 2011 – and are the primary instigators of general 
intolerance. Thus, both communities according to the film’s portrayal could be 
celebrated as nationalists who, occasionally disagreed, just as brothers often do, 
but were united against the extremist invisible threat/s. Interestingly, while al-
Gama‘a invokes the importance of Jews in Egyptian national unity and memory, 
Hassan wa Murqus- which was loosely based on the 1954 play Hassan, Murqus 
wa Cohen, erases the memory by leaving Jews out. 
Examining interpretations and the theme of unity and national brotherhood, 
the UK group was quick to accept the images and interpretations revealed in al-
Gama‘a. Significantly, more than one Muslim and indeed both Coptic families 
interviewed in this group recalled a story which involved a neighbour who was 
a Copt/Muslim and who “was like a brother/sister”. As Fouad, a Copt who lives 
in the UK recalled:
[W]e lived through the heyday of Nasser – he educated us, we were schooled, we stood 
on the international stage and held our head up high, there was no difference made 
between religions. 
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Fouad’s interpretation of religious tolerance is underpinned by his own sense 
of patriotism and nationalist sentiment. At 67 years old, he asserted that he was 
a child of Nasser, the fight against imperialism and an Arab socialist. For Fouad, 
al-Gama‘a and in particular the image of communal national unity against the 
British were familiar, part of an earlier struggle which continued through a 
straight trajectory to the time of his hero Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (another ‘great 
man’). Fouad’s view as a Copt found resonance with the UK group regardless of 
faith. When asked how Fouad accounted for a very different interpretation of the 
watchmaking scene in al-Gama‘a by U.S. Copts he shrugged and replied:
[T]here is a lot of politics involved, I don’t understand the reasons. 
The mention of ‘politics’ by Fouad in relation to Samiha’s experience is worth 
noting. As Samiha claims those who had left Egypt in an earlier phase never 
saw the real suffering that Copts recently underwent. This is a reference to the 
systematic policies of discrimination that increased under Anwar al-Sadat and 
continued into the reign of Mubarak. These measures ranged from difficulties in 
gaining repair and church building permits, to attacks on the Coptic community 
(Ibrahim 2010: 175–179). In turn, many Copts, both within Egypt and abroad in 
diaspora, increasingly viewed their patriarch, the late Shenouda III (1971–2012), 
as the spiritual but also communal representative of the community. It is precise-
ly this community politics that Fouad is presumably talking about. Yet, interest-
ingly – and in contrast to the standardised historiography on communal discord 
in Egypt – discrimination also occurred under the reign of Nasser. Traction for 
the discourse of systematic discrimination only really occurred during the reign 
of Sadat and Shenouda. For Samiha, it was difficult to identify with the portrayal 
of tolerance as her own experience, one born out of the 1970s and 1980s is in 
contrast to Fouad’s romantic nationalism. Here, the storyline of al-Gama‘a in 
the interpretation of Samiha and Fouad is linked to generation, time and place 
in diaspora.
Good Islam, bad Islam 
‘Although the Egyptian state sometimes presents itself as ‘secular’, its domestic 
political strategy employs a mixture of both appropriating and excluding reli-
gious discourse’ (Armbrust 2002: 923). Evidence of this can be seen post–2011 
when Salafis benefited from the confrontation between the Mubarak regime and 
the Muslim Brotherhood. According to al-Anani and Malik, ‘To diminish the 
political and social appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime gave more 
space and venues for the Salafis to spread their views and expand their social 
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network. Moreover, Mubarak employed the political quietism of Salafism to 
counter-balance the Muslim Brotherhood’ (al-Anani and Malik 2013: 61). Tradi-
tionally many Salafi scholars prohibit revolt or rebellion against a Muslim ruler 
(Khurooj), even if he is unjust. While Salafi Islam was not being promoted in the 
case of al-Gama‘a, viewers were nonetheless presented with two extreme exam-
ples of Islam: state endorsed ‘moderate’ practice and ‘unacceptable’ Islam. 
As a result, there was no evidence of the plurality of Islamic practises and 
political Islam. For instance, early on in the series ‘Abd al-Hamid Yunis, played by 
Salah ‘Abd Allah, asks his son Taymour, the medical student who has been arrest-
ed by Amn al-Dawla [State Security Investigations Service]: ‘Why my son? What 
did we do to you to deserve this treatment? Wasn’t the house you were raised in 
Muslim?’ (Episode 3). Here, all groups interviewed expressed their emotional 
solidarity with ‘Abd al-Hamid Yunis, who from the opening scene in the mus-
alsal highlighted his ‘acceptable’ level of piety as he was portrayed reciting the 
names of Allah to himself while driving along the side of the road (Episode 1). 
For one of the Coptic interviewees, this reminded him of the Coptic folkloric 
songs evoking saints, which he regularly played in his own car. ‘Abd al-Hamid 
Yunis is portrayed as the hard-working father, humble and self-reflective, a pillar 
of his ‘Abassiyyah community with a quiet pride in his children. This image of a 
father is highlighted when Assad from London commented that ‘the man [‘Abd 
al-Hamid Yunis] is good – he performs his duty to God and his family’ in refer-
ence to the scene where we see ‘Abdul-Hamid performs his morning fajr prayers 
followed by standing in a bread queue (Episode 2). ‘Abd al-Hamid Yunis is the 
perfect head of the family. These comments stand in contrast to the startling 
scenes of young Brotherhood members who menacingly storm the university 
campus dressed in militia outfits. There is a generational gap here: ‘Abd al-Ha-
mid Yunis’s piety is traditional and peaceful; the youth are modern and vengeful, 
which was described by one interviewee in London named Assad as such: ‘the 
young are mutishadidiyn [hardliners]’. Unlike the perfect paternal character, the 
traditional embodiment of the Egyptian father, the youth do not perform their 
role as the perfect obedient and subservient child. 
This discussion of ‘good Islam’, or at least acceptable Islam, is – in addition to 
quiet piety – also linked to nationalism. Al-Gama‘a clearly portrays Egyptian Is-
lam, as a ‘moderate’ version, which does not follow a particular madhhab [school], 
but rather is an amalgamation of traditions. As a result, on several occasions Has-
san al-Banna’s relations with the Levantine scholar and Islamic reformist, Rashid 
Rida (1865–1935), a disciple of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani are highlighted. Links 
and regular citations of Hassan al-Banna’s relationship with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, later 
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to be the king of Saudi Arabia are also made. These foreign influences highlight 
the corruption of the ‘good’ Egyptian Islam, exemplified by Hassan al-Banna’s old 
teacher, the blind Shaykh Zahran who regularly checks Hassan al-Banna’s zeal-
ous streak in the early episodes. Whereas Shaykh Zahran’s Islam is portrayed in 
the village of Mahmoudiyya against the backdrop of a rural setting, the foreign 
Rashid Rida is always met in a dark office in urban Cairo. Once again, Shaykh 
Zahran, like ‘Abd al-Hamid Yunis, is portrayed as the simple but Egyptian pater-
nal figure; stern on occasion but also loving. In contrast, Rashid Rida’s character, 
which is never fully explored, represents, like his ‘menacing Islam,’ quick appear-
ances of a foreign intruder to remind the audience of a dark undertone. 
For several interviewees from the Coptic diaspora community, the links por-
trayed between Hassan al-Banna and ‘foreign Islam,’ particularly with Rashid 
Rida and the association, serves as evidence of the long-established roots of what 
the Coptic interviewee Monika termed as ‘terrorism.’ For her, a straight trajectory 
can be drawn between Hassan al-Banna’s portrayal and interactions in the 1930s, 
and the militia of 2006. All of this underlies the menacing tones of the organisa-
tion. Interestingly, when Monika is asked about her opinion of ‘Abd al-Hamid 
Yunis she, while holding sympathy of him as a father and recognising that ‘he 
seems like a nice man,’ was unable to reconcile the fact that his son was a terror-
ist. For her, Taymour’s actions were logically linked to a failure in ‘Abd al-Hamid 
Yunis’s upbringing of his son. In contrast, her interpretation of the blind Shaykh 
Zahran was one of acceptability: ‘he is a simple traditional teacher.’ For Monika, 
therefore, there is a discourse of good or acceptable Islam as much as there is a 
discourse of bad Islam. 
Conclusion
A reading of the al-Gama‘a would be very interesting in light of the Egyptian up-
risings of 25 January 2011. It is likely that the on-going demonstrations in Egypt 
and the election of a Muslim Brotherhood president in June 2012 may have con-
tributed to the failure of a second series of al-Gama‘a, materialising as expected 
during Ramadan 2011. Al-Gama‘a as both a semi-historical document, but also a 
fictitious critique of contemporary Cairene political life, cleverly navigates a tra-
jectory in which the early, legitimate and acceptable role of Hassan al-Banna and 
his piety could be linked to the nationalist cause: the struggle against the Brit-
ish. Both diasporan audiences interviewed engaged with the production, some-
times consciously as fiction but also as a commentary of their own identification 
with socio-political life in Egypt. The main themes considered – religion and 
nation – revealed some interesting tendencies throughout the diasporan 
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communities. As argued, the US-based group (all Copts) were more likely to be 
critical of national unity, while in contrast the UK subjects identified strongly 
with images of unity through tolerance. This is particularly of interest since the 
British group was not made up of one religious group but contained both Copts 
and Muslims. Thus, it is not possible to make definitive statements concerning 
religion and reaction to the musalsal. It is far more likely that time in diaspora, 
including reasons for leaving Egypt, as well as socio-economic standing, play a 
significant role in the responses. This is a notion which the American diaspora 
group largely dismissed as romanticisation. Regarding piety and acceptable lev-
els of practice, all groups identified a ‘legitimate’ Islam in contrast to that which 
was unacceptable. The clever production of dark confined spaces, offered in large 
part contempt for the practise of organised/politicised Islam, while in contrast 
unorganised or private piety was acceptable. Allusions to foreign interventions 
were keenly picked up by the U.S. group as potential ‘terrorists.’ For the two di-
asporan groups, the musalsal clearly served as a benchmark to which their own 
identities, memories and negotiations of self could be weighed against.
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Lise Paulsen Galal
Minority religion mediated:  
Contesting representation 
Introduction1 
In 2004, Baheb el-Cima [I love cinema] was screened in Egyptian cinemas as 
the first Egyptian commercially produced feature film that placed its story in a 
solely Coptic environment. Baheb el-Cima was inspired by the globally praised 
Italian movie Cinema Paradiso (1988) and with its Egyptian mainstream film 
language and its unique story, the film was likely to expect some success. How-
ever, the choice of a Coptic environment led to protests and legal proceedings. A 
Coptic priest filed a lawsuit to stop the film for ridiculing the Christian doctrine 
and Christian believers, and secular Copts protested against what they saw as a 
uniform representation of Copts as religious fundamentalists (Lindsey 2004). A 
few years later, another commercially produced film, Hassan wa Murqus ([Has-
san and Marcus]; 2008) holding a Coptic key figure was released. Contrary to 
Baheb el-Cima, it did not stir up any larger controversy among Copts despite its 
humorous depiction of Coptic religious practices, among other things. However, 
some Facebook groups called for a boycott of the film, accusing the leading actor, 
Adel Imam, for apostasy from Islam because he played – and thus embodies – a 
Christian theology professor in the film. 
In order to understand why many Copts – at least in public – did not welcome 
Baheb el-Cima in comparison to Hassan wa Murqus, I look at how the narratives 
of the films collide and become inevitable zones of struggle in the local political 
and cultural contexts related to Copts’ precarious situation. By examining the 
story in its context(s) of reception (Siapera 2010: 111), we can better understand 
how Copts use public imaginaries in negotiating identity and belonging. 
In this chapter, I will analyse the local narratives of and responses to the two 
films in order to identify contested places of minority religion and religious iden-
tities in Egyptian public. At the core of the analysis is the ascription of meaning 
to differences by the films and by the public and how these converge and create 
1 I want to thank the editor Ehab Galal, two anonymous reviewers as well as my colle-
agues Birgitta Frello and Sara Lei Sparre for valuable comments and suggestions for 
revisions. Part of this chapter’s argument has previously been published in Danish in 
the online journal Akademisk Kvarter. 
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unforeseen responses. Mediated representations of Copts in Egypt have regu-
larly led to public protests (cf. Elsässer 2010; Iskander 2012a). Thus the protests 
against Baheb el-Cima are part of ongoing negotiations of the display of religion 
and of Muslim-Copt relations in public, which has lead to what Samia Mehrez 
(2010) has defined as ‘culture wars.’ In order to examine the ascriptions of mean-
ing to differences, the chapter will proceed as follows: First, I give a short intro-
duction to the historical background on the mediations of Copts in Egyptian 
media leading to the analytical approach of regimes of representation. Second, I 
introduce the two films followed by an analysis of public responses. The analysis 
reveals how the films’ narratives of freedom conflate with narratives of the na-
tion, the minority and religion. 
From silence to noise: the place of Copts in Egyptian media
Baheb el-Cima broke the cinematic silence that until then had characterised the 
depiction of Copts in film. Despite a huge Egyptian film production of around 
2,500 movies from 1920s until the middle of 1990s, almost no movie seriously 
deals with a Coptic figure (Shafik 1998). In her book on Egyptian cinema, Shafik 
argues that Copts were represented in rather stereotypic roles until national in-
dependence in 1952. After independence they were though more or less non-
existent in Egyptian movies. For instance, representations of religious rituals, 
feasts, weddings and funerals used pictures and words from the Islamic tradition. 
Depiction of Christian religious rituals and feasts were lacking, as were mov-
ies about the Coptic history in Egypt. According to Shafik, the film Broken Im-
ages (1986), which showed an old Coptic woman’s funeral, was the first Egyptian 
movie to depict a Coptic ceremony (Shafik 1998: 25). 
The silencing of Coptic figures and traditions reflects the attempt by the state 
to create a national narrative and imagined community by promoting the idea 
of a secular and modern national citizen (Abu-Lughod 2005). When religion 
was depicted in Egyptian film and TV, it was as Muslim traditional values and 
ritual practices, which constructed an image of the Egyptian as being Muslim, 
although secular (Abu-Lughod 2005; Shafik 1998). With islamisation, the strug-
gle over religion and religious differences also became an issue of the media. 
Religious conflicts (between Muslims and between Muslims and Christians) be-
came a prevailing issue in the media due to increasing violence in the 1980s and 
beginning of 1990s (Zaki 1995). After 1994, however, when the religious conflicts 
peeked, the Mubarak government in Egypt tried to restrain controversial repre-
sentation, followed by a strategy of positively recognizing the presence of both 
Muslim and Coptic religious communities (Ibrahim 1996: 26). 
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In the new millennium, the Mubarak regime increasingly liberalised the me-
dia field. As a result, the so-called Coptic issue transformed from being taboo 
in the Egyptian public to becoming a popular topic (Elsässer 2010: 131). Fur-
thermore, film producers were encouraged to include Copts as cinematic figures 
(Abu-Lughod 2005; Mehrez 2010; Shafik 2007).2 This break with silence has re-
sulted in creating and expanding a Coptic public, as argued by Elsässer (2010: 
132). This expansion has led to negotiations of the borders of such a public; the 
contestations over Baheb el-Cima can be seen as a consequence. Contestations 
over representation prevail and are deeply embedded in dominant discourses on 
Egyptian national identity and belonging that defend a united Egyptian public. 
In her analysis of the Egyptian state-owned newspaper al-Ahram’s coverage of 
sectarian violence from 2005–2010, Elizabeth Iskander demonstrates how al-
Ahram reconstructs the Egyptian public as united through different discursive 
strategies (Iskander 2012a). These strategies are well known in constructions of 
nationalism, as displayed by Anderson (2010) and Billig (1995). First, the strat-
egy is to choose events from history that confirm the narrative of unity, such as 
the 1919 Revolution in Egypt, while leaving out the events that challenge this 
narrative. The second strategy is to blame ‘outsiders’ for any conflicts between 
Muslims and Copts by referring to their interference, effectively constructing 
a ‘true’ national ‘Us’ versus ‘the Others’. A third strategy is to point at extremists 
(versus moderates) among Muslims as well as Copts as those who ruin an oth-
erwise harmonious relationship (Iskander 2012a: 33). These strategies are also 
supported by Coptic actors, such as the Coptic-Orthodox Church, as argued by 
Galal (2012). 
The Coptic Orthodox Church has been a key player in the on-going cultural 
struggle to define Coptic faith and life. Since the late nineteenth century, this 
has mainly been a struggle between the Coptic Church and the Coptic lay peo-
ple (Carter 1986), and with the revival of the Coptic Church in the second half 
of the twentieth century, it has been the winner of the internal Coptic struggle 
(Galal 2012). Under the Mubarak regime, the social-political context with regard 
to Copts’ position was generally defined by the regime’s and the Coptic Orthodox 
Church’s shared desire for stability. It was thus in their mutual interest to play 
2 Since the beginning of the new millennium, the liberalisation of the Egyptian media 
market has especially changed TV and film production. Hence, there are now more 
private Egyptian television channels and production companies. Still, state censorship 
and different institutionalised forms limiting the freedom of speech and political op-
position are still alive (see e.g. Mehrez 2010), as the events of 25 January 2011 and 30 
June 2013 have confirmed.
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down religious conflict while emphasising sameness in nationality (Fawzi 1998; 
Hasan 2003; Ibrahim 1996). This arrangement between the state and church 
played a crucial role in Coptic identity politics and the revival of the Church, 
of which the late Coptic Orthodox pope Shenouda was the principal architect. 
Internally within the Coptic community, the key element of the revival was the 
strengthening of various religious and social practices such as Sunday schools, 
theological seminars for laypeople, Coptic language instruction, as well as the 
resurgence of monasteries – all elements that brought the individual Copt closer 
to the church. As a consequence, institutional changes also provided Copts with 
a space – or counter public – for being Christians: the Church. The successful 
institutionalisation explains why the Church has – despite the existence of other 
Coptic voices and through the state-loyal strategy – succeeded in obtaining an 
officially legitimate role of defining what it means to be Coptic, and thus how 
Copts are different from and at the same time the same as the majority of Egyp-
tians (Galal 2012). In constructing narratives on the generic Egyptianness of the 
Church and by rejecting the interference by people outside Egypt, the Church 
confirms as an overall approach the unity-discourse (ibid.). However, responses 
such as those against Baheb el-Cima also demonstrate that Copts are placed in an 
ambiguous double bind between promoting unity while at the same time using 
increasing public awareness to fight against prejudices and discrimination. As 
Elsässer argues, the liberalisation has led to acknowledgements of the problems 
that Copts face but also to increasing sectarian tensions that leave the Copts in a 
precarious situation (2010: 132). The development illustrates how global media 
pluralism has strengthened the reach, spread and movement of narratives across 
borders and diverse media. Thus, full-length versions of both Baheb el-Cima 
and Hassan wa Murqus can now be found on YouTube. The transnationality and 
transmediality (cf. Chapter one of this volume) has lead to the circulation of 
mediated narratives in unstable, multiple and unpredictable directions (cf. Rob-
ertson 1993; Hjarvard 2009). As in the case of Baheb el-Cima, which is produced 
by an independent production company (Arab Production and Distribution 
Company), global media is increasingly released, detached and less embedded 
in state or other national established cultural institutions than national media 
traditionally has been (Hjarvard 2009). The advent of pluralistic media not only 
fosters the freedom of plural representation, but also the freedom to contest and 
reject representations. Consequently, the role of the Church is increasingly being 
challenged, not only by filmmakers but also by oppositional forces among Coptic 
civil society (Rowe 2009; Soliman 2006).
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Media researcher Eugenia Siapera argues that it is constructions of difference 
– or as she phrases it, ‘differentiations’ – that make the struggle about representa-
tion a crucial aspect of globalization. As far as representations have the potential 
to produce sameness as well as difference, it is these differential representations 
that feed religious, cultural and political struggle (Siapera 2010). Both Baheb el-
Cima and Hassan wa Murqus produce sameness and differences between Mus-
lims and Copts, however very differently. In order to gain access to multiple 
constructions of differences, Siapera suggests analysing the ‘regimes of represen-
tation.’ The term is inspired by Foucault’s ‘regimes of truth,’ referring to ‘certain 
ideas and discourses with certain power structures and mechanisms which then 
sustain these as the ‘truth’’ (Siapera 2010: 131). The use of the concept ‘regime’ 
stresses its degree of regularity and power. 
In the following I will look into how different regimes of representation of 
Coptic-Muslim relations are produced and consumed in specific political and 
(inter)discursive contexts, and how mediated narratives become combat zones 
in local (and global) political and cultural contexts. While audience research to 
a large extent has privileged private and individual negotiations of identity stem-
ming from watching TV and films, I focus on the public struggle over represen-
tation and hence identity politics in contemporary Egypt. The Coptic criticism, 
regardless from which side, is a criticism of what they consider the film’s differ-
entiation of the Christian Egyptian as ‘the Other.’ I do not present a full analysis 
of the two films. Instead I highlight how the relationship between Muslims and 
Copts is presented and how Copts, on the basis of multiple difference regimes, 
are constructed and interpreted as different or/and the same. The public audi-
ence responses that are included in the analysis are from newspaper articles and 
TV debates, as well as from researchers, primarily Mehrez (2010) and Shafik 
(2007). 
Two movies, two stories about freedom
The movies Baheb el-Cima and Hassan wa Murqus are both stories about politi-
cal and religious freedom. Baheb el-Cima tells the story of a Coptic family in a 
Coptic environment in the 1960s in Cairo. Hassan wa Murqus tells the story of a 
Muslim and a Coptic family who cross each others’ paths during a time of reli-
gious radicalisation and terror threats in Egypt. Both films particularly ridicule 
and criticise religious fanatics. 
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Baheb el-Cima
The main figure in Baheb el-Cima is the six-year-old boy, Na‘im, who is deeply 
fascinated by the cinematic world. To him, movies are the entrance to a world 
with music, love, sorrow, loss, and sexuality – all things that he starts realizing are 
part of his family’s life. Na‘im lives together with his parents and sister in Shubra, 
a big and popular neighbourhood in Cairo with a large number of Christian resi-
dents and churches. By presenting its story in a realist and humoristic form, Ba-
heb el-Cima3 is inscribed in a popular and dominant tradition within Egyptian 
film production (Shafik 2007). The story of Baheb el-Cima is first and foremost a 
story about the struggle for freedom, especially the artistic freedom, but also the 
political and religious freedom. The film is also the result of increased freedom, 
since it would most likely not have been permitted to be screened in Egypt a few 
years earlier. 
The introduction to Baheb el-Cima is a kaleidoscopic view of the neighbour-
hood and the key figures of the film. The view is followed by a voice revealing 
that the film narrative, as in Cinema Paradiso, is the scriptwriter looking back on 
his childhood from adulthood. The time of the film is 1966–67 and ends with 
the defeat to Israel in 1967. The pictured memories of Na‘im, which include au-
tobiographical elements from the screenwriter’s (Hani Fawzi) life, are sweet and 
nostalgic – an interpretation of the historical past of Egypt. A key topic is that 
the family is struggling with the father’s religiosity. One of the first scenes in the 
film shows how the father threatens Na‘im with Satan and the fire of hell, because 
he is watching movies and they are according to the father haram [sinful] and 
therefore forbidden. Also the mother suffers due to the religiosity of her husband 
that makes him reject enjoying life together with his family. An example is that 
he is keeping the Coptic Orthodox fast, which according to the father means 
that he cannot have sexual relation with his wife.4 The mother is a headmaster 
at a public school, but was previously a keen painter. When by accident an art-
ist discovers her talent, he encourages her to seek freedom and leave the public 
3 Furthermore, the title of the film addresses a broader Egyptian audience, given that 
the kind of spelling is taken from Egyptian dialect instead of using the more correct 
form ‘al Cinema.’
4 The Coptic Orthodox Church is the original Church in Egypt and was established in 
the year 42. More than 90% of Egyptian Christians are Orthodox Copts. One of the 
dogmas of the Church is fasting, which means that the believer has to abstain from 
eating animal products for 210 days yearly. 
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school’s Nasserist, oppressive and patriarchal lack of imagination. They end up 
having an affair. 
Na‘im represents the child’s honest and open-minded view of the world. He 
watches his father praying and laughs at his anxious and heartfelt prayers. He 
watches people quarrelling and fighting in the Church. He watches his young 
aunt kissing her boyfriend, and he laughs again and again. On his birthday, the 
father forbids the visitors to sing the birthday song and forbids the boy to go to 
the cinema, well knowing that this is the only thing he wants. Na‘im angrily yells: 
‘kullu haga haram haram’ [everything is sinful, sinful]. Thus, free fantasy, art, and 
human relations are presented as in opposition to religion in its fanatic form as 
displayed by the father’s manner of practicing religion. 
The father abandons his way of practicing religion when he is told that he is 
seriously ill. He then takes his son to the cinema and goes with the family on 
holiday. He once again shows interest in his wife and after a short while dies 
in his home. As Shafik also argues, the film can obviously be interpreted as a 
critique of every form of religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, and hence, 
also of the increasing islamisation of Egyptian society since 1967 (2007). Those 
who worked on the movie also suggested this line of interpretation. The director, 
Osama Fawzi, emphasises that the film is not against the Christians or specific 
groups, but against extremism of any kind (El-Rashidi 2004a). 
Seen in the perspective of what film creators such as scriptwriter Hani Fawzi 
and director Osama Fawzi face in Egypt, the film may also, as also argued by 
Mehrez (2010), be seen as a critique of oppression in a much broader sense: the 
oppression of artistic and individual freedom, as well as of political, cultural, 
social and religious freedom. Hani Fawzi had previously written the film Film 
Hindi [Indian Film] released in 2003 about the friendship between a Muslim 
and a Copt and how they discovered that their friendship was more important 
to stand up for than their engagements to each of their dishonest fiancées, who 
have the same religious background as them. It took nine years to obtain permis-
sion to screen it (Mehrez 2010: 194). During these nine years, the script had gone 
through an absurd numbers of censorship committees and so many scenes had 
been removed or rewritten that not much of the original film was left. Mehrez 
argues that Baheb el-Cima might be seen as the writer’s critique of the artistic 
limitations put on Film Hindi (ibid.). Moreover, in the film, it is not only the 
religious authorities (father and Church), who are criticised. It is also the ‘father’ 
of the nation: President Nasser, the authoritarian state and any other kind of 
patriarchal authority. Na‘im literally urinates at the family doctor and later at the 
church, when he urinates on the priest and the congregation from the gallery. As 
138 Lise Paulsen Galal
for Na‘im’s father, he gets fired, after which he is interrogated and beaten up by 
the security police because he as a civil servant had tried to help a poor family. 
Thus, the father ends up becoming both religious and political disillusioned. 
Hassan wa Murqus 
In 2008, the film Hassan wa Murqus was released. Taking the title of a famous 
play first introduced in 1945 called Hassan, Murqus and Kuhein (cf. Galal 2003), 
it depicts the difficult friendship between a Muslim and a Coptic man, leav-
ing out the Jewish Kuhein in the original play.5 The film was directed by Rami 
Imam6 and is a screwball comedy with two of the most famous actors in Egypt 
as well as in the Arab world in the leading roles: Adel Imam and Omar Sharif. 
As such, it can be considered part of mainstream and commercial Egyptian film 
production. The two protagonists include a Christian theology professor (Adel 
Iman) and a faithful Muslim man (Omar Sherif), who independently of each 
other are asked to change identity due to Islamist terrorists treat against them by 
the security police. Thus the Christian Adel Iman becomes a Muslim sheikh with 
the name of Hassan, and the Muslim Omar Sherif becomes a faithful Christian 
with the name of Murqus. After various complications, they end up becoming 
neighbours in Alexandria. Since they don’t know the other man’s change of iden-
tity, they take each other’s identity as face value believing that they are both either 
Christians or Muslims. Therefore they meet each other with grand politeness, 
friendship, and they do not mind that their son and daughter become friends, 
since they also believe they are the same behind their cover. When they find out 
that ‘they are not the same,’ they start to despise and avoid each other. In the end 
they reconcile and the movie ends by the Muslim and Christian family joining 
hands walking without being hurt in the midst of a violent uprising against the 
government in the street.7 
According to screen writer Yousef Maati, one of the messages he tried to con-
vey is of love (Knell 2008). Although the movie pictures the mutual mistrust 
between Christians and Muslims, none of the parties are particularly demonised. 
Rather it is the religious fanatics who are pictured as hypocrites because they 
5 See also Ibrahim’s chapter in this volume.
6 Rami Imam is director and actor and son of Adel Imam. He also directed the TV-
serial Ayza Atgawez ([I want to marry]; 2010).
7 This was the narrative being true during the 25 January uprising in 2011 in Egypt. 
Worldwide, the media transmitted pictures of Copts and Muslims joining a common 
cause at Tahrir place.
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support national unity in public but otherwise slander each other. Muslim fanat-
ics accuse Christians of committing treason, while the Christians blame Muslims 
for discrimination. The security police are also ridiculed as incompetent and a 
danger to national unity. Since the main message of the film is national unity, and 
the conflicts are inscribed within human greed and suspicion and not in sectar-
ian strife per se, picturing the conflicts is primarily non-controversial. 
Contesting narratives of Us and Them
The lawsuits filed against Baheb el-Cima from both a Coptic priest and secular 
Copts may, as argued by Shafik (2007), be the result of an allegorical reading of 
the film. The family and the family’s way of life are interpreted by the critics as a 
stereotypical and generalised presentation of all Christian Egyptians’ way of life. 
By presenting the adultery of the mother as the result of the father’s stubborn 
and fierce observance of the fast, including his sexual abstinence, observing a re-
ligious tradition is presented as the direct catalyst for sinful behaviour. Beside the 
mother’s adultery, the more indelicate scenes provoke the critics – for instance 
where Na‘im pees from the gallery of the church and when the young lovers kiss 
in the church tower (Mehrez 2010; El-Rashidi 2004a). 
Paradoxically, the critics on one hand criticise Baheb el-Cima for presenting a 
stereotypical and generalised ‘Other.’ On the other hand, they reject the family as 
representative of all Coptic Orthodox Christians, since the marriage is atypical 
and against Orthodox doctrine because the mother is a Protestant and the father 
Coptic Orthodox. As for the more secular Copts, they criticise the film from 
the opposite perspective, rejecting the presentation of Copts being religiously 
conservative. So, while both groups criticise the film for giving the wrong picture 
of believers, Church-affiliated spokesmen condemn the lack of true belief, while 
the seculars rebuff the imagery as too religious. These groups of Copts seem to 
read the film oppositionally – that is in opposition to the dominant narrative of 
freedom presented in the film. The oppositional reading is one of three decod-
ing positions, suggested by Stuart Hall (1980), who put forward an analytical 
distinction between the dominant, the negotiating, and the oppositional decod-
ing of audiences. The oppositional reading must be examined in the context of 
minority-majority relations in Egypt to understand why the dominant position 
as in the case of Baheb el-Cima is rejected. 
The lack of Coptic protests against Hassan wa Murqus add to the understand-
ing of the potential dominant readings as well as of the influence of the context. 
A crucial aspect is how the Muslim-Coptic relationship has been defined and 
attempted to be managed by state, Church and other players. Hassan wa Murqus 
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embodies the dominant unity narrative of national brotherhood between Mus-
lims and Copts in accordance with the narratives of the most powerful players, 
the regime and the Church. Thus, Coptic religious players do not find reason to 
object. Neither the Muslim protesters challenge the dominant reading of nation-
al unity, but rather question the secular role of religion in society. To understand 
this contextual embeddedness, I suggest exploring the protests as diverse read-
ings of the two films and their convergence with other narratives. According to 
Siapera, rejections and acceptances are closely related to how the representation 
of difference and sameness is interpreted by the audience (2010). In the follow-
ing, I identify three narratives that are strongly connected with constructions of 
difference: the right to difference, the right to equality and the right to religion. 
Obviously, these three narratives are mutually connected, but the focus changes 
in accordance with displacements between them. 
The right to difference
The reason for protesting may be explained not only by resistance to the emer-
gence of new forms of representations, but also by a change in a minority’s power 
of definition. The very limited filmic representation of the Coptic minority in 
the twentieth century seemed to assign the Copt with folkloristic characteristics 
and/or depict him or her as a comical, laughable figure (Shafik 2007: 24). These 
stereotypical portrayals can be seen as stemming from a domesticated differ-
ence regime. Siapera suggests three principal strategies for media representation 
of difference emerging from majority or mainstream media: the domesticated 
difference regime, the racist difference regime, and the commercial difference 
regime (Siapera 2010: 147). The domesticated difference regime pictures differ-
ences as superficial, reassuring and not threatening to the order of things. Differ-
ences are mostly depicted as folkloristic aspects or as elements that denote same-
ness, or as unthreatening mixtures or hybrids (ibid.). The protests against Baheb 
el-Cima suggested that the opponents did not interpret the film as representing 
a domesticated difference regime, but rather a racist difference regime. The rac-
ist difference regime constructs differences as determined by essential biological 
or cultural characteristics that are unchangeable. Differences within this regime 
are a threat to the order of things, since ‘racial’ characteristics of the ‘Others’ are 
considered irrational or even violent (Siapera 2010: 147). Thus, whereas the state 
had aimed to encourage inclusive narratives, Coptic opponents saw a regime that 
constructed Copts as members of a specific group, whose religion was not only 
ascribed to the group as an essential characteristic (as criticised by liberal Copts), 
but also was demonised (as criticised by more religious opponents). Thus, while 
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the state saw the narrative about the heterogenic Egyptian population as inclu-
sion, Coptic opponents saw the story about the Christian Egyptians as exclusion, 
and consequently the basis for further suppression, dominance and misrecogni-
tion of the right to difference. 
The depicting of differences in Hassan wa Murqus subscribe to a domes-
ticated difference regime by presenting the differences between Copts and 
Muslims as a difference in faith alone. This difference is even interchangeable, 
as the switch between the Muslim and Christian figure symbolises. Moreover, 
joking over misunderstandings and mutual suspicion supports the reassuring 
reciprocity, whereas the popular stereotypical representations of Islamic fanat-
ics as laughable and idiotic repeatedly keep ‘ordinary’ believers free of charge 
(Abu-Lughod 1993; Galal 2006). Thus, differences are characterised by not be-
ing inherently dangerous for society. The lack of predominant Coptic protests 
suggests that Copts identify with this dominant decoding position. Although 
the farcical depictions could potentially be decoded as racist, these kinds of 
depicted differences did not motivate Muslim opponents to accuse the film 
actor Adel Imam of apostasy for his role in Hassan wa Murqus. They did not 
challenge the represented difference regimes as such, but insisted on the invio-
lability of religious differences. Religious differences may not be transgressed, 
not even in the embodiment of an actor. Thus, whereas the Baheb el-Cima pro-
testers challenged the representations themselves as misleading or discrimi-
nating, the Hassan wa Murqus campaigners appeared to challenge principles 
of representation as such. 
To understand the responses it is, as argued, necessary to look at the context 
for representation. Since the national revolutions in 1919 and 1952, the domi-
nant narrative about the relationship between Muslims and Copts has been one 
of national unity (Galal 2012; Iskander 2012a and 2012b). The secular and liberal 
ambitions of the regime have fed this narrative. However, with increasing islam-
isation since the 1970s, the narrative under Mubarak’s regime developed into 
statements that reflected the state’s and the Church’s shared interest in playing 
down and opposing sectarian unrest between Muslims and Copts. This strategy 
has, on one hand led, to an apparently widespread acceptance of the Church and 
Christianity as a religion. On the other hand it has made the Copts invisible and 
hence has also silenced the institutionalised exclusion and general discrimina-
tion (ibid.).8 The difference regime of domestication silences the power relations 
8 In general, it is possible to point at the following areas of discrimination of Christians 
in Egypt: lack of access to certain offices in the state administration and military; lack 
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as it has a taste for the exotic. As argued by Graham Huggan, exoticism describes 
‘a particular mode of aesthetic perception – one which renders people, objects 
and places strange even as it domesticates them, and which effectively manufac-
tures otherness even as it claims to surrender to its immanent mystery’ (Huggan 
2001: 13). Thus, exoticism is not only aesthetic, but also political. It is not only 
about strangeness, but also about familiarity. It is a symbolic system that do-
mesticates the cultural difference by inscribing it with a familiar vocabulary that 
makes the strangeness comprehensible. The curiosity that the difference arouses 
functions as ‘a decoy to disguise’ power (Huggan 2001: 14). In other words, the 
domestication of the exotic ‘Others’ involves a disregard for the context and its 
power relations. 
Elsewhere I have argued to name this strategy ‘conspiracy of silence’ because 
both parties of different reasons to some degree share an interest in silencing 
an unequal power relation (Galal 2009: 82). Not only is the recognition of dis-
crimination and marginalisation linked to a feeling of shame, but the Coptic 
Orthodox Church has also supported the national unity narrative in exchange 
for maintaining a certain degree of autonomy for itself and the Coptic commu-
nity (Galal 2009; Hasan 2003). The Church has become the official representa-
tive of the Copts vis-à-vis the state and has at the same time become as space 
for a counter-public, in which the minority has been able to practice and live 
their particular identity as Christians, while they live in the national public as 
Egyptians. Consequently, the power to define Coptic identity has been left in 
the hands of the Church, while secular and liberal Coptic voices have been mar-
ginalised. Being Coptic has been something practiced within the church, and 
as Mehrez stresses, Copts have generally been hesitant to present themselves in 
their particularities outside the church (Mehrez 2010: 192).
The success of the Coptic-Orthodox Church’s hard-won certain degree of au-
tonomy for Copts is closely related to the narrative and thus the construction of 
Copts as being different from only when it comes to religion, but the same in 
relation to national loyalty and identity. In this way, autonomy is legitimised by 
an essentialised religious identity defined by religious authorities. In this per-
spective, Baheb el-Cima’s criticism of religion is not only reprehensible because 
of its stereotyping, but also because it implicitly challenges the Church’s power 
of definition. The Church sees this power as the foundation for fairness and 
of representation in parliament; obstacles in connection to building and repairing of 
churches; and invisibility in the national curriculum as part of the Egyptian history as 
well as in the media (Fawsi 1998; Ibrahim 1996).
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tolerance between the majority and minority. The protests of religious Copts can 
therefore be understood as stemming from the division of power between state 
and Church, which during Mubarak had been promoted in the Egyptian pub-
lic. The narrative of the right to difference is inscribed by Coptic opponents in 
what could be called a specifically Egyptian form of the modern national state’s 
multiculturalism that has been supported by the state’s continuous assertion that 
Copts are an indissoluble part of the Egyptian national totality. By allowing a 
film like Baheb el-Cima, the state broke – so to speak – the conspiracy of silence. 
On one hand, Hassan wa Murqus also broke the conspiracy of silence by ad-
dressing Muslim-Coptic relations. On the other hand, however, it confirmed the 
hegemonic discourse of national unity despite all disagreements and depicted 
Copts and Muslims as facing the same challenges. The Copts were not singled 
out, as the opponents claimed was the case in Baheb el-Cima. Instead Hassan wa 
Murqus may be seen as successfully inscribing Copts as a commercial difference 
regime that embraces differences as long as they can be made into consumables. 
Differences in the commercial difference regime are seen as style and appear-
ance, which might be sold as a particular ethnic or cultural kind. But can be 
consumed by anybody (Siapera 2010: 147), as in the case of Hassan wa Murqus, 
which was seen by both Muslims and Copts. 
The Coptic criticism of Baheb el-Cima may appear paradoxical, since the film 
wanted to make visible an otherwise cinematically neglected minority. The film 
portrays a struggle for liberal ideas of freedom, including recognition of reli-
gious pluralism, hence promoting the right to difference. However, disagreement 
occurred over the right to define ‘the difference.’ Part of the Church establish-
ment did not have any intention of giving up this right; some of the liberal Copts 
saw this as their chance to maintain their rights. The internal dispute within the 
Coptic community furthermore stresses that the issue at stake is about how to 
organise differences in a multi-religious Egypt. Whereas the Church insisted on 
a multiculturalism that essentialised differences, protecting the Church’s legiti-
mate right to define ‘its essence,’ liberal Copts wanted a form of multiculturalism 
that left room for the individual to define his or her religious identity. As for 
the protesters against Hassan wa Murqus, the multiculturalism they defend is a 
multiculturalism that not only essentialised differences, but was also based on an 
extreme interpretation of Islam as constitutive for organising differences. 
The right to equality
Whereas the protesters against Hassan wa Murqus did not defend the right 
to equality, it was a vital element in the protest against Baheb el-Cima. The 
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accusations towards the actor Adel Imam in Hassan wa Murqus for apostasy 
articulated a discourse of purity and superiority of Islam over Christianity. No 
claim of equality was put forward by Muslim protesters, who rather claimed 
privileges for Muslims. The protests against Baheb el-Cima also addressed Coptic 
relations to Muslims. Thus, the religious Copts found that the film was subscrib-
ing to the global narrative of the clash and contrast between Islam and Christi-
anity, as elaborated in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (1996), which 
posits that the chief sources of conflict in the contemporary era will be cultural 
and religious reasons. While this narrative contradicts the Egyptian story of na-
tional unity and close ties between Muslims and Copts, it seems to be activated 
by suspending the conspiracy of silence. Paradoxically, loosened control in the 
media has created room for an increasing number of racist statements about 
each other’s religions (Hulsman 2010). In the eyes of the Coptic opponents, Mus-
lims – and not only the state – have not demonstrated mutual understanding 
and respect for each other’s religion. Hence, critics argue that the film’s director, 
Osama Fawzi, who is a convert from Christianity to Islam, had ‘abandoned his 
roots and adopted a staunchly anti-Christian stance’ (El-Rashidi 2004a). Char-
acteristically, the individuals behind the film were accused of aiming to deepen 
the gulf between Muslims and Christians. At the same time, this narrative was 
particular vigorous because it addressed a Western audience. Thus, another of 
the protesters’ lawyers, Gabriel, stated: 
[…] given the image it is portraying to the world. The last thing we need at this time in 
political history is a negative, and false, portrayal of sectarian relations in this part of the 
world. The director is clearly trying to stir things up in the West – to create even more 
antagonism than there already is. The West is ignorant, and would swallow this as fact in 
an instant. (El-Rashidi 2004b)
Seen from this perspective, the film appeared as an example of Muslims’ hateful 
representations of Christians. The danger of this representation was explained by 
referring to western ignorance and thus possible misplaced intervention. Conse-
quently, the narrative of religious conflict appeared double-sided. As for internal 
relations in Egypt, it was used to claim equality for Muslims and Christians alike 
when it came to religion. Vis-á-vis external relations with the West, it was used 
to emphasise the national risk of mediating such narratives. Particularly since 
the 1990s, this kind of mobilizing the risk-of-western-intervention narrative 
has been a widespread strategy among supporters of the conspiracy of silence 
as soon as specific violent clashes between Christians and Muslims have taken 
place (Galal 2009: 145). Evidently, the objection of the lawyer is embedded in the 
dominant discourses also presented by Iskander (2012a: 33), which construct 
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outsiders (the West) and extremists as the actors who potentially steer up sectar-
ian conflict. Thus, the message appears to be that Egyptian media and film should 
not feed into this. 
The right to religion
Narrating the right to difference and the right to equality inevitable converges 
with the narrative of the particular status of religion. As the Coptic lawyer, Mor-
cos Aziz, who filed the lawsuit against Baheb el-Cima on behalf of the protesters, 
stated: 
We are not against freedom but it should not be against the doctrine. This movie mocks 
the Christian doctrine (El-Rashidi 2004a). 
This idea of the exceptional position of religion is not – as in the statement given 
above – about bringing Copts into opposition to Muslims. On the contrary, ac-
cording to Mehrez, protesters tried to mobilize ‘our Muslim brothers’ against the 
film (Mehrez 2010: 204). Once again, the narrative of the religion’s inviolabil-
ity is introduced, as seen in several Egyptian court cases on literature, films or 
practices filed by both Muslims and Christians. A Muslim lawyer, Nabih Ahmed 
El-Wahsh, who supported the Coptic protesters, stated ‘even as a Muslim I don’t 
accept this movie. The slamming of any religion is wrong, and we reject it. There 
is no difference between extremism in Islam, in Christianity, in Judaism. The film 
reflects a condemnation of Christianity’ (El-Rashidi 2004b). 
The protests against Hassan wa Murqus also arose from an alleged attempt to 
protect religion, as protesters encouraged people to boycott Adel Imam, because 
‘[t]his man is promoting conversion to Christianity’ (El-Hennawy 2008). With-
out being particular articulate, they were referring to Islamic law on apostasy, 
thus maintaining the superiority of religious law (or doctrine) over practices of 
modern popular culture. In other words, the right of religion trumped the actor’s 
right to the role he was casted to play. 
This fear of transgressions in the form of Muslims becoming Christians (even 
if only as actor playing a role) or Christians becoming Muslims was also the 
reason for protests against the musalsalat [drama series] Awan al-Ward [Time of 
the Roses] that was broadcast during Ramadan in January 2000. The television 
serial was a result of the state’s encouragement to include Copts as mediated fig-
ures and presented a Coptic leading figure (Abu-Lughod 2005: 176ff). However, 
instead of creating tolerance towards diversity, a Coptic lawyer filed a case in 
order to get it prohibited, because the female main character converts into Islam 
in the end (ibid.). Since Coptic Christianity doctrine does not condemn apostasy, 
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the protest reflected the convergence between the right to difference and right to 
religion. Religious differences are not to be touched; they should stay as they are 
and people converting – even only as fictional figures – is perceived as a threat 
towards the order of things. 
In the eyes of the religious protesters, issues of human and minority rights are 
a question of the right to religion more so than the individual’s right to religious 
freedom. It is the right to establish authority or authoritative interpretations le-
gitimated by religion. 
In this context, it is crucial that the legitimacy of this claim is strengthened by 
the state surrendering the power of definition to the Church, as well as keeping 
up religious-based laws on apostasy. Moreover, the state censorship appears to 
support such claims by its reluctance to deal with these issues. All films in Egypt 
face state censorship, but when the topic refers to religion, the sensitivity of the 
censors in order to avoid public protests is bigger than when it comes to other 
subjects. For such cases, Mehrez describes how the state censorship committee 
hands over the case to a specific committee set up for the purpose of avoiding 
problems itself (Mehrez 2010: 205). The argument is that the religious question 
may create religious responses, and in the case of Baheb el-Cima, the last com-
mittee of many included religious authorities from the Coptic Church. This last 
committee, however, never came into function (ibid.). My argument is that in 
order to understand such diverse public responses to mediated representations 
of Copts and Muslim-Coptic relations, it is necessary to examine the influence 
of hegemonic discourses institutionalised by powerful institutions like the State 
and the Church. Furthermore, it is vital to look into how the same institutions 
legally or bureaucratically support protests of the kinds examined in this chapter. 
Conclusion
The portrayal of united Muslims and Christians against the backdrop of the 
country going into pieces in the end of Hassan wa Murqus is very similar to the 
images that have been broadcasted by Egyptian state television since the Egyp-
tian Revolution of 2011. Thus, hegemonic discourse is very much alive and has 
been used in particular sensitive situations to calm down conflicts. Thus videos 
celebrating a diverse and unified people were transmitted during and after the 
Maspero tragedy in October 2011 in which 28 people, among them two Copts, 
were killed in clashes between Coptic demonstrators and military in Cairo. Af-
ter the removal of the Egyptian president Morsi in July 2013, the same images 
were also in use. During this same period, violent clashes between or attacks on 
Copts have increased without any serious attempts by the state to restrain such 
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sectarian clashes. The most serious attempt has been to elect the former field 
marshal Sisi as the country’s new president in June 2014, by the support of the 
State. Consequently, it is likely that official and publically legitimate portrayals 
of the relationship between Muslims and Copts in Egypt will follow the same 
lines as previously by emphasising unity. The Maspero tragedy furthermore con-
structed one of the victims, Mina Daniel, as a victim of the people’s revolution 
and not as a victim of persecution of Copts. Thus, the tragedy was inscribed in 
the unity discourse. At the same time, however, another Coptic victim was given 
his own Facebook site in memorial. On the site, he is depicted as a Coptic martyr, 
thus associating him with other Coptic martyrs who historically have been vic-
tims of Muslim persecution. 
In addition to these examples and the two films Baheb el-Cima and Hassan 
wa Murqus illustrate how the liberalisation of media and detachment from state 
institutions invites for diversity in media use as well as media representations 
leading to negotiations of power of definition. The pivotal point for the protest 
against Babeh el-Cima was the struggle for the power to represent Egyptian cul-
tural, religious and current identity. It was definitely not only a struggle for a 
specific representation of the minority; it was also a struggle for the authority 
to represent and define. What I have tried to argue is that the Coptic opposition 
against Baheb el-Cima is not just a matter of a clash between global liberal nar-
ratives of freedom against local regressive narrative of religions. Narratives of 
difference, freedom and religion converge in the mobilisation of support from 
particular others. In this process, different pairs of differences are produced: mi-
nority versus majority, Muslim versus Christian, non-religious versus believer. 
Because of the displacements between them, the Coptic Orthodox Church is able 
to ignore that the film primarily depicts Protestant Christians when it refers to 
the clash-of-religion narrative as valid for all Christians who are victims of the 
same narrative. At the same time, within the ontological narrative of religion, 
it may claim that the marriage between protestant and orthodox Christians is 
against the doctrine and hence non-representative. 
The different narratives of difference and sameness used by the opponents are 
embedded in an on-going struggle over Egyptian identity. The filmic representa-
tion illustrates that the narrative about a culturally pluralistic Egypt does exist, 
but the extent to which this story can be told or must be silenced faces difficultly 
as long as it is considered to contest the national narrative of unity and religious 
ontological narratives. 
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